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ABSTRACT 
 
Essays on Choice and Demand Analysis of Organic and Conventional Milk in the United 
States. (December 2009) 
Pedro Aya-ay Alviola IV, B.S., University of the Philippines; M.A., University of the 
Philippines 
Chair of Advisory Committee: Dr. Oral Capps, Jr. 
 
This dissertation has four interrelated studies, namely (1) the characterization of 
milk purchase choices which included the purchase of organic milk, both organic and 
conventional milk and conventional milk only; (2) the estimation of a single-equation 
household demand function for organic and conventional milk; (3) the assessment of 
binary choice models for organic milk using the Brier Probability score and Yates 
partition, and (4) the estimation of demand systems that addresses the censoring issue 
through the use of econometric techniques.   
 In the first paper, the study utilized the estimation of both multinomial logit and 
probit models in examining a set of causal socio-demographic variables in explaining the 
purchase of three outcome milk choices namely organic milk, organic and conventional 
milk and conventional milk only. These crucial variables include income, household 
size, education level and employment of household head, race, ethnicity and region.    
Using the 2004 Nielsen Homescan Panel, the second study used the Heckman 
two-step procedure in calculating the own-price, cross-price, and income elasticities by 
 iv 
estimating the demand relationships for both organic and conventional milk. Results 
indicated that organic and conventional milk are substitutes. Also, an asymmetric pattern 
existed with regard to the substitution patterns of the respective milk types.  
Likewise, the third study showed that predictive outcomes from binary choice 
models associated with organic milk can be enhanced with the use of the Brier score 
method.  In this case, specifications omitting important socio-demographic variables 
reduced the variability of predicted probabilities and therefore limited its sorting ability.  
 The last study estimated both censored Almost Ideal Demand Systems (AIDS) 
and Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) specifications in modeling non-
alcoholic beverages. In this research, five estimation techniques were used which 
included the usage of Iterated Seemingly Unrelated Regression (ITSUR), two stage 
methods such as the Heien and Wessells (1990) and the Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) 
approaches,  Generalized Maximum Entropy and the Dong, Gould and Kaiser (2004a) 
methods. The findings of the study showed that at various censoring techniques, price 
elasticity estimates were observed to have greater variability in highly censored non-
alcoholic beverage items such as tea, coffee and bottled water.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The recent shift towards differential diet mechanisms in favor of healthier foods 
is an indicator that the typical American consumer is now highly conscious of both the 
different food items being offered in the market and its impact on nutrition and total 
wellbeing. Similarly, recent trends in supermarkets offering healthier and natural food 
choices can be seen as a reaction to rising demand for healthier foods. This rapid 
expansion in the organic food market has in effect triggered in part the increasing growth 
in the organic milk industry. 
 Why look at the organic milk and non-alcoholic beverage industry? There are 
several reasons why these markets deserve research scrutiny. First, the increasing growth 
of the organic milk market represents the current shift of healthy food items that are 
increasingly being demanded by the American consumer. Examining this particular 
market will help define profiles of consumers that are responsive and sensitive to healthy 
food choices and therefore assist in the fine tuning of policies that addresses significant 
health concerns in the United States. As well, it is important to focus on the 
interdependencies of milk with other products such as fruit juice, tea, carbonated soft 
drinks and bottled water. In this regard, the non-alcoholic beverage complex represents 
  
____________  
This dissertation follows the style of the American Journal of Agricultural Economics. 
 2 
ideal cases for testing estimation procedures that address the censoring problem in 
demand systems estimation. 
 With varying levels of censoring, we are in position to evaluate the performance 
of several cutting edge estimators. Thus, this dissertation will contribute towards a 
clearer picture of how choices are made with regards to healthy alternative foods such as 
organic milk and shed some light on the existing debate on the appropriate estimator to 
use in estimating censored demand systems. 
Organization of the Dissertation 
Chapter II begins the study by looking at the possible household choice 
determinants of three milk choice outcomes, namely: organic milk and conventional 
milk, organic milk only and conventional milk only. This was achieved through the use 
of both multinomial logit and probit models. On the other hand, Chapter III estimated a 
two-stage model, namely the use of a probit model in the first stage to account for 
selection bias, and then incorporating it in the second stage, where the calculation of 
price and income elasticity coefficients was done by estimating demand equations for 
both organic and non-organic milk. In Chapter IV, the extensive use of discrete choice 
models in the research led naturally to the examination of the quality of predicted 
probabilities. This chapter assessed the prediction probabilities of fundamental discrete 
choice models, namely the linear probability model, the logit and probit models by 
probability scoring techniques such as the Brier Probability Scoring Method and Yates 
partition. On the other hand, Chapter V estimated a micro-demand system of the non-
alcoholic beverages that included conventional milk of which varying levels of data 
 3 
censoring were observed. The central theme of this chapter looked at various methods of 
estimating censored demand system that have been recently proposed in the literature 
and made comparative analysis of each estimation technique. Finally, in Chapter VI we 
summarize the findings of the essays and provide recommendations and key points for 
future research efforts. 
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CHAPTER II 
EXAMINING THE FACTORS AFFECTING HOUSEHOLD PURCHASE OF 
ORGANIC AND CONVENTIONAL FLUID MILK IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
In recent years, the fluid milk industry has undergone several notable changes. In 
the past, fluid milk consumers have looked at fat content levels (Gould, 1996) as an 
indicator that product choices can be available to support healthy dietary lifestyles. US 
consumers are now highly conscious of the different food items offered in the 
marketplace and their impact on nutrition and total well-being. With advances in 
biotechnology, conventional milk production has increased because growth hormones 
such as the recombinant bovine somatotropin (rBST) have been widely available to the 
dairy industry. However, despite scientific claims that rBST milk is safe for human 
consumption, the public perception has been to oppose its introduction and demand other 
forms of milk variants that are labeled rBST free. Unlike other dairy milk products that 
arose due to the controversies of the rBST milk dilemma, the organic fluid milk industry 
has been steadily rising with minimal influence from any coalitional networks. In fact, 
DuPuis (2000) argued that the industry’s increasing market shares were due to the 
acceptance of mainstream consumers who saw organic milk as a viable alternative in 
meeting their changing taste and preferences. Also, the industry was characterized as 
flexible in terms of catering to those changing needs.            
According to Dimitri and Venezia (2007), US sales of organic milk have been 
steadily rising by about 25 percent from the 1990’s up until 2004. This growth was 
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largely driven by the increasing market sales of the organic food market. Dimitri and 
Greene (2002) and Li et al. (2007) opined that consumer acceptance of organic food was 
largely driven on the grounds that it was a pesticide-free product.  Furthermore, the 
organic milk industry has gained wider distribution from large retail chains such as 
Costco and Wal-Mart, thus boosting its product exposure in the market (Thompson, 
1998; Dimitri and Venezia, 2007). In addition, dairy producers switched from 
conventional milk production to organic operations in response to opportunities created 
through the rightward shift in demand for organic milk. Thus, given these developments, 
organic milk sales have been increasing ever since starting in the early 1990s, while 
sales of conventional milk have been relatively constant during this time span (Miller 
and Blayney, 2006). 
There have been previous studies concerning the demand interplay between 
organic and conventional milk. Several studies including Glaser and Thompson (2000), 
Dhar and Foltz (2005) and Alviola and Capps (2009) revealed that organic and 
conventional milk are substitutes and that there exist significant differential responses 
with regard to cross-price effects. These works dealt with the purchased quantities of 
organic and conventional milk. On the other hand, studies that examine the factors that 
drive the decision to buy organic and conventional milk have been limited. Dimitri and 
Venezia (2007) and Alviola and Capps (2009) examined the factors that affect the binary 
choice decision of buying organic and conventional milk at the household level. 
However, one can extend the dichotomous choice model to a polychotomous model 
because households may purchase organic milk only, conventional milk only or both 
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organic and conventional milk conditional on the decision to purchase milk in the first 
place.       
Thus, the objective is to characterize consumer buying behavior with respect to 
the three aforementioned milk purchase choices. In particular, we wish to identify and 
assess household characteristics that drive each of these types of milk purchases. In this 
way, we add to the literature by carrying out an extension of what had been previously 
undertaken regarding the purchase of organic and conventional milk.       
Literature Review 
Past studies regarding choice models that deal with organic and conventional 
milk have been instrumental in understanding the underlying factors that influence the 
purchase of both milk types. For example Hill and Lynchehaun (2002) cited various 
socio-demographic factors that affect the buying of organic milk. These factors included 
personal values, attitudes, age, and ethnicity, presence of children, education, 
advertising, taste, packaging quality, food scares, prices and income. Similarly Dimitri 
and Venezia (2007) presented a descriptive analysis of organic milk users based on 
analysis of Nielsen Homescan data for calendar year 2004. Their findings indicated that 
the typical organic milk consumer was white, highly educated and less than 50 years old.  
Also, organic milk users were generally Orientals and Hispanic. However, their analysis 
was based on descriptive statistics, and no formal statistical analysis was conducted. 
 Alviola and Capps (2009) utilized a probit model in characterizing the household 
choice between organic and conventional milk. The source of data was also the 2004 
Nielsen Homescan panel. They concluded that households likely to purchase organic 
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milk were single person, affluent, highly educated, located in the west region, black, 
oriental, Hispanic and have no children. However, the major limitation of their study is 
that the choice outcome is limited to two (organic versus conventional milk) when in 
fact these outcomes can extend beyond binary choices. 
 Using the same data set as that of Dimitri and Venezia (2007) and Alviola and 
Capps (2009), McKnight (2007) looked at households that purchased organic milk and 
utilized cluster analysis to differentiate choices between organic milk and conventional 
milk. The key variable in this analysis was the percentage share of organic milk purchase 
to total fluid milk purchase. This choice partitioning then was used to construct a 
multinomial logit model with household socio-demographic variables as choice drivers. 
The findings indicated that households small in size with well educated household heads 
were more likely to purchase organic milk. The limitations of the study were twofold: 
(1) since the choice outcome variable was characterized as percentage of organic milk 
purchase to total fluid milk purchase, it ignored the interplay of choices between organic 
milk and conventional milk; (2) choices were assumed to be independent, ignoring the 
possibility that both organic milk and conventional milk choices might be related.           
Methodology 
In the literature, the use of multinomial models has been widespread with 
multinomial logit models dominating over probit models due to the ease of estimation. 
Starting with the work of McFadden (1978), Dubin and McFadden (1984) and more 
recently Train (2003), improvements on the multinomial logit model continuously have 
been refined. The inherent tractability of this model particularly in applied work in 
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agricultural markets and commodities has been well received (Vergara et al., 2004). 
However the tractability of the multinomial logit model comes with a cost, in that it 
assumes the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The fallout of this assumption 
is the constancy of choice odds even as the number of alternative choices increases.  
With the use of multinomial probit models, on the other hand, the IIA assumption is 
relaxed.  
With the pioneering work of Hausman and Wise (1978), applications of the 
multinomial probit model have been employed in various fields such as political science, 
especially in  voter choice of candidates (Dow and Endersby, 2004; Alvarez and 
Nagler,1994), likelihood of completing high school and college education (Jepsen, 
2008), transportation and brand choice (Nobile, Bhat and Pas, 1996 and Hrushka, 2007) 
and farming adoption decisions resulting in availability of multiple technology 
(Dorfman, 1996). However, if the number of choice alternatives exceeds four, the 
practicality of the use of the multinomial choice models diminishes due to mathematical 
complexity. The current thrust on workable solutions with regard to overcoming this 
formidable intractability has been the usage and refinement of numerical methods 
(Train, 2003; Weeks, 1997; Breslaw, 2002 and Bunch, 1991) in achieving solution 
convergence. Despite the advances in this field, some researchers particularly Maddala 
(1983) questioned the extra computational burden posed by the multinomial probit 
model. More recently Greene (2008) noted that while advances in numerical methods are 
now available for researchers, restrictions on the variance-covariance matrix of the error 
terms must be in place to achieve convergence.          
 9 
Random Utility Model 
 
Following Cameron and Trivedi (2005) and Greene (2008), consider a kth choice 
multinomial model among a class of m choices. The utility function of the kth choice can 
be written as 
(1)                                ,),( kkkkk VVU εε +=                         k = 1,2,…..,m,                                      
where Vk and εk are the deterministic and stochastic factors of the kth choice. The 
deterministic component Vk can be expressed as Vk = Wkηk where Wk are the identified 
drivers of the individual’s kth choice and ηk are the k-parameters to be estimated. One 
also can construct an alternative utility function Ur to represent the rth choice among the 
available m choices. Therefore to motivate the problem in terms of utility comparisons, 
an individual chooses the kth choice among all other competing choices as indexed by 
the jth choice if and only if Uk ≥ Ur. This situation implies that an individual chooses 
choice k if and only if it yields the highest level of utility among all choices (McFadden, 
1973, 1974a, 1974b and 1978). Following Cameron and Trivedi (2005), if we let p be 
the probability of occurrence, then the probability of occurrence of the kth choice (Pr 
(Y=k)) becomes:                   
 (2)                                                         )Pr()Pr( rk UUkY ≥== ,                                                   
     )Pr( rrkk eVeV +≥+=  
                                                            )Pr( rrrkkk eWeW +≥+= ηη , 
                                                            )Pr( rrkkkr WWee ηη −≤−=  , 
                                                            )Pr( 'rkrk V≤= µ , 
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where µrk and V’rk are defined respectively as er – ek and Wkηk - Wrηr.  Assumptions can 
be made about the error terms. If the errors assume an extreme value distribution with 
mean 0 and variance π2/6, then the resulting model is a multinomial logit model (MNL). 
On the other hand if the errors assume a jointly normal distribution, then a multinomial 
probit model (MNP) emerges.  
 The fundamental crux between these models has revolved around the 
independence of irrelevant alternative (IIA) axiom where the multinomial logit model 
has the property of its choice odds being invariant to additional alternatives. As 
additional alternatives are either being added or subtracted, the choice odds remain the 
same for any pairwise comparison of the relevant alternatives. This invariance property 
however raises serious concerns on model validity. As noted by Baltagi (2005), when 
choices are likely to be close substitutes, the MNL and its allied models (conditional 
logit models) may produce inconsistent estimates if the choices are truly not 
independent. This assumption maybe appealing in terms of empirical tractability but is 
very restrictive in terms of characterizing underlying utility preferences (Greene, 2008).  
 One of the alternative approaches however, is to forego the IIA axiom by 
assuming an error structure that is multivariate normal, leading to the multinomial probit 
model. Flexibility is achieved by permitting cross correlations among choices through 
the specification of a correlated error structure. However, the choice of the multinomial 
probit model comes with a cost that as the number of alternatives expands, the 
computational ability to evaluate multiple integrals in finding closed form solutions 
becomes increasingly difficult (Maddala, 1983). In this exercise, the deployment of the 
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multinomial probit model for modeling organic and non-organic milk choices comes 
from two major considerations: (1) the IIA axiom may not be a realistic assumption to 
impose; and (2) the choice variable takes on only three responses, resulting in 
computationally tractable model from a numerical integration viewpoint (Maddala, 
1983).  
 The choice to buy either organic or conventional milk yields the same odds of 
either purchasing one or the other milk type. However, if another alternative choice is 
given such as buying both organic and conventional milk then the IIA axiom 
presupposes that the odds between purchasing organic or conventional milk will not 
change. This imposition may not be realistic as one can immediately deduce that 
purchasing both milk types can affect the odds of purchasing either organic or 
conventional milk alone. The other reason revolves around numerical ease. While 
computational burden of estimating the multinomial probit model is exceedingly longer 
relative to the multinomial logit model, the three choices of either purchasing organic 
milk, conventional milk or both is still within the purview of the trivariate normal 
integral limit where standard analytical integration methods can still be applied 
(Cameron and Trivedi, 2005). However, if multiple responses exceeded four choices 
then simulation techniques such as frequency simulators, sampling and Bayesian 
estimation have been in recent years used to make the multinomial probit model 
tractable (Train, 2003). More recently Greene (2008) opined that caution has to be 
emphasized that in using multinomial probit models, the requirement of additional 
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restrictions such as zero or equal correlation among the error terms are usually imposed 
in order to achieve convergence.                        
Multinomial Probit and Logit Models 
A logical extension of the binary choice models is to estimate unordered discrete 
responses that go beyond two choice outcomes. Thus, for each choice outcome of the 
dependent variable, the corresponding discrete values range from to 0 to m-1 where m 
denotes the maximum number of choice outcome. In this exercise, three choices have 
been identified wherein a household might purchase both organic and conventional milk 
(1), organic milk (2) and only conventional milk (3). Thus, these choices are 
characterized as unordered categorical variables in that the household may arbitrarily 
choose to purchase organic milk or conventional milk or both without being constrained 
by any choice-ordering axiom.  
In using the multinomial probit model, consider the case where the choice 
variable takes on three responses and let Wi be a vector of independent variables that are 
related to the purchase of organic and conventional milk. Following Greene (2008), 
Cameron and Trivedi (2005), Wooldridge (2002), Gan (2007) and Maddala (1983), the 
probability of selecting both organic and conventional milk (1st) choice in a multinomial 
probit model can be represented as:  
(3)                                    ),Pr()1Pr( 3121 UUUUY >>== ,                                                         
),Pr( 333111222111 eWeWeWeW +>++>+= ηηηη , 
   ),Pr( 113313112212 ηηηη WWeeWWee −<−−<−= , 
   ),Pr( 111333111222 eWWeeWWe +−<+−<= ηηηη  , 
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and if the error terms are assumed to be multivariate normal then the last expression  
becomes; 
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where φ(.) and Φ(.) are pdf and cdf respectively. For choice alternatives 2 and 3, the 
same process can be done in terms of deriving the choice probabilities.   
In the multinomial logit model case, the choice variable takes on integer values 
from j = 0,…….,m-1 and let Wi be a vector of  independent variables that are related the 
purchase of organic and non-organic milk. Following Greene (2008), Cameron and 
Trivedi (2005) and Wooldridge (2002), the probability of the ith individual selecting the 
jth choice in a multinomial logit model can be represented as:  
(5)                                                   
∑
−
=
= 1
0
)exp(
)exp(
m
j
ji
ji
ij
W
W
P
η
η
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where Pij is the probability that the ith choice selected and ηi are the parameters to be 
estimated. For this exercise, the study evaluated i =3, where the choices are organic and 
conventional milk (qi = 1), only organic milk (qi = 2) and only conventional milk (qi = 3).  
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Variance-Covariance Matrix Structure of the Error Terms for Multinomial Probit 
Model1 
In order to relax the IIA assumption, the multinomial probit model permits cross 
correlations between the error terms. In this exercise, STATA’s calculation of the 
variance-covariance matrix requires several restrictions, which translates into 
constraining one of the variances in the differenced error variance-covariance matrix in 
order for the matrix to be identified (Note that it does not matter which variance need to 
be constrained). Following Long and Freese (2006), Kropko (2008) and StataCorp 
(2005) and assuming that the variance of Choice 1 is fixed, the resulting differenced 
error variance-covariance matrix can be denoted as; 
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where )( 1222 eeVar −=ασ   and  )( 1323 eeVar −=ασ  and expanding further2, we have 
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In order to constrain 2
2α
σ into a constant, the STATA asmprobit routine restricts the 
variance of both choice 1 and choice 2 equal to 1. Thus in a three choice model, the 
                                                 
1
 Kropko (2008) and Long and Freese (2006) provide excellent discussions on how STATA calculates the 
variance-covariance matrix of the differenced error terms used in its “asmprobit” command. The 
discussion of the multinomial probit error variance-covariance structure follows their exposition.  
2
 See Kropko (2008) for example. 
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following restrictions are imposed in order for the differenced errors variance-covariance 
matrix to be identified. 
(8)                                                      122
21
== ee σσ , 
(9)                                                      0
3121
== eeee ρρ ,             
Thus, it follows from (8) that covariances (ex. 0
21221
== eeeeee σσρσ ) associated with 
choice 1 are 0. With the restrictions from both equation 8 and 9, the final differenced 
error variance-covariance matrix as calculated by STATA’s “asmprobit” command 
becomes; 
(10)                                                  
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, 
For this exercise the constrained choice is 3, thus the differenced error variance-
covariance matrix is; 
 
 Choice 2 Choice 1 
Choice 2 2 . 
Choice 1 0.64323 0.25022 
 
As for the other multinomial probit (uncorrelated error) variant, this model was 
calculated by STATA’s “mprobit“command.  This type of variant is the normal 
counterpart of the multinomial logit model and therefore still assumes IIA resulting to 
error terms that are uncorrelated. 
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Marginal Effects 
For the estimation of the marginal effects, one has to take the partial change of 
the choice probability with respect to the conditioning variables. Thus, the marginal 
effects for the multinomial logit model can be written as 
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Equation 14 can be interpreted as the change in probability of the ith choice of the jth 
household given a change in the independent variables Wi.   
As for the multinomial probit model, the derivation of the respective marginal 
effects is much more complicated (see Dorfman, 1996 for example). The calculation of 
the marginal effects in both the multinomial logit model and multinomial probit model in 
STATA is done by numerical approximation.  
Empirical Specification 
In this empirical exercise, several socio-demographic variables such as 
household income, household size, employment status and educational level of 
household head, race, ethnicity, number of children in the household and region are 
hypothesized factors affecting purchasing choice of organic and conventional milk. The 
general multinomial model specification is given as follows: 
(15)                       
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where, the ith household has the jth choice (j = 1, 2 and 3) denoting households who 
purchased both organic and conventional milk, organic milk only and conventional milk 
 17 
only, respectively. Φ is the cdf and Wi is the vector of socio-economic and demographic 
variables of the household which include Inc as household income and HHsize is the 
household size where indicator variables were created for one, two, three, four and five 
more members representing the number of household members respectively. Other 
demographic indicator variables include EMP as employment status of household head, 
while Educ is the level of education of the household head. The variable Race represents 
the race type and Ethcy refers to ethnicity, that is whether the household is Hispanic, or 
not.  Agechild represents the presence of children in the household and finally the 
variable Reg represents region.   Milk prices are not included in the multinomial 
logit/probit estimation. Prices were derived as the ratio of expenditure to quantity; but if 
there was no recorded purchase then no price can be computed3.   
Description of Data 
 For this empirical exercise, the data pertaining to the choice of purchasing 
organic and conventional milk, income and household socio-demographic variables are 
from the AC Nielsen Homescan Panel for calendar year 2004. The AC Nielsen scanner 
data set is the world’s largest, on-going household scanner data survey system, tracking 
household purchases in the United States. Table 2.1 presents the definition and summary 
statistics of all the relevant variables partitioned by choice outcome.  
For households that purchased both organic and conventional milk (choice 1), the 
average price paid for both milk types were approximately $3.15/half gallon and 
$2.03/half gallon, respectively. The average purchase quantity was approximately 8.53 
                                                 
3
 One may use imputation techniques to derive missing prices, but the empirical results are tied to the use 
of these procedures. 
 18 
half gallons of organic milk and 39.39 half gallons of conventional milk. On the other 
hand, households that only purchased organic milk (choice 2), had an average purchase 
price and quantity of $3.25/half gallon and 13.19 half gallons. Finally, the average 
purchase price and quantity  of households that purchased only conventional milk 
(choice 3)  were approximately  $1.75/half gallon and 47.68 half gallons. 
From Table 2.1, the variable Inc is defined as household income, where for this 
sample, the average income level for households that purchased both organic and 
conventional milk was $55,317, while for those household that purchased only organic 
milk the average household income is approximately $49,044.Likewise, the average 
income for households that purchased only non organic milk is approximately $49, 356. 
The study also used indicator variables to describe the number of household members 
with hs1as the base variable with hs2 pertaining to a household having 2 members. The 
variables hs3 and hs4 denoted 3 and 4 members in a household while the last household 
size indicator variable hsp5 describes 5 or more members in the household. The 
demographic values indicate that more than 70% of the household respondents for 
choice 1 and choice 3 are households with 1 or 2 members. For those households that 
purchased only organic milk (choice 2), almost 62 % are single-member households.  
Agepcchild corresponds to a dummy variable with 1 indicating the presence of children 
and 0 otherwise. Almost 25% of households associated with choices 1 and 3 have 
children, while only 8% of households associated with choice 2 (organic milk only) have 
children. 
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Table 2.1. Descriptive Statistics of Relevant Household Demographic Variables  
  (Choice 1 = organic and conventional) (Choice 2 = organic milk) (Choice 3 = conventional milk) 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
 
inc (Household Income) 55317 28181 5000 100000 49044 27683 5000 100000 49356 27117 5000 100000 
agepcchild (Presence of children 
in Household) 0.254 0.435 0.000 1.000 0.080 0.271 0.000 1.000 0.254 0.435 0.000 1.000 
Household Size             
hs1 (one member) 0.257 0.437 0.000 1.000 0.617 0.487 0.000 1.000 0.260 0.439 0.000 1.000 
hs2 (two members) 0.392 0.488 0.000 1.000 0.258 0.438 0.000 1.000 0.392 0.488 0.000 1.000 
hs3 (three members) 0.149 0.356 0.000 1.000 0.072 0.259 0.000 1.000 0.142 0.349 0.000 1.000 
hs4 (four members) 0.126 0.332 0.000 1.000 0.034 0.182 0.000 1.000 0.128 0.334 0.000 1.000 
hsp5 (five members) 0.076 0.264 0.000 1.000 0.019 0.137 0.000 1.000 0.078 0.268 0.000 1.000 
Employment Status of Family Head            
emparttime (part time) 0.176 0.380 0.000 1.000 0.167 0.373 0.000 1.000 0.155 0.362 0.000 1.000 
empfulltime(fulltime) 0.441 0.497 0.000 1.000 0.542 0.499 0.000 1.000 0.433 0.496 0.000 1.000 
unemp(unemployed) 0.383 0.486 0.000 1.000 0.292 0.455 0.000 1.000 0.412 0.492 0.000 1.000 
Educational Level of Family Head            
Education less than highschool 0.026 0.159 0.000 1.000 0.004 0.062 0.000 1.000 0.040 0.196 0.000 1.000 
eduhighschool (highschool level) 0.188 0.391 0.000 1.000 0.072 0.259 0.000 1.000 0.287 0.453 0.000 1.000 
edusomecollege (some college) 0.310 0.462 0.000 1.000 0.273 0.446 0.000 1.000 0.321 0.467 0.000 1.000 
educollegeplus (collegeplus) 0.476 0.499 0.000 1.000 0.652 0.477 0.000 1.000 0.351 0.477 0.000 1.000 
Race/Ethnicity              
white 0.757 0.429 0.000 1.000 0.674 0.470 0.000 1.000 0.835 0.371 0.000 1.000 
black 0.128 0.334 0.000 1.000 0.178 0.383 0.000 1.000 0.092 0.289 0.000 1.000 
oriental 0.038 0.192 0.000 1.000 0.053 0.225 0.000 1.000 0.020 0.138 0.000 1.000 
other 0.076 0.265 0.000 1.000 0.095 0.293 0.000 1.000 0.054 0.226 0.000 1.000 
hispyes(hispanic) 0.092 0.289 0.000 1.000 0.083 0.277 0.000 1.000 0.062 0.242 0.000 1.000 
hispno (not hispanic) 0.908 0.289 0.000 1.000 0.917 0.277 0.000 1.000 0.938 0.242 0.000 1.000 
Region             
east 0.169 0.375 0.000 1.000 0.178 0.383 0.000 1.000 0.162 0.369 0.000 1.000 
central 0.168 0.374 0.000 1.000 0.167 0.373 0.000 1.000 0.244 0.429 0.000 1.000 
south 0.392 0.488 0.000 1.000 0.322 0.468 0.000 1.000 0.383 0.486 0.000 1.000 
west 0.271 0.445 0.000 1.000 0.333 0.472 0.000 1.000 0.211 0.408 0.000 1.000 
obs 4295       264       33633       
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The demographic characteristics of the household head also were included in this 
study. Both the employment status and educational attainment of the household head 
were represented as dummy or indicator variables. The variables unemp, empparttime 
and empfulltime were indicator variables representing whether the household head was 
unemployed, employed part-time or employed fulltime. The results indicate that for 
households choosing choice 1, almost 44% are employed fulltime whereas for those 
households under choice 2 more than 50% were also employed fulltime. For households 
with choice 3, approximately 43% were employed fulltime.  Similarly the variables 
edulths, eduhighschool, edusomecollege and educolleges were utilized to describe 
whether the household head achieved educational attainment below high school, high 
school, above high school but below college and college and post-college. From the 
table more than half of the household in all three choices have some college units or 
have college or higher degrees. For example in choice 1, almost 79% of the households 
have college education whereas for those household who purchased only organic milk 
(choice 2) 65% alone comprise those heads which have college and higher degrees. 
Similar with choice 1, those who purchased only conventional milk (choice 3) have 
approximately 67 % of their household heads with college units and college plus 
degrees. 
Also included into the model are the race and ethnicity of the household. The 
indicator variables white, black, oriental and others represented the racial household 
distinctions. The majority of the households of all the three choices are white households 
with choice 1 (76%), choice 2 (67%) and choice 3 (84%).  On the other hand, household 
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ethnicity was represented as hispanic (hispyes) and nonhispanic (hispno) and more than 
90% in all of the three choices are non-Hispanic households. Finally, regional dummy 
variables were also included to describe the regional location of the household. The four 
major regional dummies that were created were east, central south and west. The 
number indicate that 39% of the households for choice 1 are from the south while those 
household that were under choice 2, approximately 33% were from the west. For choice 
3, 38% of the households were from the south.    
Empirical Results  
Test of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) 
A fundamental characteristic of the Multinomial Logit Model (MNL) is its 
assumption of the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) axiom.  However, given 
that pairwise choice alternatives S and T are close substitutes, then the MNL model may 
produce inconsistent estimates. Consequently, if choices S and T are truly not 
independent, the MNL model may not be the optimal model to choose. 
 The Hausman-McFadden (1984) and Small-Hsiao (1985) tests involve pairwise 
comparisons of estimated coefficients of the full model vis-a- vis those estimates 
generated by restricted models where at least one choice alternative has been removed 
(Long and Freese, 2006). For these tests, the null hypothesis is whether alternatives S 
and T are independent of other alternatives. If the Chi-square statistic is significant, then 
the use of the MNL model is deemed inappropriate.  
Table 2.2 presents the results of the two tests where the Hausman-McFadden test 
imply that both two choices failed to reject the null hypotheses and therefore use of the 
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MNL model is still valid. Notice that choice 2 have negative Chi-squared values. While 
implausible, these values are to be interpreted as not violating the IIA condition 
(Hausman-McFadden, 1984). On the other hand, the Small-Hsiao (1985) test results 
indicate Choice 1 rejecting the null hypotheses while Choice 2 failing to reject it. This 
situation implies that for Choice 1, IIA is not valid while for Choice 2, the independence 
axiom holds. Notice that both the Hausman-McFadden and Small-Hsiao test produced 
contradictory results. Apparently, these conflicting results from the Hausman-McFadden 
and Small-Hsiao tests were investigated by Cheng and Long (2007) by running Monte 
Carlo simulations on the size properties of these two tests. The study concluded that the 
Hausman-McFadden test results in poor estimates even if the sample size is larger than 
1000 while the Small-Hsiao test performance were ambiguous with different data 
structures.  
The study further concludes that these tests are inadequate in evaluating IIA 
validity or violations and note McFadden’s (1973) recommendation that care and valid 
judgment must be taken into account in using the MNL models especially if the 
partitioned choice outcomes are really distinct from each other. On the other hand, this 
exercise explicitly assumes a priori that the choices might not be distinct and therefore 
prompts us to use other models that would explicitly assume choice correlations (i.e. 
multinomial probit model).  
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Table 2.2. Hausman and Small Hsiao Tests for Independence of Irrelevant 
Alternatives (IIA) for a Multinomial Logit Model (MNL) 
     
 Omitted Choicea 
Chi-Squared 
Statistic df P-value Evidence 
     
Hausman Test (n=38192)     
Choice1 4.5470 19 1.0000 Accept Ho 
Choice2 -0.0370b 19 1.0000 Accept Ho 
     
Small Hsiao Test (n=38192)     
Choice 1 44.809 19 0.001 Reject Ho 
Choice 2 15.34 19 0.701 Accept Ho 
     
Ho: Difference in the coefficients are not systematic 
Note if Chi2 < 0 then the model does satisfy the asymptotic assumptions of the test. 
a
 Since there are 3 alternatives in this model, 2 test variations are expected  where omission of choice 1 
results in  the first restricted model and omission of choice 2 produces the second restricted model. 
Both the Hausman and Small-Hsiao tests compare the restricted models’ coefficients with the full 
model where all choices are included.  
b,
 Hausman and McFadden (1984) opined that a possible negative result is evidence  that IIA is not 
violated. 
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Multinomial Model Parameter Estimates  
Table 2.3 presents three multinomial models namely the multinomial logit model 
and variants of the multinomial probit models. For the multinomial probit models, the 
variation comes from the various assumptions made about the error variance-covariance 
matrix. These variations include uncorrelated and unequal correlation of error terms.  
The findings of the three models indicate that as the number of household size 
increases, the less likely that these households will purchase the combination of both 
organic and conventional milk (choice 1) and organic milk (choice 2) and this finding is 
readily apparent in choice 2 relative to choice 1. This situation implies that a single 
household is more likely to purchase both organic and a combination of organic and 
conventional milk relative to households with two, three, four and five or more 
household members. Household income although insignificant is positive throughout all 
models suggesting increasing likelihood of buying both organic and combination of 
organic and conventional milk. On the other hand households with children are less 
likely to buy both organic and combination of organic and conventional milk relative to 
households without children.  
As for employment status, household heads that are employed fulltime are less 
likely to buy milk relative to those whose employment status is part time or not 
employed. The estimates for the household head’s level of education suggest a pattern 
indicating increasing likelihood of purchasing organic and combination of both milk 
types as educational level increases. As for race, the results show white households are 
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Table 2.3. Multinomial Logit and Probita Estimated Coefficients and P-values of Fluid Milk Purchase   
 
  Multinomial Logit Multinomial Probit Multinomial Probit 
   (Uncorrelated Error Terms) 
(Unequal Correlation of 
Error Terms) 
Variables Response 1b Response 2c Response 1 Response 2 Response 1 Response 2 
  Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
       
inc 0.1712 0.0368 0.1289 0.0433 0.0448 0.0664 
 (0.000)d (0.647) (0.000) (0.272) (0.060) (0.053) 
agepcchild -0.0622 -0.5136 -0.0498 -0.2475 -0.0212 -0.2047 
 (0.306) (0.141) (0.266) (0.100) (0.275) (0.087) 
Household Size       
hs2 -0.0566 -1.1466 -0.0532 -0.5863 -0.0368 -0.4941 
 (0.206) (0.000) (0.106) (0.000) (0.100) (0.000) 
hs3 -0.0862 -1.4279 -0.0750 -0.7173 -0.4652 -0.5924 
 (0.181) (0.000) (0.116) (0.000) (0.115) (0.000) 
hs4 -0.1876 -2.0069 -0.1565 -1.0130 -0.0776 -0.8593 
 (0.016) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.087) (0.000) 
hsp5 -0.2069 -2.0398 -0.1694 -0.9729 -0.0819 -0.8049 
 (0.023) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.094) (0.000) 
Employment of Family Head      
empparttime 0.1074 0.4930 0.0815 0.2307 0.0327 0.1601 
 (0.028) (0.011) (0.025) (0.016) (0.130) (0.037) 
empfulltime -0.1732 0.1917 -0.1292 0.0545 -0.0427 -0.0056 
 (0.000) (0.226) (0.000) (0.4780) (0.076) (0.932) 
Education of Family Head      
eduhighschool 0.0375 0.9948 0.0252 0.3910 0.0119 0.2916 
 (0.723) (0.333) (0.733) (0.334) (0.667) (0.257) 
edusomecollege 0.3435 2.0012 0.2462 0.8717 0.0948 0.6989 
 (0.001) (0.047) (0.001) (0.028) (0.111) (0.001) 
educollegeplus 0.6197 2.6918 0.4607 1.2509 0.1777 1.0293 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.0020) (0.078) (0.000) 
Race/Ethnicity        
white -0.2025 -0.8757 -0.1564 -0.4300 -0.0634 -0.3535 
 (0.017) (0.008) (0.015) (0.009) (0.093) (0.017) 
black 0.2350 -0.0054 0.1784 0.0561 0.0619 0.0789 
 (0.014) (0.988) (0.014) (0.752) (0.155) (0.600) 
oriental 0.2843 0.2163 0.2283 0.2023 0.0822 0.1980 
 (0.018) (0.605) (0.02) (0.34) (0.145) (0.246) 
hispyes 0.3057 0.2548 0.2376 0.1970 0.0840 0.2066 
 (0.000) (0.467) (0.000) (0.246) (0.099) (1.540) 
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Table 2.3 Continued 
 
  Multinomial Logit Multinomial Probit Multinomial Probit 
   (Uncorrelated Error Terms) 
(Unequal Correlation of 
Error Terms) 
Variables Response 1b Response 2c Response 1 Response 2 Response 1 Response 2 
  Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients Coefficients 
Region       
central -0.3774 -0.3885 -0.2730 -0.1994 -0.0970 -0.1615 
 (0.000) (0.066) (0.000) (0.054) (0.063) (0.057) 
south -0.0327 -0.2528 -0.0250 -0.1226 -0.0109 -0.0934 
 (0.494) (0.171) (0.480) (0.180) (0.416) (0.057) 
west 0.1375 0.2908 0.1059 0.1909 0.0405 0.1825 
 (0.008) (0.120) (0.006) (0.041) (0.113) (0.014) 
Constant -2.1369 -5.5852 -1.7395 -3.4493 -0.5923 -3.1550 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.064) (0.000) 
              
       
Wald chi2(36) 1006.8700 
 
983.0900  501.8000  
 0.0000 
 
0.0000  0.0000  
log 
Pseudoliklihood -1463.2930 
 
-1460.7740    
log simulated 
Pseudoliklihood 
   
 -1458.9130  
obs 38192 
  
38192   38192   
aBase outcome is response 3 (only conventional milk) 
bResponse 1 is purchase of both organic and conventional milk 
cResponse 2 is purchase of organic milk only 
dvalues in parentheses are p-values 
 
  
27 
less likely to buy organic and conventional milk and organic milk only compared to 
black and oriental households while Hispanics are more likely to buy both organic and 
combination milk relative to non-Hispanics.  The findings for regions are relatively the 
same for all models as households located in the west are more likely to buy strictly 
organic milk and combination of organic and combination milk. However, those 
households located in the South and Midwest are less likely to buy organic milk and a 
combination of organic and conventional milk. 
Marginal Effects Analysis 
Multinomial Logit Analysis 
Looking at the multinomial logit model, as household incomes increase the 
purchase probability increases by 0.0162 and 0.0001 and decreases by 0.0163 if the milk 
purchase is combination, strictly organic milk and strictly conventional milk (Table 2.4). 
For the marginal effects of household size equal or greater than 5 members, the 
probability of purchasing declines by 0.0180 and 0.0035 and increase by 0.0215 
respectively, in purchasing a combination of organic and conventional milk and strictly 
organic milk and strictly conventional milk. Also we find a similar trend with respect to 
presence of children in that, the probability of purchase declines by 0.0057 and 0.0016 
and an increase of 0.0072 if the choice is to buy the combination of organic and 
conventional milk, strictly organic milk and strictly conventional milk. 
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Table 2.4. Marginal Effects of Multinomial Logit and Probit1 Models of Fluid Milk Purchase by Organic, Conventional or 
Both  
  
 Multinomial Logit  Multinomial Probit  Multinomial Probit 
 (Uncorrelated Error Terms)  (Uncorrelated Error Terms)  
(Unequal Correlation of Error 
Terms) 
Variables 
Response 
1 
Response 
2 
Response 
3  
Response 
1 
Response 
2 
Response 
3  
Response 
1 
Response 
2 
Response 
3 
            
inc 0.0162 0.0001 -0.0163  0.0169 0.0001 -0.0170  0.0169 0.0002 -0.0171 
 (0.000) (0.817) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.761) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.447) (0.000) 
agepcchild -0.0057 -0.0016 0.0072  -0.0060 -0.0017 0.0078  -0.0063 -0.0018 0.0080 
 (0.314) (0.104) (0.204)  (0.293) (0.079) (0.182)  (0.880) (0.733) (0.852) 
Household Size            
hs2 -0.0050 -0.0037 0.0086  -0.0059 -0.0044 0.0102  -0.0096 -0.0045 0.0141 
 (0.239) (0.000) (0.042)  (0.169) (0.000) (0.018)  (0.700) (0.720) (0.646) 
hs3 -0.0076 -0.0032 0.0109  -0.0087 -0.0037 0.0124  -0.0135 -0.0037 0.0172 
 (0.189) (0.000) (0.063)  (0.145) (0.000) (0.039)  (0.734) (0.748) (0.691) 
hs4 -0.0165 -0.0039 0.0203  -0.0185 -0.0043 0.0228  -0.0233 -0.0044 0.0277 
 (0.013) (0.000) (0.002)  (0.007) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.632) (0.754) (0.587) 
hsp5 -0.0180 -0.0035 0.0215  -0.0199 -0.0038 0.0238  -0.0250 -0.0038 0.0288 
 (0.017) (0.000) (0.004)  (0.010) (0.000) (0.002)  (0.659) (0.760) (0.613) 
Employment of Family Head           
empparttime 0.0103 0.0020 -0.0122  0.0104 0.0020 -0.0125  0.0113 0.0016 -0.0129 
 (0.036) (0.032) (0.014)  (0.036) (0.051) (0.014)  (0.743) (0.718) (0.689) 
empfulltime -0.0164 0.0007 0.0156  -0.0170 0.0007 0.0163  -0.0166 0.0004 0.0162 
 (0.000) (0.188) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.263) (0.000)  (0.645) (0.757) (0.656) 
Education of Family Head           
eduhighschool 0.0031 0.0045 -0.0076  0.0024 0.0039 -0.0062  0.0011 0.0036 -0.0047 
 (0.761) (0.451) (0.508)  (0.808) (0.428) (0.552)  (0.992) (0.787) (0.963) 
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Table 2.4 Continued  
 
 Multinomial Logit  Multinomial Probit  Multinomial Probit 
 (Uncorrelated Error Terms)  (Uncorrelated Error Terms)  
(Unequal Correlation of Error 
Terms) 
Variables 
Response 
1 
Response 
2 
Response 
3 
 
Response 
1 
Response 
2 
Response 
3 
 
Response 
1 
Response 
2 
Response 
3 
edusomecollege 0.0328 0.0112 -0.0441  0.0311 0.0098 -0.0409  0.0287 0.0094 -0.0381 
 (0.003) (0.220) (0.001)  (0.003) (0.147) (0.000)  (0.846) (0.735) (0.755) 
educollegeplus 0.0607 0.0166 -0.0773  0.0598 0.0150 -0.0748  0.0577 0.0145 -0.0722 
 (0.000) (0.139) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.061) (0.000)  (0.754) (0.708) (0.623) 
Race/Ethnicity             
white -0.0197 -0.0040 0.0238  -0.0203 -0.0043 0.0246  -0.0216 -0.0040 0.0256 
 (0.027) (0.053) (0.009)  (0.025) (0.061) (0.009)  (0.671) (0.673) (0.609) 
black 0.0240 -0.0001 -0.0239  0.0249 0.0001 -0.0250  0.0249 0.0002 -0.0251 
 (0.022) (0.925) (0.024)  (0.020) (0.951) (0.021)  (0.763) (0.906) (0.756) 
oriental 0.0299 0.0007 -0.0306  0.0325 0.0014 -0.0338  0.0330 0.0015 -0.0345 
 (0.033) (0.690) (0.030)  (0.026) (0.554) (0.022)  (0.740) (0.771) (0.716) 
hispyes 0.0321 0.0008 -0.0329  0.0337 0.0013 -0.0349  0.0334 0.0016 -0.0350 
 (0.000) (0.572) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.474) (0.000)  (0.694) (0.757) (0.664) 
Region            
central -0.0330 -0.0011 0.0342  -0.0333 -0.0010 0.0344  -0.0341 -0.0007 0.0348 
 (0.000) (0.065) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.151) (0.000)  (0.564) (0.730) (0.543) 
south -0.0030 -0.0008 0.0039  -0.0030 -0.0009 0.0040  -0.0033 -0.0009 0.0042 
 (0.505) (0.166) (0.397)  (0.510) (0.188) (0.394)  (0.906) (0.721) (0.880) 
west 0.0133 0.0010 -0.0144  0.0139 0.0015 -0.0154  0.0142 0.0017 -0.0160 
 (0.010) (0.181) (0.006)  (0.009) (0.112) (0.004)  (0.700) (0.722) (0.637) 
Prob(Outcome) 0.1062 0.0035 0.8904  0.1075 0.0036 0.8889  0.1091 0.0035 0.8874 
values in parentheses are p-values         
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As for the household head’s employment status, the findings indicate that for a 
household head that is employed full time, the probability of purchasing decreases by 
0.0164 and increases by 0.0007 and 0.0156 respectively, if the purchase choice is 
combination, strictly organic milk and strictly conventional milk. If on the other hand the 
household head is employed part time, then the probability of purchasing a combination 
of organic and conventional milk and organic milk only increases by 0.0103 and 0.0020. 
However, the purchase probability decreases by 0.0122 if the milk purchase is 
conventional. On the other hand, if the household head education is college level we find 
that the purchase probability increases by 0.0607 and 0.0166 and decreases by 0.0773 
respectively, if the choice purchase is combination, strictly organic and strictly 
conventional. The same purchase probability trends are observed if the household head 
is either a high school graduate or has some college level units.  
As for race, if the household is white then the probability of purchase declines by 
0.0197 and 0.0040 and increases by 0.0238 if the milk purchase is a combination, 
organic milk only or conventional milk. With regards to black and oriental households, 
the probability of purchase increases by 0.0240 and 0.0299 if the milk purchase is a 
combination of organic and conventional milk. If on the other the purchase is organic 
milk only, then the probability declines by 0.0001 if the household is black and increases 
by 0.0007 for an oriental household. Both purchase probabilities of black and oriental 
household decline by 0.0239 and 0.0306 if the milk purchase is conventional milk. For 
the ethnicity variable, the findings indicate that for hispanic households, the probability 
of purchasing organic milk and combination increases by 0.0321 and 0.0008 whereas the 
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probability of purchasing conventional milk declines by 0.0329. As for regions, 
households in the west purchase probability increases by 0.0133 and 0.0052 and declines 
by 0.0144 if the purchase choice is combination milk, strictly organic milk and strictly 
conventional. On the other hand, for those households in the south, the probability of 
purchase declines by 0.0030 and 0.0008 and increases by 0.0039 if the purchase is 
combination of organic and conventional milk, strictly organic and strictly conventional. 
Relative to the south households, those located in the central region a have similar 
purchase probability trends.  
Multinomial Probit Analysis 
The marginal effects for the two multinomial probit variants seem to be close in 
both magnitude and signs relative to the multinomial logit model marginal effects. For 
the multinomial probit model with uncorrelated error terms, the closeness and same sign 
magnitudes relative to the multinomial logit may be attributed to the fact that the error 
terms are assumed to be independent standard normal random variables. The difference 
however of the said multinomial probit model is the relatively longer computation time 
to achieve convergence due to solving standard numerical integration as required by an 
error structure that is standard normal. Thus, this type of multinomial probit still assumes 
IIA. 
There is little difference in estimated marginal effects generated by the 
multinomial logit model and the other multinomial probit variants. Thus, differences in 
the marginal effects can only occur if there is indeed a significant departure of both 
probability distributions. As argued by Dow and Endersby (2004), the relatively 
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narrower confidence interval of the marginal effects estimates found in the multinomial 
logit model relative to its probit analog seem to justify the use of the multinomial logit 
model over its probit counterpart in terms of the confidence it generates. It should noted 
that for this exercise, the 95 percent confidence bands of the marginal effects estimates 
are narrower in the multinomial logit model relative to the multinomial probit  estimates. 
Similarly, the work of Kropko (2008) strongly suggests that even when the 
independence of irrelevant alternative (IIA) axiom is severely violated, the multinomial 
logit model estimates provide more accurate results vis-à-vis those generated by the 
multinomial probit model.    
Numerical Stability and Precision of Multinomial Logit (MNL) and Probit  
(MNP) Marginal Effects Estimates 
When the respective multinomial model variants are compared, we find that little 
differences exist in the magnitudes of the marginal effects. However, the estimated 
marginal effects for the Multinomial Probit (unequal error correlation) are mostly 
insignificant. The standard errors generated by maximum simulated likelihood are larger 
relative to the other two cases. Following Dow and Endersby (2004), Greene (2008) and 
Judd (1998), we calculate the condition numbers of the three models respectively. The 
condition number (CI) is defined as the square root of the ratio between the largest and 
smallest eigenvalues (Greene, 2008). Likewise, Judd (1998) suggests a measure that can 
indicate numerical stability and accuracy. By taking the log10 (CI), indices that are less 
than or equal than 3 or 4 indicated numerical optimization stability while those greater 
than 10 imply instability.  
  
33 
 Table 2.5 presents the conditional numbers and log10 (CI) values for the 
multinomial logit, multinomial probit (uncorrelated error terms) and multinomial probit 
(correlated error terms) models. Results show that the log10 (CI) value for the MN Probit 
error correlated variant is 8.36 while for the MN Logit and MN Probit uncorrelated error 
variant,  the log10 (CI) values are approximately 2.32 and 2.045. This finding implies 
that the MN Logit and MN Probit uncorrelated error variant likelihood estimation 
procedure is numerically more stable and accurate than the MN Probit error correlated 
variant. This finding lends support to the notion that because of the inherent instability of 
likelihood estimation in the MN Probit error correlated variant, its estimated coefficients 
and/or standard errors are suspect, yielding greater likelihood of statistical insignificance 
for the estimated marginal effects. 
Assessment of Predictive Capacity of the Organic Milk Multinomial Choice  
Model (Case of the Multinomial Logit and Probit Model) 
We also examined the predictive capacity of both the multinomial logit and 
probit for organic milk (uncorrelated error term variant). Several studies including Park 
and Capps (1997) and Capps et al. (1999) have utilized prediction success tables in 
evaluating the predictive ability of multinomial/polychotomous choice models. In this 
approach, a successful prediction refers to a situation where both actual and predicted 
outcomes match in each of the outcome choices. To illustrate, suppose that the 
associated predicted probabilities of the ith household are as follows: choice 1 (0.2), 
choice 2 (0.3) and choice 3 (0.5). From the predicted values, the ith household should 
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Table 2.5. Conditional Indices and Log10 (CI) of Multinomial Model Variants  
    
  Multinomial Logit Multinomial Probit Multinomial Probit 
  
(Uncorrelated Error 
Terms) 
(Uncorrelated Error 
Terms) 
(Unequal Correlation of 
Error Terms) 
Max Eigenvalue 4.0457 0.6275 0.46766937 
Min Eigenvalue 0.00009396 0.00005104 0.0000000000000000087 
Condition 
Number(CI)a 207.5031 110.8788 232131789.3914 
log10(CI)b 2.3170 2.0448 8.3657 
a
 The condition number is defined as the square root of the ratio between highest and lowest eigen values 
(Greene, 2008) 
b
 The log10 (CI) provides a measure of numerical precision with numbers ≤ 3  indicating numerical stability and 
those > 10 showing potential instability (Judd, 1998 cited in Dow and Endersby, 2004) 
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choose outcome 3 because it has the highest probability and if the actual choice is indeed 
choice 3, then the model has made a correct prediction. Now if we sum all the correct 
predictions in all the choice outcomes and divide it by the total number of actual choices, 
then we get a measure of how successful the multinomial model is in making right 
predictions. Likewise, the ratio of a choice outcome’s right predictions and its 
corresponding number of actual choices determines the model’s ability to predict that 
particular outcome.   
 In this exercise however, an attempt was made to generate the usual prediction 
success table but was unsuccessful due to the dominant frequency of choice 3 
(conventional milk). Almost all of the generated predicted probabilities pointed to choice 
3 as the choice that should be chosen. This outcome however reduces the likelihood of 
having right predictions for choice 1 (organic and conventional milk) and choice 2 
(organic milk only) and therefore constrains the ability of the model to correctly predict 
both choices 1 and 2. In order to circumvent this problem, we utilize the percentage of 
the observed frequencies of each choice as cutoff points in constructing the various 
conditions that will likely lead to the predicted choice of a particular outcome. The 
cutoff values are 0.112458 (Choice 1), 0.006912 (Choice 2) and 0.8806295 (Choice 3).    
Denoting P(xb1), P(xb2) and P(xb3) as the predicted probabilities for choice 1 , 2 
and 3, the following are  conditions by  which  each of the  3 choices can be predicted : 
Choice 1 
 
8806295.0)3(&12`0069.0)2(&112458.0)1( pp xbPxbPxbP ≥  
8806295.0)3(&006912.0)2(&112458.0)1( pxbPxbPxbP ≥≥
8806295.0)3(&006912.0)2(&112458.0)1( ≥≥ xbPxbPxbP p  
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Choice 2 
 
8806295.0)3(&006912.0)2(&112458.0)1( pp xbPxbPxbP ≥  
8806295.0)3(&006912.0)2(&112458.0)1( pxbPxbPxbP ≥≥  
8806295.0)3(&006912.0)2(&112458.0)1( ≥≥ xbPxbPxbP p  
 
Choice 3 
 
8806295.0)3(&006912.0)2(&112458.0)1( ≥xbPxbPxbP pp  
8806295.0)3(&006912.0)2(&112458.0)1( ≥≥ xbPxbPxbP p  
8806295.0)3(&006912.0)2(&112458.0)1( ≥≥ xbPxbPxbP p  
 
Results indicate that for the multinomial logit case, the model predicts that 
approximately 19.16 percent of the time that choice 1 (organic and conventional milk) 
will be chosen. On the other hand, choice 2’s (organic milk only) prediction is 8.4 
percent. As for the last choice, the model predicts that 72.37 percent of the time, choice 
3 (conventional milk) will be selected.  Similar findings were also observed for the 
multinomial probit case where choice 1 is 19.27 percent, while for choice 2 is 8.64 
percent and 72.08 percent for choice 3. Also, the results tend to favor the multinomial 
probit over the multinomial logit in having a higher prediction rate in choices 1 and 2. 
However, for choice 3, the multinomial logit model has a higher prediction probability 
relative to its counterpart multinomial probit model.  
Conclusions and Implications  
The findings of both models indicate that as the number of household member 
increases, the less likely that these households will purchase organic milk and 
combination of both organic and conventional milk. This result implies that a single 
household is more likely to purchase both organic and conventional milk relative to 
households with two, three, four and five or more household members. Household 
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income is positive suggesting increasing likelihood of buying both organic and 
combination milk. On the other hand households with children are less likely to buy both 
organic and combination of organic and conventional milk relative to households 
without children. The estimates for the level of education of the household head indicate 
increasing likelihood of purchasing organic and combination of both as educational level 
increases. As for race, the results show that white households are less likely to buy 
compared to black and oriental household while Hispanics are more likely to buy both 
organic and combination milk relative to non-Hispanics.  For regions, households 
located in the west are more likely to buy strictly organic milk and a combination of 
organic and conventional milk. As for employment status, household heads that are 
employed fulltime are less likely to buy milk relative to those whose employment status 
is part time or not employed.  
 This work provides input in designing marketing strategies that can target 
particular demographic groups such as single person, college educate household heads, 
oriental, Hispanic and western located households. We note that these findings represent 
the 2004 conditions and that a more current data set may further update recent 
behavioral changes with regards to the interplay between factors that affect organic and 
conventional milk purchase.  
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CHAPTER III 
HOUSEHOLD DEMAND ANALYSIS OF ORGANIC AND  
CONVENTIONAL FLUID MILK IN THE UNITED STATES BASED  
ON THE 2004 NIELSEN HOMESCAN PANEL∗ 
 
In recent years, consumer concerns have moved beyond issues of fat content 
(Gould, 1996) to issues related to the environment, genetically modified organisms 
(GMOs), health risks, and pesticide use. Recent trends in supermarkets offering healthier 
and natural food choices can been seen as a reaction to consumer concerns. The rapid 
expansion in the organic food market (Thompson, 1998) in particular has, in effect, 
triggered growth in the organic milk industry. Dairy products, along with fresh produce, 
were among the first organic products experienced by consumers (Demeritt, 2004). As 
reported by Dimitri and Venezia (2007), beginning in the early 1990s, the distribution of 
organic milk was mainly done through specialty shops and other small-scale operators. 
Currently, organic milk is available in nearly all food retail venues, including 
conventional supermarkets and mass merchandisers (e.g. Costco and Wal-Mart), 
implying wide distribution of the product within the last decade. Glaser and Thompson 
(2000) also observed that organic milk sold in gallons and pints barely registered any 
sales, but organic milk sold in half-gallon containers recorded impressive sales. Because 
                                                 
∗
 Reprinted with permission from “Household Demand Analysis of Organic and Conventional Fluid Milk 
in the United States Based on the 2004 Nielsen Homescan Panel” by Pedro A. Alviola IV, and Oral Capps, 
Jr., in press. Agribusiness: an International Journal, Copyright[2009] by Wiley Periodicals, Inc., A Wiley 
Company  
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retail sales of organic milk have been growing since the mid 1990s, while overall sales 
of conventional milk have remained relatively constant over the same time period 
(Miller and Blayney, 2006), market shares for organic milk are on the rise. Organic milk 
currently constitutes about six percent of retail milk sales (Dimitri and Venezia, 2007).  
Organic dairy is a rapidly growing market sector, offering opportunities for 
farmers to boost their incomes through conversion from commercial to organic 
production. Organic milk retails at premiums as high as 80 percent over conventional 
milk (Glaser and Thompson, 2000), while producers can accrue premiums of more than 
40 percent over conventional prices (Organic Valley, 2005). For producers who are 
facing the decision of whether or not to invest in the conversion to organic production 
methods, it is crucial to have information on the prospects for the market, in particular, 
issues concerning consumer demand. 
In this light, the objective of this research is to analyze household demand for 
organic milk and for conventional milk in the United States, addressing most of the 
limitations indigenous to previous research efforts. We wish to better understand the 
drivers of the demand for organic milk and for conventional milk, particularly own-price 
effects, cross-price effects, and income effects, as well as the effects of socio-
demographic characteristics of households. Similar to the descriptive work done by 
Dimitri and Venezia (2007), we employ the Nielsen Homescan Panel in our analysis. 
Initially, we center attention on the factors affecting the decision to purchase organic 
milk and conventional milk at the household level.  
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Once the decision to purchase organic milk and conventional milk is made, we 
subsequently focus on factors affecting the amount purchased. Consequently, we 
identify the impacts of socio-demographic variables such as household size, the presence 
of children, employment status, education level, race, and ethnicity of the household 
head and region associated with the quantities of organic fluid milk and conventional 
milk purchased, and we estimate own-price, cross-price, and income elasticities for 
organic milk and conventional milk at the household level.  In this way, we add to the 
store of knowledge in dealing with a formal econometric analysis of the demand for 
organic milk and conventional milk, by offering a micro-perspective at the household 
level across the United States. 
Literature Review 
Previous research on consumer demand for organic milk has made important 
contributions to the understanding of the market. For example, Bernard and Mathios 
(2005) find that consumers are willing to pay substantially more for organic milk and 
rBST-free milk than for conventional milk. Glaser and Thompson (2000), through the 
use of scanner data, find that purchases of organic milk are very sensitive to changes in 
prices. Dhar and Foltz (2005) considered demand interrelationships for rBST free milk, 
organic milk, and unlabeled (conventional) milk through the estimation of a Quadratic 
Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS). The data indigenous to this analysis are 
weekly milk prices and sales for twelve U.S. cities over the period of March 9, 1997, to 
February 24, 2002. Findings revealed that rBST free milk and organic milk were 
complements, conventional milk and rBST free milk were substitutes, and conventional 
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milk and organic milk were substitutes. Additionally, own-price elasticities for rBST 
free milk, organic milk, and conventional milk were estimated to be -4.40,   -1.37, and -
1.04, respectively. The limitations of this research were threefold: (1) because the 
analysis only covered 12 U.S. cities, it may not be representative of national demand 
patterns; (2) the period of the analysis may not reflect current market trends; and (3) the 
analysis did not deal with socio-demographic characteristics of individual consumers or 
households. 
Dimitri and Venezia (2007) relied on the use of Nielsen Homescan data from 
2004, with coverage of 38,375 households that purchase milk. The Nielsen Homescan 
data are a nationwide panel of households who scan their food purchases for home use 
from all retail outlets. Data include detailed product characteristics, quantities, and 
expenditures for each food item purchased by each household. The data are unique in 
that purchase information and demographic information about the households is 
available. In conducting descriptive analysis of the 2004 Nielsen data, they concluded 
that the typical consumer of organic milk is white, well-educated, and living in a 
household headed by someone younger than 50 years old. Further, households of all 
income levels purchase organic milk. Across ethnic groups, a higher share of Oriental, 
Hispanic, and “other” households purchase organic milk rather than conventional milk. 
The limitations of this research were twofold: (1) no formal statistical analysis of these 
data was conducted; and (2) no own-price, cross-price, or income elasticities were 
estimated. 
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Methodology 
 We plan to address most of the limitations of previous research efforts in 
analyzing household demand for organic milk and for conventional milk. Through the 
use of the 2004 Nielsen Homescan Panel, we employ the Heckman two-step procedure 
in this analysis. 
Random Utility Model 
The decision of whether or not to purchase organic milk can be modeled as a 
binary choice, wherein the outcome variable Yi takes on two values: 1 with the 
occurrence of the event (purchase organic milk) or 0 (purchase conventional milk), i = 1, 
2, …, n, with n referring to the number of households in our sample4. With this 
specification, we can assume a utility function given as:  
(1)  ),( iiWU ε , 
where utility is function of the covariates Wi involved in the decision process. Assuming 
that the utility function U exists, this choice problem can be represented as  
(2)  1111 eWU += η , 
(3)  0000 eWU += η , 
where U1 and U0 are the utility levels associated with purchasing organic milk (U1) and 
conventional milk (U0); the disturbance terms e1 and e0 are random error components. 
                                                 
4
 Other choice possibilities also included households which purchase no milk at all and households which 
purchase both organic and conventional milk. The number of households which purchase no milk during 
calendar year 2004 was extremely small. The number of households purchasing only organic milk was 
264, the number of households purchasing both organic milk and conventional milk was 4,295, and the 
number of households purchasing only conventional milk was 33,633. We were concerned with the 
decision to buy organic (conventional) milk or not over the entire year. Work is underway, in a separate 
analysis,  in estimating a polychotomous choice model dealing with the aforementioned three choices.   
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For this exercise, we assume the ith household chooses to purchase organic milk (Yi=1) 
because more utility is derived relative to the purchase of conventional milk (Yi=0). 
Thus, if the ith household chooses to purchase organic milk, then U1 > U0 and 
consequently:                                                    
(4)   )Pr()1Pr( 01 UUYi >== , 
(5)    Pr(Yi = 1) )Pr( 000111 eWeW +>+= ηη , 
(6)    Pr(Yi = 1) )Pr( 001110 ηη WWee −<−= , and  
(7)    Pr(Yi = 1) = Pr(µ  < 0011 ηη WW − ). 
Subsequently, if we assume that e1 and e0 are normally distributed, then the random 
variable µ  = (e1-e0) also is normally distributed. Consequently, Pr(Yi = 1) = 
Φ( 0011 ηη WW − ), where Φ represents the cumulative distribution function (cdf). This 
relationship holds across all households, i = 1,…, n. Through standardization of µ, Φ 
then represents the standard normal cumulative distribution function. In this way, we 
justify the use of the probit model in investigating the decision to purchase organic fluid 
milk. Given the binary nature of the choice problem, we also justify the use of the probit 
model in investigating the decision to purchase conventional milk. 
 Hill and Lynchehaun (2002) identified various factors that influence consumer 
preferences in purchasing organic milk (Figure 3.1). Factors considered are grouped 
according to: (1) personal factors such as values and lifestyles; (2) intrinsic factors such 
as price and packaging; (3) cultural and social factors including age, ethnicity, and 
income; (4) knowledge factors; (5) extrinsic factors; and (6) uncontrollable factors. As 
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Figure 3.1 Factors that influence the consumer preference towards organic milk 
(Hill and Lynchehaun, 2002). 
 
Personal Factors  
Values and 
Lifestyles & 
Attitudes and 
Behavior 
Intrinsic Factors 
Price; Packaging; 
Taste; Quality; 
and Safety 
Cultural and 
Social Factors 
Age; Ethnicity; 
Income; and 
Presence of 
Children 
 Knowledge Factors 
Educated about 
Nutrition, Health, and 
the Environment 
 
Extrinsic Factors 
Merchandising; 
Advertising; and 
Availability 
 
Uncontrollable 
Factors 
Food Scares 
Purchase of Organic Milk 
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well, as stated previously, Dimitri and Venezia (2007) provided hypotheses regarding 
typical consumers purchasing organic milk. 
Heckman Sample Selection Approach 
 
Following Heckman (1976, 1979), the issue of sample selection bias may arise if 
we limit our sample to those households who purchase organic milk or to those 
households who purchase conventional milk. The remedy, as proposed by Heckman, is 
to use a two-step approach where the first-stage involves the usage of a binary choice 
specification (i.e. probit model) to account for the selection bias. In the second stage, we 
estimate the model using least squares, with the inclusion of the omitted variable, 
representing the selection bias, as an additional covariate or regressor.  
There have been previous studies that have looked at censoring and sample 
selection issues in regard to estimating the demand for conventional fluid milk. Schmit 
et al (2002) utilized a two-step sample selection model based on a Nielson Homescan 
Panel of U.S. households from January 1996 through December 1999 in order to 
estimate at-home demand for fluid milk and cheese. Likewise, Dong et al., (2004b) 
examined milk purchasing behavior using a double-hurdle model, accounting for not 
only the censored nature of commodity purchases, but also for the dynamics of the 
purchase process. This work involved data from a panel of upstate New York 
households over the period 1996 to 1999. In our analysis, we consider only purchase 
patterns of organic and conventional milk over calendar year 2004.  
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First Stage of the Heckman Procedure 
Using the probit model, we denote qi as an indicator variable that takes on value 
of 1 if the ith household purchases organic milk and 0 if the ith household purchases 
conventional milk. Mathematically the probit model can be represented as:  
 (8)   )()1Pr( ηii Wq Φ== , and 
 (9)   )(1)0Pr( ηii Wq Φ−== , 
where Φ  is the standard normal cumulative distribution function (cdf) and Wi is vector 
of variables that are related to the decision to purchase organic milk, similar to those 
described by Hill and Lynchehaun (2002) and by Dimitri and Venezia (2007). The 
corresponding vector of first-stage parameter estimates is represented by iη . Thus, with 
)ˆ( ηφ iW  as the calculated probability density function from this first-stage estimation, the 
Inverse Mill’s Ratio (IMR) can be calculated as 
(10)   )ˆ(
)ˆ(
η
ηφ
T
i
T
i
W
W
IMR
Φ
=  
The IMR captures all the effects of the omitted variable regressor; hence the IMR 
is added to the set explanatory variables in the model in the second stage. 
Second- Stage of the Heckman Procedure 
In the second stage estimation, the demand equation for organic milk becomes: 
(11)   





Φ
+== )ˆ(
)ˆ()1|(
i
T
i
i
T
i
ii
o
i W
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η
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αβ + vi, or  
(12)   iiioi IMRXqzE αβ +== )1|( + vi,  
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where oiz  is the quantity of organic milk purchased by the ith household, W represents 
the vector of variables related to the decision to purchase organic milk, and X constitutes 
the vector of explanatory variables related to the amount of organic milk purchased. 
Importantly, observations for which qi = 1, i =1, 2, …, n1 are used in the second-stage 
estimation—n1 corresponds to the number of households who purchase organic milk. 
Following Saha, Capps, and Byrne (1997) and Greene (2008), let ijX  denote the jth 
regressor common to both Wi and Xi. The estimated marginal effect (ME) of a change in 
this regressor is given by: 
(13)   
ij
i
jij X
IMR
EM
∂
∂
+= αβˆ . 
Thus, the ME is composed of two parts: a direct effect on the expected quantity of 
organic milk purchased, reflected by jβ , and a change in the IMR with respect to a unit 
change in Xij. After some simplification, equation (13) can be rewritten as 
(14) ),ˆˆˆ(ˆˆˆ 2iiTijjij RMIRMIWEM +⋅⋅−= ηηαβ   
where: 
ijEMˆ  =   marginal effect of the jth explanatory variable for the ith household, 
jβˆ   =   parameter estimate associated with the jth explanatory in the second-stage of 
the model, 
αˆ  =   parameter estimate associated with the IMR variable in the second stage of 
the model, 
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jηˆ  =   parameter estimate of the jth explanatory variable associated with the first-
stage probit analysis,  
ηˆTiW  =   the prediction from the probit analysis for the ith household, and  
iRMI ˆ   =  the Inverse Mills Ratio for the ith household purchasing organic milk. 
 Equation (14) represents the appropriate expression in calculating the marginal 
effects associated with the Heckman two-step procedure. In general, jijEM βˆˆ ≠ ; the only 
cases where jijEM βˆˆ = are as follows: (1) either αˆ is not statistically different from zero 
or (2) the jth explanatory variable in the second stage of estimation does not appear in 
the first-stage. Finally, since the estimated ME is observation-dependent, we propose to 
evaluate the marginal effects at the sample means.  
 Of note, the demand equation for conventional milk is quite similar to the 
specifications given in equations (11) and (12). In those equations, we replace 
)1|( =ioi qzE  with )0|( =ici qzE , where ciz is the quantity of conventional milk 
purchased by the ith household. We replace W with W* to represent the vector of 
variables related to the purchase of conventional milk. Further, we replace X with X* to 
represent the vector of explanatory variables related to the amount of conventional milk 
purchased. Finally, we replace IMR with IMR* to represent the inverse Mill’s ratio in the 
demand equation for conventional milk. The number of households who purchase 
conventional milk is n2, that is i = 1, 2, …, n2. 
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Empirical Specification 
 In this empirical exercise, the first-stage probit model specification is 
hypothesized to be a function of household income; employment status and education of 
the household head; race and ethnicity of the household head; region in which the 
household is located; and the presence of children (less than 18 years of age) in the 
household. The basis of this specification comes from the work of Hill and Lynchehaun 
(2002) as well as the work of Dimitri and Venezia (2007). 
 Mathematically, we write the probit specification for the decision to purchase 
organic milk as follows: 
(15) 
+++++++== iiiiiiii AgepchildHsHsHsHsIncomeWqP 6543210 5432)1( ηηηηηηη  
+++++ iiiii plusEducollegelegeEdusomecoloolEduhighscheEmpfulltimeEmpparttim 1110987 ηηηηη
 
iiiiiiii WestSouthCentralHisyesOrientalBlackWhite ∈+++++++ 18171615141312 ηηηηηηη 5 
 A description of the variable names in this specification is given in Table 1, 
along with their associated descriptive statistics. The majority of the explanatory 
variables are dummy or indicator variables. The reference categories to avoid the 
dummy variable trap are: (1) household size of 1, (2) no children under 18 years of age 
in the household, (3) the household head is unemployed, (4) the household head did not 
complete high school, (5) the household head is not white, black, or Oriental, (6) the 
                                                 
5
 We may also write mathematically the probit specification for the decision to purchase conventional milk 
as )0( ∗= ii WqP . The explanatory variables in this specification W* are the same as those in 
equation (15). Further, the parameter estimates in the specification are opposite in sign but are of the same 
magnitude. 
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household head is not Hispanic, and (7) the household is located in the East. By 
definition, the household head is the female head or the male head if no female head 
exists in the household.  
 Note that our specification does not include price as a potential explanatory 
variable influencing the decision to purchase organic milk. Prices are imputed as the 
ratio of expenditure to quantity in the Nielsen data; in essence, prices are unit values6. 
However, if organic milk is not purchased, it is not possible to derive the corresponding 
unit value. One can use other mechanisms in order to impute the missing prices, but we 
do not use additional imputation procedures in the probit analysis.  
 On the other hand, the second-stage specification deals with the amount of 
organic milk purchased, given that the decision to purchase was made.  
 Mathematically, we write the second-stage specification in the Heckman 
routine as: 
(16) +++++++= jijijijijijiji HsHsHsIncomePnonorgPorgQ 432 6543210 βββββββ  
+++++ jijijijiji oolEduhighscheEmpfulltimeEmpparttimAgepchildHs 1110987 5 βββββ  
jijijijijiji HisyesOrientalBlackWhiteplusEducollegelegeEdusomecol 171615141312 ββββββ +++++
 
jijijijiji vIMRWestSouthCentral +++++ 21201918 ββββ , where 
Qji, corresponds to the quantities of organic milk purchased (j =1) and conventional milk 
purchased (j = 2) respectively for the ith household; Porgji and Pnonorgji are the prices 
                                                 
6
 These calculated unit values may also reflect quality differences, and, consequently, the estimated 
income and price elasticities may be biased. However, we believe that the commodities involved are 
sufficiently disaggregated and homogeneous so as to minimize the degree of bias (Cox and Wohlgenant, 
1986). 
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for unit values of organic milk and conventional milk, respectively, faced by the ith 
household. The rest of the variables are the same as those in the probit specification 
given by equation (12). Data pertaining to prices of soymilk or rBST-free milk were not 
available in the Nielsen Homescan panel. Consequently, these prices are excluded from 
our analysis7. 
 Unlike the situation in the estimation of the probit model given by equation 
(15), equation (16) requires the use of price variables for both organic milk and for 
conventional milk. In the estimation of the second-stage demand equation for organic 
milk (conventional milk), we use only those observations for which purchases of organic 
milk (conventional milk) were made. Consequently, no imputation of own-price 
variables in the respective demand equations is necessary. However, for the cross-price 
variables in the respective demand equations, we need to impute these values. In cases 
when purchases of organic milk were made, households may not have purchased 
conventional milk and vice versa. Our imputation process in this analysis rests on the use 
of regional dummy variables: (1) when 0=jiPorg , then  
]03836.012081.009014.020705.1exp[ jijijiji WestSouthCentralPorg ∗−∗−∗−=  and 
(2) when 0=jiPnonorg , then  
 
                                                 
7
 The exclusion of rBST-free and soy milk prices may bias the parameter estimates and therefore affect the 
values of price elasticities of organic and conventional milk. The direction of the bias is difficult to 
ascertain. Based on the current literature on milk demand analysis, organic milk and rBST-free milk are 
complements while conventional milk and rBST free milk are substitutes (Dhar and Foltz, 2005). Likewise 
conventional milk and soymilk are complements (Dhar and Foltz, 2004).  
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]00543.002107.012828.056082.0exp[ jijijiji WestSouthCentralPnonorg ∗−∗+∗−= .8 
Issues of Price Endogeneity 
 Because the prices in the analysis are unit values derived from the ratio of total 
expenditures to quantities purchased, there exists the possibility of price endogeneity 
(Dong, Shonkwiler and Capps, 1998). To determine the existence or nonexistence of 
price endogeneity in both the organic and conventional milk demand models, we 
conducted Hausman tests.  
 In conducting these tests, we identified socio-demographic variables such as 
household income, race, region and poverty status as instrumental variables (IV) for 
prices of organic and conventional milk. However, our data set corresponds to a cross-
section of U.S. households, and, as such, the availability of valid instruments was 
severely limited if not lacking. Lewbel (1997), Nakamura and Nakamura (1998), and 
Park and Davis (2001), contended that if the chosen instruments were not highly 
correlated with the endogenous variable under investigation (prices in our case), then the 
IV estimator is biased and inefficient. Furthermore inference results generated from 
Hausman tests become suspect because the likelihood increases of accepting the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity as the instruments become less relevant (Nakamura and 
Nakamura, 1998, and Park and Davis, 2001). Thus, with severely limited instruments 
inherent in any data set, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates may be more 
appropriate to use relative to those generated by IV estimation. 
                                                 
8
 No problems of collinearity with the regional indicator variables and the respective price variables were 
evident. In addition to capturing price variation, region also may be capturing the effects of non-economic 
factors, such as environmental issues. 
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 In performing the Hausman test, the first stage involved both regressions of 
organic and conventional milk prices as a function of income, race, region, and poverty 
levels. Further, the demand specification included the residuals of the first-stage 
estimation and F-tests were conducted to determine whether the coefficients 
corresponded to the residuals from the augmented regressions were statistically different 
from zero. Our findings indicated that endogeneity was not present in the organic milk 
demand relationship (p-value = 0.8647). However, for the conventional milk demand 
relationship, the hypothesis of price exogeneity (p-value=0.000) was rejected, which 
prompted the use of two-stage least squares (TSLS). Results from TSLS estimation for 
the conventional milk equation, however, indicated degrading collinearity patterns and 
non-significance of most of the estimated parameters, thus prompting the choice of OLS 
generated parameters. In keeping with Nakamura and Nakamura (1998), as well as Park 
and Davis (2001), given the limited instruments inherent in this cross-sectional data set, 
OLS estimates were deemed more appropriate than those generated by IV methods. 
Data Description 
 For this empirical exercise, the data pertaining to the choice of purchasing 
organic milk, price and quantity of organic milk and conventional milk, income, and 
household socio-demographic variables are from the 2004 Nielsen Homescan Panel. 
Table 3.1 presents the definition and summary statistics of all the relevant variables 
considered in the analysis. For each household, we aggregate their purchases of organic 
milk and conventional milk over the entire calendar year.  
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 The variable Yesorg (Noorg) is the dependent variable for the probit model and 
is defined as 1 to represent the purchase of organic (conventional) milk and 0 otherwise. 
Roughly 12 percent of the sample of households purchased organic milk sometime 
during the calendar year of 2004, and thus 88 percent of the sample of households 
purchased conventional milk during the 2004 calendar year.  
 The price and quantity variables of organic milk (Porg, Qorg) and conventional 
milk (Pnonorg and Qnorg) are standardized for a half gallon milk container. Most 
organic milk is sold by the half gallon (Glaser and Thompson, 2000), so we use the half 
gallon as the standard volume metric for this analysis. Conditional on making purchases, 
the average amounts of organic and conventional milk bought for calendar year 2004 
were 9 and 47 half gallons, respectively. The average price paid for organic milk was 
$3.16 per half gallon and the average paid for conventional milk was $1.78 per half 
gallon. Consequently, there is a substantial premium paid for organic milk on the order 
of $1.38 per half gallon.  
 The average household income level of the sample is slightly above $50,000. 
Concerning household size, 26 percent of the sample consists of single-person 
households, while nearly 40 percent consists of two-person households. The proportions 
of households with three, four, and five or more members are 14 percent, 13 percent, and 
8 percent, respectively. Additionally, households with children less than 18 years old 
(Agechild) are roughly 25 percent of the sample. 
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Table 3.1. Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis  
  
Variable Description Observation Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
 
Yesorg (qi = 1) 
Household purchased organic 
milk   38,192 0.119 0.324 0 1 
Noorg (qi = 0) 
Household did not purchase 
organic milk 38,192 0.881 0.324 0 1 
Qorg 
Quantity of organic milk 
purchased  
     
 (half gallons) 4,559 8.798 14.798 0.5 293 
Qnorg 
Quantity of conventional milk 
purchased       
 (half gallons) 37,928 46.739 42.641 0.25 1011 
Porg 
Price of organic milk (half 
gallons) 4,559 3.155 0.541 2.12 4.58 
Pnonorg 
Price of conventional milk (half 
gallons) 38,192 1.780 0.541 0.99 4.36 
Income HH income  38,192 50,024 27,306 5,000 100,000 
Hs1 HH size of 1a 38,182 0.262 0.440 0 1 
Hs2 HH size of 2 38,192 0.391 0.488 0 1 
Hs3 HH size of 3 38,192 0.143 0.350 0 1 
Hs4 HH size of 4 38,192 0.127 0.333 0 1 
Hs5 HH size > 4 38,192 0.077 0.267 0 1 
Agepcchild 
HH has at least 1 child less than 
18 yrs of       
 age 38,192 0.253 0.435 0 1 
No children 
HH has no children less than 18 
years of  
     
 age 38,192 0.747 0.435 0 1 
Unemployed Head of HH is unemployed 38,192 0.408 0.491 0 1 
Empparttime 
Head of HH is employed part-
time 38,192 0.157 0.364 0 1 
Empfulltime 
Head of HH is employed full-
time 38,192 0.435 0.496 0 1 
Edulths 
HH head completed less than 
12 years of       
 schoolinga 38,192 0.038 0.192 0 1 
Eduhighschool 
HH head is high school 
graduate 38,192 0.275 0.446 0 1 
Edusomecollege 
HH head has completed some 
college 38,192 0.320 0.446 0 1 
Educollegeplus 
HH head has at least a college 
education 38,192 0.367 0.482 0 1 
White HH head is white 38,192 0.825 0.380 0 1 
Black HH head is black 38,192 0.096 0.295 0 1 
Oriental HH head is Oriental 38,192 0.022 0.146 0 1 
Other HH head is classified as othera 38,192 0.057 0.232 0 1 
Hispyes HH head is Hispanic 38,192 0.066 0.248 0 1 
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Table 3.1 Continued  
 
Variable Description Observation Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Hispno HH is not hispanica 38,192 0.934 0.248 0 1 
East HH is located in the Easta 38,192 0.163 0.370 0 1 
Central HH is located in the Midwest 38,192 0.235 0.424 0 1 
South HH is located in the South 38,192 0.384 0.486 0 1 
West HH is located in the West 38,192 0.219 0.413 0 1 
Source: Nielsen Home Scan Panel for Calendar Year 2004 
HH denotes household; the HH head is defined as the female head. If a female head of household does not 
exist, then the HH head is the male head. 
a
 Reference category so as to avoid the dummy variable trap.
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  Demographic characteristics of the household head also are included in this 
analysis. Both the employment status and educational attainment of the household head 
are represented as dummy or indicator variables. The variables Unemp, Empparttime, 
and Empfulltime are indicator variables representing whether the household head is 
unemployed, employed part-time, or employed full-time. Roughly 60 percent of 
household heads are employed either part-time or full-time. Similarly the variables 
Edulths, Eduhighschool, Edusomecollege, and Educollegeplus are utilized to describe 
whether the household head completed less than a high school education, was a high 
school graduate, completed some college, or obtained at least an undergraduate degree. 
Nearly 70 percent of the sample had at least some college, while slightly more than 25 
percent completed high school but not attended college.  
Also included into the model are race and ethnicity of the household. The 
indicator variables White, Black, Oriental, and Other represent the major racial 
household distinctions. About 83 percent of the sample is classified as white, 10 percent 
is classified as black, and slightly more than 2 percent is classified as Oriental. 
Household ethnicity is represented as either Hispanic (Hispyes) or non-hispanic 
(Hispno). About 7 percent of our sample is classified as Hispanic. Finally, dummy 
variables labeled as East, Midwest, South, and West are included to describe the regional 
location of the household. The majority of the households are located in the South (38.4 
percent), followed by the Midwest (23.5 percent), West (21.9 percent), and East (16.3 
percent).  
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Empirical Results  
First-Stage Analysis: Probit Model 
The maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters and the accompanying 
estimates of the marginal estimates of the first-stage probit model analysis are provided 
in Table 3.2. From the Wald chi-squared statistic, at least one of the coefficients 
associated with the set of explanatory variables is statistically significant despite the 
magnitude of pseudo R2 (McFadden R2 statistic) of 0.029. This magnitude of the 
measure of goodness-of-fit is not atypical in probit models. 
From Table 3.2, as the number of household member increases, it is less likely 
that households will purchase organic milk. Hence a single-person household is more 
likely to purchase organic milk relative to households with two, three, four, and five or 
more members. Looking at the marginal effects, we find that for household size equal to 
or greater than 5 members, the probability of purchasing organic milk is less by 0.0293, 
relative to a single household. For other household size categories, the probability of 
purchasing organic milk is less by 0.0283 for Hs4, 0.0178 for Hs3, and 0.0146 for Hs2. 
On the other hand, as household income increases, the likelihood of purchasing organic 
milk is greater. The presence of children in the household is not a statistically significant 
factor affecting the likelihood of purchasing organic milk. Household heads employed 
part-time are more likely to purchase organic milk relative to unemployed heads. This 
probability is higher by 0.0130. On the other hand, household heads employed full-time 
are less likely to purchase organic milk relative to unemployed household heads. This 
probability is lower by 0.0159 relative to those who are unemployed. 
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Table 3.2. Parameter and Marginal Effects Estimates of Probit Analysis of Organic 
Milk Choicea 
Variable Estimates (P>|z|) 
Marginal 
Effects (P>|z|) 
Hs2  -0.0768 0.0010 -0.0146 0.0010 
Hs3  -0.0968 0.0040 -0.0178 0.0020 
Hs4  -0.1589 0.0000 -0.0283 0.0000 
Hs5 -0.1673 0.0000 -0.0293 0.0000 
Income 3.27E-06 0.0000 6.26E-07 0.0000 
Agepcchild  -0.0429 0.1740 -0.0081 0.1680 
Empparttime  0.0659 0.0090 0.0130 0.0110 
Empfulltime  -0.0837 0.0000 -0.0159 0.0000 
Eduhighschool  0.0245 0.6380 0.0047 0.6410 
Edusomecollege  0.1908 0.0000 0.0381 0.0000 
Educollegeplus  0.3555 0.0000 0.0721 0.0000 
White  -0.1292 0.0040 -0.0260 0.0060 
Black  0.1215 0.0170 0.0246 0.0240 
Oriental  0.1619 0.0130 0.0339 0.0230 
Hispyes  0.1673 0.0000 0.0349 0.0000 
Central -0.1933 0.0000 -0.0348 0.0000 
South -0.0222 0.3710 -0.0042 0.3690 
West 0.0807 0.0030 0.0159 0.0040 
Constant -1.3431 0.0000     
McFadden R2 0.029    
Number of Observations 38,192    
Wald Statistic (18) 800    
p-value 0.000       
Wald Tests     
Joint tests of hypotheses associated 
with the indicator variables 
Chi-squared 
statistic p-value 
  
(1) Hs2=Hs3=Hs4=Hs5=0 20.42 0.0004 
  
(2) Empparttime= Empfulltime=0 40.09 0.0000 
  
(3) Eduhighschool=Edusomecollege=   
  
     Educollegeplus=0 208.42 0.0000 
  
(4) White=Black=Oriental=0 114.35 0.0000 
  
(5) Central=South=West=0 113.95 0.0000 
    
aThe exact same magnitudes of parameter estimates are obtained in the probit analysis of conventional 
milk choice. However, the signs of the respective coefficients are reversed. 
  
60 
The level of education of the household head plays an important role in the 
purchase of organic milk. From Table 3.2, as the educational level of the household head 
increases, the probability of purchasing organic milk increases. For household heads 
with at least a college level education, the probability of purchasing organic milk 
increases by 0.0721 relative to household heads with less than a high school education. 
For those households with educational levels corresponding to some college, the 
likelihood of buying organic milk increases by 0.0381 relative to household heads with 
less than a high school education.  
Hispanic households are more likely to purchase organic milk relative to non-
Hispanic households. The likelihood of purchase of Hispanic households (Hisyes) 
increases by 0.0349 relative to non-hispanic households.  Black and Oriental households 
are more likely to purchase organic milk relative to other race types. For the black and 
Oriental households, the probability of purchasing organic milk is higher by 0.0246 and 
0.0339, respectively, relative to other race types. For white households, the probability 
of purchasing organic milk decreases by 0.0260 relative to other types. Consequently, 
white households are the least likely to purchase organic milk, controlling for other 
socio-economic and demographic factors. 
Finally, for the regional indicator variables, the findings indicate that households 
located in the West are more likely to purchase organic milk, while those located in the 
Midwest are least likely to purchase organic milk. For households located in the West, 
the probability of purchasing organic milk increases by 0.0159 relative to households 
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located in the East. For households located in the Midwest, the probability of purchasing 
organic milk decreases by 0.0348 relative to those in the East. 
These results are consistent with the findings of the sparse literature. For 
example, according to Pittman (2004) and Dong et al (2004b), blacks are less likely to 
consume conventional milk than other races, while Hispanic households are more likely 
to consume conventional milk. Dong et al (2004b) also found that household size was 
positively correlated with the likelihood of purchasing conventional milk.   
Assessment of Predictive Capacity of the Probit Choice Model  
A prediction success table is used to assess the usefulness of the probit model. 
Several studies (Park and Capps, 1997; Capps et al., 1999) use this approach in 
evaluating qualitative choice models. In generating the appropriate classification values, 
we use a cut-off value equal to 0.119 instead of the default 0.5009. This value 
corresponds to the ratio of the total number of households purchasing organic milk to the 
total number of households in the sample, that is, the market penetration. From Table 
3.3, the percentage of correct predictions is approximately 0.58.   
In short, using our decision rule or cut-off probability of 0.119, the model is 
correct 58 percent of the time in predicting choices for both organic milk and 
conventional milk, respectively. In terms of sensitivity or the ability to correctly predict 
the decision to purchase organic milk, the model is correct approximately 61% of the 
time. On the other hand, in terms of specificity or the ability of the model to correctly  
                                                 
9
 If the 0.5 default value is used instead of the market penetration of organic milk, then the model is not be 
able to correctly classify any households that purchased organic milk. 
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Table 3.3. Prediction-Success Table: Choices of Organic Milk and Conventional 
Milk 
 
  Actual Choice 
Predictions Organic Milk Conventional Milk Total 
Organic Milk 2,772 14,266 17,038 
Conventional Milk 1,787 19,367 21,154 
Total 4,559 33,633 38,192 
    
Percentage of Right Predictions (%) 57.97   
Sensitivity(%)a 60.80   
Specificity(%)b 57.58   
Cutoff value 0.119     
a The percentage of correctly predicting the choice of choosing organic milk 
(2,772/4,559) 
 
b
 The percentage of correctly predicting the choice of choosing conventional 
milk (19,367/33,633) 
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classify the decision to purchase conventional milk, the model is correct approximately 
58% of the time. 
Second Stage Analysis: Estimation of Demand Equations10 
For the second stage, estimation of the two demand equations for organic and 
conventional milk is performed using least squares. For the organic milk demand 
equation, the goodness-of-fit statistic is 0.074, while for the conventional milk demand 
equation, the goodness-of-fit ratio is 0.226. The parameter estimates and the associated 
p-values are exhibited in Table 3.4. Note, however, that in the organic milk demand 
equation the variable Invmills (inverse mills ratio) is statistically significant at the 0.05 
level (p-value=0.0300), indicating evidence of sample selection bias. Thus, for 
explanatory variables common to both the probit (first-stage equation) and the second-
stage equation, the parameter estimates are not the appropriate marginal effects. 
However, for the conventional milk demand model, the inverse mills ratio (p-
value=0.4540) is statistically insignificant; hence sample selection bias is not evident. 
Thus, the estimated coefficients in the second-stage equation for conventional milk 
correspond to the appropriate marginal effects. 
Second-Stage Results for Organic Milk 
For the second-stage estimation, once the decision to purchase organic milk has 
been made, from Table 3.4, holding other things constant, for every unit increase in the 
price of organic milk the quantity purchased of organic milk declines by 5.6 half gallons.  
                                                 
10
 Attempts were made to estimate the first and second-stage equations simultaneously. However, the 
estimation routine failed to converge. Consequently, the estimation of the Heckman two-step procedure is 
done sequentially. The software package used in this analysis was STATA 9.2. 
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Table 3.4. Second Stage Parameter Estimates of  Demand Analysis of Organic 
and Conventional Milk 
 
Variable Organic P>|t| Marginal Conventional P>|t| 
  Milk   Effects Milk   
      
Porg  -5.5893 0.0000  2.6621 0.0100 
Pnonorg  3.4728 0.0000  -22.9181 0.0000 
Invmills -128.3534 0.0300 
 
16.2653 0.4540 
Income -0.0003 0.0430 0.00005 -0.00001 0.6160 
Hs2  9.3840 0.0110 0.9698 13.3728 0.0000 
Hs3  12.2548 0.0080 1.6492 18.8843 0.0000 
Hs4  19.4247 0.0110 2.0185 26.1841 0.0000 
Hs5 17.5322 0.0290 -0.7872 32.1777 0.0000 
Agepcchild  5.8490 0.0080 1.1541 5.2759 0.0000 
Empparttime  -7.5255 0.0180 -0.3099 -1.8289 0.0210 
Empfulltime  8.2172 0.0410 -0.9537 -5.5228 0.0000 
Eduhighschool  -0.7233 0.6600 1.9627 -0.9707 0.4110 
Edusomecollege  -19.1697 0.0440 1.7218 -3.6604 0.0250 
Educollegeplus  -33.9874 0.0490 4.9483 -3.2492 0.2260 
White  16.3271 0.0090 2.1750 5.0256 0.0000 
Black  -12.8049 0.0290 0.4969 -15.3822 0.0000 
Oriental  -15.4636 0.0370 2.2629 -7.1158 0.0010 
Hispyes  -15.8197 0.0470 2.4986 -3.1379 0.0550 
Central 21.5736 0.0260 0.4058 0.5385 0.7060 
South 2.2439 0.0820 -0.1881 2.3717 0.0010 
West -7.0075 0.0660 1.8313 -3.0126 0.0010 
Constant 243.8373 0.0230   63.7563 0.0000 
     
 
R-squared 0.074   0.226 
 
Number of Observations 4,559   37,928 
 
F( 21, 4537) 19.23   617.63 
 
Prob > F 0.000      0.000 
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Table 3.4 Continued  
 
F-tests Organic Milk 
 
Conventional milk 
Joint tests of hypotheses 
associated with the indicator 
variables F-value Prob > F 
 
F-value Prob > F 
Hs2=Hs3=Hs4=Hs5=0 3.98 0.0032 
 
108.86 0.0000 
Empparttime= Empfulltime=0 3.11 0.0466 
 
36.00 0.0000 
Eduhighschool=Edusomecollege=   
 
  
          Educollegeplus=0 4.94 0.0020 
 
6.41 0.0002 
White=Black=Oriental=0 3.23 0.0214 
 
73.19 0.0000 
Central=South=West=0 3.81 0.0097 
  
25.16 0.0000 
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On the other hand, a unit increase in the price of conventional milk translates to 
increases in the purchase of organic milk by almost 3.5 half gallons.  
Relative to single-person households, two-person households purchase almost 1 more 
half gallon of organic milk annually; three-person households purchase 1.65 more half 
gallons of organic milk annually; and four-person households purchase 2 more half 
gallons of organic milk annually. However, for households with five or more persons, 
annual purchases of organic milk are lower by 0.8 half gallons relative to single-person 
households. Households with children less than 18 years of age purchase almost 1.2 
more half gallons of organic milk annually relative to households with no children less 
than 18 years of age. However, household heads who are employed either part-time or 
full-time annually purchase less organic milk, on the order of 0.3 to 1 half gallons, 
relative to households with heads that are unemployed.  
However, the reverse is true regarding educational levels of household heads. 
Relative to household heads who have less than a high school education, those with a 
high school education purchase almost two more half gallons of organic milk annually; 
those with some college education purchase 1.7 more half gallons of organic milk 
annually. Additionally, those with at least an undergraduate education purchase nearly 5 
more half gallons of organic milk annually relative to those household heads with less 
than a high school education. As for race, whites and Orientals purchase roughly 2.2 
more half gallons of organic milk annually relative to other races. Hispanics buy more 
than 2.5 half gallons of organic milk annually relative to non-Hispanics. Regionally, 
marked differences exist in the volumes of organic milk purchased. Relative to 
  
67 
households located in the East, those located in the West buy more than 1.8 half gallons 
of organic milk annually; households located in the Midwest buy 0.4 more half gallons 
of organic milk annually than households located in the East; but households located in 
the South buy almost 0.2 half gallons less annually than households located in the East.  
Second Stage Results for Conventional Milk 
A unit increase in the price of conventional milk translates to a decline of 
approximately 23 half gallons of conventional milk, while an increase in the unit price of 
organic milk leads to an increase in purchase of conventional milk by almost 2.7 half 
gallons. Also, the presence of children in the household translates to increased purchases 
of conventional milk by roughly 5.3 half gallons annually. For household size, the 
purchases of conventional milk increase as number of household members increase. To 
illustrate, two-person households buy 13.4 more half gallons of conventional milk 
annually relative to single-person households; three-person households purchase almost 
19 more half gallons of conventional milk annually, relative to single-person households. 
For four-person households, the gap is 26 more half gallons annually, and for five or 
more person households the gap is 32 half gallons annually.  
Similar to the findings for organic milk, employed household heads purchase less 
conventional milk than unemployed household heads. The difference is between 1.8 and 
5.5 half gallons annually, depending if household heads are employed part-time or full-
time. In contrast with the findings for organic milk, purchases of conventional milk 
decline as the level of education increases. Concerning race, whites purchase more 
conventional milk relative to other races; blacks and Orientals purchase less 
  
68 
conventional milk relative to other races. Hispanic households purchase less 
conventional milk than non-Hispanic households. Households located in the South buy 
more conventional milk relative to households located in other regions, while 
households located in the West buy less conventional milk relative to households located 
in other regions. 
Elasticity Estimates11 
We now present estimates of own-price, cross-price and income elasticities of 
both organic and conventional milk (Table 3.5). The standard definition of price 
elasticity is the percent change in the quantity demanded brought about by a one-percent 
change in price. Using this definition, we find that the own-price and cross-price 
elasticities of organic milk are -2.00 and 0.70 respectively. These numbers imply that a 
one-percent increase (decrease) in the price of organic milk translates to a 2.00 percent 
decline (rise) in the quantity demanded for organic milk. On the other hand, if the price 
of conventional milk increases (decreases) by one-percent, the quantity demanded for 
organic milk increases (decreases) by 0.70 percent. The income elasticity for organic 
milk is approximately equal to 0.27, which implies that a one-percent increase in 
household income leads to nearly a 0.30 percent increase in quantity demanded for 
organic milk. 
 
                                                 
11
 Tomek and Robinson’s (2003) formula of total elasticity is Ti = Eii + Eij*Sji where Eii and Eij are the own 
price and cross price elasticties and Sji represents the elasticities of “price transmission”. The concept 
behind the formula denotes that a change in price of say commodity i will result in changes in prices of 
other commodities as well (mutatis mutandum). We assume that changes in the price of organic milk do 
not affect the price of conventional milk and vice versa. Also, in calculating the income elasticities we 
abstract from price rationing and assume perfect competition in supply. 
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Table 3.5. Price and Income Elasticity Estimates for Organic and 
Conventional Milka 
 
 
Variable Organic Milk Conventional Milk 
   
Own-Price Elasticity -2.0046 -0.8729 
Cross-Price Elasticity 0.7027 0.1797 
Income Elasticity 0.2672 -0.0135 
a
 elasticities are computed at the sample means. 
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On the other hand, the own-price, cross-price, and income elasticities for 
conventional milk are -0.87, 0.18, and -0.01, respectively. The interpretations are the 
same as that of the organic case. The demand for organic milk is elastic, but the demand 
for conventional milk is inelastic. The sensitivity to own-price changes of organic milk 
is at odds with the findings of Hammarlund (2001), who finds that, on average, 
consumers are willing to pay up to five times the price of conventional milk to 
buyorganic milk. Owing to the positive cross-price elasticities, evidence indicates that 
organic and conventional milk are substitutes. Evidence also seems to indicate that 
organic milk is a necessity (income elasticity estimated to be 0.27), but conventional 
milk is an inferior good (income elasticity estimated to be -0.01). Dhar and Foltz (2005) 
estimated own-price elasticities as follows: rBST-free milk (-4.40), organic (-1.37), and 
conventional milk (-1.04). Dhar and Foltz (2005) also found that both rBST-free and 
organic milk were substitutes for conventional milk. Our own-price elasticity estimates 
for organic milk (-2.00) and for conventional milk (-0.87) differ significantly from those 
by Dhar and Foltz (2005)12. 
Our cross-price elasticity estimates indicate that a one-percent change in the price 
of conventional milk leads to a 0.70 percent change in the quantity demanded for organic 
milk, whereas a one-percent change in the price of organic milk results in a 0.18 percent 
change in the quantity demanded for conventional milk. This asymmetric pattern in the 
respective cross-price elasticities as suggested by Dhar and Foltz (2005) may be 
                                                 
12
 Statistical tests were performed to consider whether our elasticity estimates were different from those 
elasticities generated by Dhar and Foltz (2005). In looking at comparisons of own-price and cross-price 
elasticities, we reject in all cases the equivalence of our estimates with those of Dhar and Foltz (2005).    
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attributed to the difficulty or unwillingness of consumers to switch back from a high-
quality product to a relatively lower-quality product, even if there are notable price 
changes. The cross-price elasticity of organic milk with respect to conventional milk was 
estimated to be 3.15 by Dhar and Foltz (2005). The cross-price elasticity of conventional 
milk with respect to organic milk was estimated to be 0.02 by Dhar and Foltz (2005). 
Our estimates of the cross-price elasticities are significantly different from those of Dhar 
and Foltz (2005).  
To highlight the importance of generating elasticities, we also calculated the 
effect of a one-percent increase in the price of organic milk and the price of conventional 
milk on total milk sales. Using Dimitri and Venezia’s (2007) calculated organic milk 
expenditure share of 0.32, our results show that a one-percent increase in the price of 
organic milk translates to a 0.20 percent decrease in total milk sales. Likewise, a one-
percent increase in the price of conventional milk translates to a 0.31 percent increase in 
total milk sales.13 The effects in each case, however, are modest.      
Implications, Conclusions and Limitations 
The findings from the probit analysis indicate that single-person households are 
more likely to purchase organic milk relative to other households with more family 
                                                 
13
 The basis of this calculation is as follows. Letting TR (total revenue) = P1Q1 (total revenue from organic 
milk) + P2Q2 (total revenue from conventional milk), 
1
2
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∂
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∂
∂
, which implies that the percentage change in total revenue due to a 
one-percent change in P1 may be expressed as 2121111 GVVGV ++ , where V1 is the expenditure share 
of organic milk, V2 is the expenditure share of conventional milk, G11 is the own-price elasticity of organic 
milk, and G21 is the cross-price elasticity of conventional milk with respect to organic milk. The 
percentage change in total revenue due to a one-percent change in P2 similarly may be expressed as 
1212222 GVVGV ++ , where G22 is the own-price elasticity of conventional milk and G12 is the cross-
price elasticity of organic milk with respect to conventional milk. 
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members. Likewise, affluent households are more likely to purchase organic milk, and 
household heads with some college are more likely to purchase organic milk than heads 
of households with lower levels of education. In terms of region, households located in 
the West are the most likely to purchase organic milk, and those in the Midwest are the 
least likely to purchase organic milk. The presence of children in the household may 
reduce the likelihood of purchasing organic milk relative to those with no children. As 
for race, black and Oriental households are most likely to purchase organic milk and 
white households are least likely to purchase organic milk. Finally, Hispanic households 
are more likely to buy organic milk than households that are non-hispanic. Thus, from 
these demographic profiles, we find that variables such as household size, number of 
children, employment status and education of household head, race, ethnicity, and region 
have a significant effect on the likelihood of purchasing organic milk. 
However, once the decision to purchase either organic milk or conventional milk 
has been made, our findings indicate that as household size increases, purchases of both 
organic and conventional milk increase. The presence of children in the household also 
leads to increases in the purchase of both milk types. However, as the level of education 
increases, purchases of organic milk rise but purchases of conventional milk fall. Whites 
and Orientals purchase more organic milk than other races; whites also buy more 
conventional milk, but blacks and Orientals buy less conventional milk. Hispanic 
households purchase more organic milk but less conventional milk than non-Hispanic 
households. Finally, households located in the West purchase the most organic milk 
relative to other regions, whereas households located in the South purchase more 
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conventional milk than households located in other regions. Our second-stage results 
concerning the impacts of socio-demographic factors on purchases of organic milk 
largely are in agreement with those found by Dimitri and Venezia (2007). 
From the estimated elasticities, we find that organic and conventional milk are 
substitutes, although an asymmetric pattern exists in this relationship. The demand for 
organic milk is more sensitive to changes in the price of conventional milk, but the 
demand for conventional milk is not very sensitive to changes in the price of organic 
milk. Additionally, the demand for organic milk is elastic but the demand for 
conventional milk is inelastic. Finally, organic milk technically is a necessary good but 
conventional milk is an inferior good.  
The results from our work will enhance marketing efforts of organic milk in 
targeting particular demographic groups, particularly college-educated households, 
households located in the West, and Hispanic households. Also, owing to our findings 
concerning own-price elasticities, retailers should lower the prices of organic milk but 
raise prices of conventional milk in order to increase sales revenue, holding all other 
factors constant. As well, increases in the prices of conventional milk, all other things 
equal, will lead to increases in purchases of organic milk. 
The major limitation of our analysis is that we provide only a snapshot of the 
organic and conventional milk market in 2004. Whether this demand picture continues to 
hold in the future is a function of the interplay among retailers, the supply of milk from 
organic and conventional dairies, and the socio-demographic characteristics of the 
population. A replication of our analysis with more recent data certainly is worthwhile to 
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monitor demand patterns for organic milk and for conventional milk. Further, in future 
work, attention should be centered on household choices of buying organic milk only, 
conventional milk only, or buying both organic and conventional milk. Finally, in lieu of 
centering attention on purchase patterns over a calendar year, future work should also 
consider transactions throughout the year in order to ascertain seasonal patterns, as well 
as dynamic aspects of milk purchasing behavior. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE IMPORTANCE OF SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES ON THE 
QUALITY OF PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FROM BINARY CHOICE 
MODELS: AN APPLICATION OF THE BRIER PROBABILITY SCORE 
METHOD CONCERNING THE CHOICE OF ORGANIC MILK 
 
Introduction  
The use of binary choice models has been standard in explaining behavioral 
choice between two alternatives or events. Because of the pervasiveness of these models 
in terms of looking at the underlying drivers associated with dichotomous choice, the 
task of evaluating these models in terms of their ability to predict correct predictions 
becomes paramount. One popular measure of fit is the use of the prediction-
success/expectation-prediction contingency tables. This approach classifies correct 
predictions from the following rule: if the predicted probability is greater than 0.5 and 
the first choice is selected, then the decision of choosing the first choice is correctly 
predicted. Likewise, if the probability is less than 0.5 and the second alternative is 
chosen, then the model has made a correct classification of the alternative choice. 
Accordingly, summing the correctly classified cases over the total number of 
observations gives the percentage of correct predictions. The higher the percentage of 
right predictions, the better predictive power the model possesses. Another alternative 
rule is to forego the 0.5 cut-off and use the mean frequency of observations of the choice 
variable as the cut-off (Capps and Kramer, 1985). There is flexibility in this approach 
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because if the mean frequency is lower than 0.5, then the model will not be able to 
predict correct classifications. 
 The advantage of the approach is its simplicity and ease in calculations and if a 
symmetric loss function is assumed then 0.5 cutoff rule is justified (Cameron and 
Trivedi, 2008). However Stock and Watson (2007) argued that the equal odds cutoff 
does not take into account the quality of the predicted probabilities as the approach does 
not discriminate whether the predicted probabilities are 51 percent or 99 percent. 
Likewise Wooldridge (2002) opined that the percent of correctly predicted can be 
misleading because there is relative ease in predicting one of the outcome and while the 
opposite is true in predicting the other alternative. Thus, Wooldridge suggested that the 
more appropriate values to look at are the sensitivity and specificity where the former is 
the ability to predict outcome Y=1 while the latter is ability to correctly classify outcome 
Y=0. Several studies including Alviola and Capps (2009) argued that the appropriate 
cutoff should be based on the frequency of the observations corresponding to the binary 
choice. This cutoff reflects the actual probability because the equal odds rule does not 
take into account the number of observations that chose a certain event. Also Cameron 
and Trivedi (2005, 2008) suggested the comparison of the average value of the binary 
outcome variable (Y=1) and the mean of the predicted probabilities.   
 The Stock and Watson (2007) and Wooldridge (2002) critiques and the Cameron 
and Trivedi (2005, 2008) approach represent the standard textbook orthodoxy in 
measuring goodness of fit of binary choice models with the use of prediction-success 
contingency tables. Although most of these studies opine that the approach is 
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suboptimal, they do not offer any superior alternative. We attempted to address this gap 
by assessing the predictive capacity of binary choice models through the use of 
probability scores. 
 We examined the prediction probabilities of fundamental discrete choice models, 
namely the logit and probit models as well as the linear probability model (LPM), 
through the Brier Probability Scoring Method. The Brier score is a type of incentive 
compatible probability forecast method that is used to assess subjective probability 
forecasts. We also applied the Yates Brier Sore Partition in order to determine the effect 
of differing model specifications on the ability to sort events that occurred and those that 
did not occur. Finally, in our analysis, we utilized the 2004 Nielsen Homescan panel in 
constructing three choice models associated with the purchase/nonpurchase of organic 
milk.          
Methodology 
Random Utility Model  
The choice of whether to purchase organic milk can be modeled as a binary 
choice wherein the outcome variable Yi takes on two values where 1 can be thought of 
an occurrence of an event or 0 otherwise.  In this alternative specification, an agent can 
assume a utility function where utility comparisons can be made. Given the utility 
function;  
(1)                             ),( iixU ε  
where U is function of the covariates vector x, the agent can assign 1 to a choice where 
he/she derives higher level of utility and 0 if the alternative choice produced a lower 
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utility level. Assuming that the utility function can be approximated as linear, this choice 
problem can represented as 
(2)                            111 exU T += β                                                              
(3)                            000 exU T += β                                                                                                                                                                         
where U1 and U0 are the corresponding deterministic utility choices and errors terms e1 
and e0 are random error components. So for this exercise the household chooses to 
purchase organic milk (Yi=1) because higher utility is derived relative to conventional 
milk. If the household chooses organic milk i.e. U1 > U0 and if we let p be the probability 
of occurrence, then the probability of occurrence Pr (Yi=1) becomes:                                 
(4)                                     )Pr()1Pr( 01 UUYi >==                                                                 
(5)                                     )Pr()1Pr( 0011 exexY TTi +>+== ββ                                 
(6)                )Pr()1Pr( 0110 ββ TTi xxeeY −<−==                                 
(7)                             )Pr()1Pr( 01 ββµ TTi xxY −<==                                         
(8)        )()1Pr( βTi xFY ==                                                              
where F(.) can be designated as the cumulative density function (cdf). If we assume that 
e1 and e0 are normally distributed, then the difference µ = e1-e0, also is normally 
distributed. If F(.) is assumed to be the standard normal cdf, then the probit model 
emerges. If, on the other hand, the error terms e1 and e0 follow an extreme value 
distribution, then the difference follows a logistic distribution. Also, since the Linear 
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Probability Model (LPM) does not rely on any distribution function, the probability of 
occurrence is equal to βTi xY == )1Pr( .14 
Binary Choice Models and Brier Probability Score 
Following the determination of event probabilities from the probit, logit and 
LPM models, the derivation of the predicted probabilities can be calculated by replacing 
the β’s in equation (8) with their corresponding estimated coefficients (
∧β ’s). Thus for 
this exercise, the respective predicted probabilities can be denoted as )(
∧
= βTmij xFp  
where mijp , represents the predicted probabilities of individual i on choice j (j = 0, 1) in 
model m. In this case, m = probit (P), logit (L) or LPM. The respective predicted 
probabilities of the three models are as follows: 
(9)   )(
∧
Φ= P
TP
ij xp β                        
(10)      )(
∧
= L
TL
ij xp βϕ                                                                      
(11)               LPMTLPMij xp
∧
= β                                                                    
where Φ and φ are standard normal and logistic cdfs for the probit and logit 
specifications.   
With extensive use of binary choice models in modeling dichotomous product 
choices, assessing both forecast accuracy and sorting capability become paramount. 
                                                 
14
 Of course, the problem with the LPM is the possibility that probabilities may fall outside the unit 
interval (0 to 1). That is, probabilities may either be less than zero, between 0 and 1, or greater than 1. The 
use of the probit model or logit model eliminates any possibility that probabilities are outside the unit 
interval. 
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Following the approach of Bessler and Ruffley (2004) and Olvera and Bessler (2006), let 
the probability of occurrence of individual i on the  jth event be ijp  and denote ijd  as a 
binary index number that takes on the values of one if the jth event occurred and zero 
otherwise. Thus, the individual level quadratic probability score (PS) can be written as: 
(12)                                  2)(),( ijij dpdpPS −=                                                        
where, the values of PS can range from zero to one. This equation can be generalized 
with a mean probability score (Brier score) indexed over N observations (households in 
our example) at i = 1,…,N. Therefore, the Brier score can be written as: 
(13)                             ∑
=
−





=
N
i
ijij dpN
dpPS
1
2
_
)(1),(                                              
Given equation (13), a Brier Score of 0 means perfect forecast accuracy while a score of 
1 denotes complete forecast inaccuracy. In this exercise, estimation of the mean 
probability score was calculated in order to assess the quality of probability forecasts 
from binary choice models and to determine the importance of socio-demographic 
variables in terms of the ability to discriminate events that occurred and those that did 
not occur.   
Yates Decomposition of the Brier Score  
Furthermore, the Yates covariance partition (1982, 1988) of the Brier score was 
utilized to address the issue of relationship between reported and actual forecasts. The 
Yates partition discussed in Bessler and Ruffley (2004) and Olvera and Bessler (2006), 
separates the Brier score into decomposable factors such as bias, scatter, minimum 
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variance probability score, variance of outcome index (d) and covariance between p and 
d.  In notation form, this decomposition can be written as: 
(14)             ),(*2)()()(),( 2
_
dpCovBiaspScatterpMinVardVardpPS −+++=                        
 Starting with the term Var(d), defined as outcome index variance, the notational 
representation can be written as:  
(15)                                      )1()(
__
ijij dddVar −=                                                     
with ∑
=
=
N
i
ijij d
N
d
1
__ 1
 as the mean of the outcome index d. This term reflects the factors 
that are exogenous to the forecaster (Yates 1982, 1988).  
Scatter (p) is defined as:  
(16)                                    [ ])()(1)( 0011 jj pVarnpVarn
n
pScatter +=                                  
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pVar  denote conditional 
variances  of the predicted probabilities for events that occurred (p1) and for those events 
that did not occur (p0). Thus, scatter is the weighted average value of the two conditional 
variances and is defined as an indicator of the total noise contained in the predicted 
probabilities of the two events. Note that n0 + n1 = N.     
 MinVar(p) represents the total variance and is defined as:  
(17)                                )()()( pScatterpVarpMinVar −=                                         
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where ∑
=
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N
i
ijij ppN
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_
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_
ijp  as the mean probability of occurrence 
∑
=
N
i
ijpN 1
1
. Likewise, the component Bias is denoted as:  
(18)                   
__
ijij dpBias −=                                               
This term measures the difference of the mean predicted probability and the mean 
outcome index. Thus, Bias measures, on average, the deviation associated with the 
forecasted probabilities to their true outcomes. The deviation also is the rate of 
miscalibration because the bias term measures how probability forecasts are 
overpredicted or underpredicted (Yates 1982, 1988).  
 The term Cov(p,d) reflects ability to filter relevant information that enables a 
proper assignment of probabilities for events that occurred and for those that did not 
occur. This term is given as: 
(19)                  ))((),(
_
0
_
1 dVarppdpCov −=                                                  
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p  are mean probability of occurrence for 
events that occurred and those that did not occur.  
Empirical Specification  
 In this exercise, two model specifications were estimated for each binary 
choice model. The respective model specifications were modeled as:    
(20)
iiiiiiii AgepchildHsHsHsHsIncomeWqP 6543210 5432)1( βββββββ ++++++==
+++++ iiii legeEdusomecoloolEduhighscheEmpfulltimeEmpparttim 10987 ββββ  
  
83 
iiiiii SouthCentralHisyesOrientalBlackWhitePlusEduCollege 17161514131211 βββββββ ++++++
iWest εβ ++ 18                           
 
(21)      ),()|1Pr( 10 IncomeFXq ii ββ +==                                                                    
In each specification as given by equation (20) or equation (21), qi represents household 
i’s choice to purchase organic milk and 0 otherwise. Also, F(.) is the cdf, either a 
standard normal distribution to represent a probit specification or a logistic distribution 
to represent a logit specification. With the LPM model, the cdf is omitted in its 
specification.  The set of explanatory variables include household socio-demographic 
variables associated with the household head such as household income (Inc), type of 
employment, level of education, race, and ethnicity of the household, the presence or 
absence of children and region (Reg).  
 Equation (21) omits everything except for the income covariate. We use this 
specification to determine the impact of censoring potentially important socio-
demographic variables on the forecasting ability of binary choice models. Thus, two sets 
of predicted probabilities for each choice model (probit, logit and LPM) were estimated. 
These in turn were used to derive two sets of Brier Scores, prediction success tables, and 
Yates Brier Score partition (decomposition) factors.        
Data 
 For this empirical exercise, the data pertaining to the choice of purchasing 
organic milk, income and household socio- demographic variables are from the 200 
Nielsen Homescan Panel. Table 4.1 presents the definition and summary statistics of all 
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Table 4.1. Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis  
  
Variable Description Observation Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
 
Yesorg (qi = 1) 
Household purchased organic 
milk   38,192 0.119 0.324 0 1 
Noorg (qi = 0) 
Household did not purchase 
organic milk 38,192 0.881 0.324 0 1 
Income HH income  38,192 50,024 27,306 5,000 100,000 
Hs1 HH size of 1a 38,182 0.262 0.440 0 1 
Hs2 HH size of 2 38,192 0.391 0.488 0 1 
Hs3 HH size of 3 38,192 0.143 0.350 0 1 
Hs4 HH size of 4 38,192 0.127 0.333 0 1 
Hs5 HH size > 4 38,192 0.077 0.267 0 1 
Agepcchild 
HH has at least 1 child less than 
18 yrs of       
 age 38,192 0.253 0.435 0 1 
No children 
HH has no children less than 18 
years of       
 age 38,192 0.747 0.435 0 1 
Unemployed Head of HH is unemployed 38,192 0.408 0.491 0 1 
Empparttime 
Head of HH is employed part-
time 38,192 0.157 0.364 0 1 
Empfulltime 
Head of HH is employed full-
time 38,192 0.435 0.496 0 1 
Edulths 
HH head completed less than 
12 years of       
 schoolinga 38,192 0.038 0.192 0 1 
Eduhighschool 
HH head is high school 
graduate 38,192 0.275 0.446 0 1 
Edusomecollege 
HH head has completed some 
college 38,192 0.320 0.446 0 1 
Educollegeplus 
HH head has at least a college 
education 38,192 0.367 0.482 0 1 
White HH head is white 38,192 0.825 0.380 0 1 
Black HH head is black 38,192 0.096 0.295 0 1 
Oriental HH head is Oriental 38,192 0.022 0.146 0 1 
Other HH head is classified as othera 38,192 0.057 0.232 0 1 
Hispyes HH head is Hispanic 38,192 0.066 0.248 0 1 
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Table 4.1 Continued  
 
Variable Description Observation Mean 
Std. 
Dev. Min Max 
Hispno HH is not hispanica 38,192 0.934 0.248 0 1 
East HH is located in the Easta 38,192 0.163 0.370 0 1 
Central HH is located in the Midwest 38,192 0.235 0.424 0 1 
South HH is located in the South 38,192 0.384 0.486 0 1 
West HH is located in the West 38,192 0.219 0.413 0 1 
Source: Nielsen Home Scan Panel for Calendar Year 2004 
HH denotes household; the HH head is defined as the female head. If a female head of household does not 
exist, then the HH head is the male head. 
a
 Reference category so as to avoid the dummy variable trap. 
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the relevant variables that were used in the study. The Nielsen scanner data set is the 
world’s largest, on-going household scanner data survey system wherein it tracks 
household purchases in the United States.  
 The variable Yesorg is the dependent choice variable and is indexed as 1 to 
represent purchase of organic milk and 0 otherwise. Income is defined as household 
income and the average income level of the sample was $50,025/household.As for the 
household size, the study used indicator variables to describe the number of household 
members where Hs1 (26%) and Hs2 (40%) pertain to households having one and two 
members while hs3 has 3 household members with a mean proportion of 14 percent. The 
two last household size indicator variables hs4 and hs5 describes 4 and 5 or more 
members in the household. The respective mean proportion are 13 and 8 percent 
respectively Also, households with children less than 18 years old (agepcchild) were 25 
percent of the sample. 
The demographic characteristics of the household head were also included in this 
study. Both the employment status and educational attainment of the household head 
were represented as dummy or indicator variables. The variables Unemp, Empparttime 
and Empfulltime are indicator variables representing whether the household head was 
unemployed, employed part-time or employed fulltime. Their respective mean 
proportions are 41 percent, 16 percent and 43 percent. Similarly the variables Edulths, 
Eduhighschool, Edusomecollege and Educolleges denote household head educational 
attainment whether it is below high school, high school, above high school but below 
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college and college and beyond. The respective mean proportions are 4 percent, 28 
percent, 32 percent and 37 percent. 
Also included into the model were race and ethnicity of the household. The 
indicator variables White, Black, Oriental and Others represented the major racial 
household distinction. Approximately 83 percent are white households.  On the other 
hand household ethnicity was represented as either Hispanic (Hispyes-7 percent) or non-
hispanic (Hispno-93 percent). Finally, regional dummy variables such as East, Central, 
South and West were included to describe the regional location of the household. The 
respective mean proportions are 16 percent, 24 percent, 38 percent and 22 percent 
respectively. 
Results 
Inter-Binary Choice Model Comparisons 
For this exercise, three models were used, namely the probit, logit and linear 
probability models to represent the binary choice between organic and conventional 
milk. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 report the logit, probit and LPM estimated parameters of both 
the full model and income only model .The Brier Score and Yates partition components 
are exhibited in Table 4.4. The calculated Brier Scores (BS) for the three respective 
models are given as follows: Probit (BS=0.1028960), Logit (BS=0.1029092) and LPM 
(BS=0.1028963). Furthermore, the Probit model has the highest forecast covariance 
value compared to the other two models. These results imply that the probit model 
predicts better than the logit and LPM models by having both the lowest Brier scores and 
highest forecast covariance values (Table 4.4).  
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Table 4.2. Full Model Parameter Estimates of Logit, Probit and LPM Analysis of 
Organic Milk Choice 
   
    
Variable Logit Model Probit Model  Linear Prob. Model 
  Estimates (P>|z|) Estimates (P>|z|) Estimates (P>|z|) 
       
Hs2  -0.1420 0.0010 -0.0768 0.0010 -0.0148 0.0010 
Hs3  -0.1818 0.0040 -0.0968 0.0040 -0.0191 0.0040 
Hs4  -0.2921 0.0000 -0.1589 0.0000 -0.0304 0.0000 
Hs5 -0.3105 0.0010 -0.1673 0.0000 -0.0329 0.0000 
Income 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Agepcchild  -0.0790 0.1880 -0.0429 0.1740 -0.0082 0.1740 
Empparttime  0.1272 0.0080 0.0659 0.0090 0.0138 0.0070 
Empfulltime  -0.1532 0.0000 -0.0837 0.0000 -0.0160 0.0000 
Eduhighschool  0.0529 0.6150 0.0245 0.6380 0.0045 0.5490 
Edusomecollege  0.3808 0.0000 0.1908 0.0000 0.0309 0.0000 
Educollegeplus  0.6830 0.0000 0.3555 0.0000 0.0663 0.0000 
White  -0.2429 0.0040 -0.1292 0.0040 -0.0273 0.0090 
Black  0.2212 0.0180 0.1215 0.0170 0.0258 0.0320 
Oriental  0.2789 0.0170 0.1619 0.0130 0.0461 0.0080 
Hispyes  0.2997 0.0000 0.1673 0.0000 0.0355 0.0000 
Centrak -0.3779 0.0000 -0.1933 0.0000 -0.0339 0.0000 
South -0.0431 0.3560 -0.0222 0.3710 -0.0044 0.3740 
West 0.1470 0.0030 0.0807 0.0030 0.0175 0.0020 
Constant -2.3285 0.0000 -1.3431 0.0000 0.0958 0.0000 
   
    
Pseudo R2 0.0287  0.029 
   
Obs 38192  38192 
 
38192  
Wald chi2(18) 804.39  800 
   
Prob>chi2 0.000  0.000 
   
R2 
   
 0.0212 
 
F( 18, 38173) 
    
43.5 
 
Prob > F 
        
0.000 
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Table 4.3. Income-Only Model Parameter Estimates of Logit, Probit and LPM 
Analysis of Organic Milk Choice 
 
Variable Logit Model Probit Model  Linear Prob. Model 
  Estimates (P>|z|) Estimates (P>|z|) Estimates (P>|z|) 
       
Income 7.34E-06 0.0000 3.88E-06 0.0000 7.89E-07 0.0000 
Constant -2.38081 0.0000 -1.3788 0.0000 0.079893 0.0000 
       
Pseudo R2 0.0059  0.0059    
Obs 38192  38192  38192  
Wald chi2(1) 165.54  164.12    
Prob>chi2 0.0000  0.0000    
R2     0.0044  
F( 1, 38190)     156.94  
Prob > F         0.0000   
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Table 4.4. Brier Score and Decompositions of Probit, Logit and Linear 
Probability Model (LPM) and Model Variants for Organic Milk Choice 
      
PROBIT MODEL Probit    Probit    % Change 
  (Full Model)   (Income Only)a     
Brier Score (BS) 0.1028960  0.1046501  1.705 
Variance of d (Var(d)) 0.1051212  0.1051212  0.000 
Minimum variance of p (Min Var(p)) 0.0000487  0.0000020  -95.873 
Scatter (Scatter(p)) 0.0022488  0.0004615  -79.478 
Bias2 1.1E-10  8.1E-13  -99.264 
Forecast covariance (2Cov(p,d)) 0.0045228   0.0009346   -79.336 
Slope 0.0215121  0.0044453  -79.336 
Intercept 0.1167921   0.1188407   1.754 
      
LOGIT MODEL Logit    Logit    % Change 
  
(Full Model)   (Income Only)     
Brier Score (BS) 0.1029092  0.1046490  1.691 
Variance of d (Var(d)) 0.1051212  0.1051212  0.000 
Minimum variance of p (Min Var(p)) 0.0000484  0.0000015  -96.921 
Scatter (Scatter(p)) 0.0022520  0.0004645  -79.374 
Bias2 0.0000000  0.0000000  0.000 
Forecast covariance (2Cov(p,d)) 0.0045124   0.0009388   -79.195 
Slope 0.0214629  0.0044655  -79.194 
Intercept 0.1168085   0.1188375   1.737 
      
LINEAR PROBABILITY MODEL LPM   LPM    % Change 
  
(Full Model)   (Income Only)     
Brier Score (BS) 0.1028963  0.1046569  1.711 
Variance of d (Var(d)) 0.1051212  0.1051212  0.000 
Minimum variance of p (Min Var(p)) 0.0000471  0.0000021  -95.520 
Scatter (Scatter(p)) 0.0021779  0.0004623  -78.773 
Bias2 0.0000000  0.0000000  0.000 
Forecast covariance (2Cov(p,d)) 0.0044500   0.0009288   -79.128 
Slope 0.0211657  0.0044175  -79.129 
Intercept 0.1168440   0.1188432   1.711 
a
 Model variant has income as the only explanatory variable for all the three choice models.  
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Prediction success tables also were utilized to assess the ability of the “complete” 
model to classify outcomes (Table 4.5). Instead of the default 0.5 cut-off value, the 
appropriate critical values were calculated based on the purchase frequency of organic 
milk relative to the whole sample size. The choice of cut-off value was made to reflect 
the actual probability of choosing organic milk and not the usual application of the equal 
odds approach in both choices. For all three choice models utilized, the cutoff value was 
equal to 0.119. Results indicate that the logit model garnered the highest percentage of 
right predictions (58.41 percent) relative to the probit (57.97 percent) and the LPM 
(54.64 percent). The implication is that the logit model results in 58 percent correct 
predictions, the probit just fewer than 58 percent correct predictions, and the LPM 
slightly more than 54 percent correct predictions. Thus, among the three models, the 
logit model performs best in correctly classifying those households that chose organic 
and/or conventional milk. Although both methods resulted in different outcome in terms 
of model superiority, the observed values are very close that inference suggests that 
there is no significant difference. The observed values are in agreement with Capps and 
Kramer (1985) where they analyze food stamp participation using probit and logit model 
specification. Their conclusions include that both models empirical performance were 
indeed minimal. 
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Table 4.5. Prediction-Success Evaluation for Probit, Logit and Linear 
Probability Models (LPM) in Both Full Model and Income-only Specifications 
 
     
PROBIT Actual Choice 
 Complete   Income Only 
Predictions 
Organic 
Milk Conventional  
Organic 
Milk Conventional 
Organic Milk 2772 14266  2340 14336 
Conventional 1787 19367  2219 19297 
Total 4559 33633   4559 33633 
 Full Model Income Only    
% Right Predictionsa 57.97 56.65    
Sensitivity (%)b 60.80 51.33    
Specificity (%)c 57.58 57.38    
Cut-off value 0.12 0.12       
   
    
LOGITd Actual Choice 
 Complete   Income Only 
Predictions 
Organic 
Milk Conventional  
Organic 
Milk Conventional 
Organic Milk 2747 14073  2340 14336 
Conventional 1812 19560  2219 19297 
Total 4559 33633   4559 33633 
 Full Model Income Only    
% Right Predictions 58.41 56.65    
Sensitivity (%) 60.25 51.33    
Specificity (%) 58.16 57.38    
Cut-off value 0.12 0.12       
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 Table 4.5 Continued  
 
LPMe Actual Choice 
 Complete   Income Only 
Predictions 
Organic 
Milk Conventional  
Organic 
Milk Conventional 
Organic Milk 2962 15727  2340 14336 
Conventional 1597 17906  2219 19297 
Total 4559 33633   4559 33633 
 Full Model Income Only    
% Right Predictions 54.64 56.65    
Sensitivity (%) 64.97 51.33    
Specificity (%) 53.24 57.38    
Cut-off value 0.12 0.12       
a
 For full model ((2772+19367)/38192)*100 and for income only ((2340+19297)/38192)*100 
b
 This is the percentage of correctly predicting the choice of choosing organic milk. For full 
model (2772/4559)*100 and for income only (2340/4559)*100 
c
 This is the percentage of correctly predicting the choice of choosing conventional milk. For 
full model (19367/33633)*100 and for income only (19297/33633)*100 
d, e
 Same calculations as with the probit example 
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Inter-Model Probabilistic Graphs  
Following Yates (1982, 1988) and Olvera and Bessler (2006), illustrative 
constructs called probabilistic or covariance graphs were utilized to demonstrate the 
ability to differentiate binary choice events that had occurred or did not occur. The 
graphs illustrate the ability to discriminate between the choice of purchasing organic and 
conventional milk across three binary choice models, namely probit, logit and linear 
probability models (LPM). Results indicate that the slope and intercept of the three 
probabilistic graphs (Figures 4.1a, 4.2a and 4.3a) have values that are close to one 
another  
Intra-Binary Choice Model Comparisons 
In this section of the paper, the analysis shifts from comparing different binary 
choice models to looking at one choice model and its respective model variant. More 
specifically, we compare a choice model containing covariates such as income and 
various socio-demographic variables with a model variant which contains income as its 
only explanatory variable.  
 Results from Table 4.4 indicate that for all three models, Brier scores had 
increased between complete models and their variants with income as the only 
explanatory variable. More specifically, the increase in terms of percent change for the 
probit versus probit variant (income only) model was approximately 1.71 percent. For 
the logit model and its respective logit variant, the percent change increased by 1.69 
percent. As for the LPM and model variant, the approximate increase in percentage 
change was 1.711 percent. The increase in the Brier scores implies diminishing 
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forecasting ability of all three models with respect to predicting both choices (Table 4.4). 
This difference in Brier score was brought about by the declining variability of the 
predicted probabilities due to the omission of critical socio-demographic variables in a 
binary choice model specification (MinVar(p)). Thus, the results imply that when 
important socio-demographic determinants are removed, the variability of predicted 
probabilities is reduced and therefore forecasting ability is diminished. 
 Results from the prediction success-tables exhibited in Table 4.5 indicate that for 
both probit and logit models, the percent of right predictions declined by approximately 
2.27 percent and 3 percent. As for the LPM model, percentage of right predictions 
increased by 3.69 percent. Also for both the probit and logit models, we find that in 
terms of sensitivity or the ability to classify correctly the choice of organic milk, the 
sensitivity declined by 15.58 percent and 14.82 percent. Likewise, the specificity, or the 
ability to correctly predict the choice of conventional milk, declined by 0.36 percent and 
1.34 percent among model variants. The sensitivity of the LPM decreased by 21 percent 
while its specificity increased by 7.77 percent. Again based on the results of the 
prediction-success or contingency tables, censure of critical important socio-
demographic variables reduces in most cases the ability of choice models to make right 
predictions. 
Intra-Model Probabilistic Graphs  
Figures 4.1a, 4.1b, 4.2a, 4.2b, 4.3a 4.3b illustrate pairwise covariance graphs for 
probit, logit, LPM specifications and their respective model variants. Results show that
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(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 4.1. Probit (a) and probit-income variant (b) model probabilistic graphs 
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(a) 
 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 4.2. Logit (a) and logit-income variant (b) model probabilistic graphs 
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(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 4.3. Linear Probability Model (a) and LPM-income variant (b) model 
probabilistic graphs 
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the slopes of the probit, logit and LPM covariance graphs declined significantly when 
socio-demographic variables were removed from the original binary choice 
specification. For example, percentage changes in the slope for the probit and its 
income-only variant declined by approximately 79 percent. For the logit and LPM 
models, the percentage change in slope also decreased by 79 percent. These numbers are 
confirmed by the flatter probabilistic graphs that characterize choice models that are 
income-only variants. 
Intra-Model Analysis of the Yates Partition 
The Yates partition decomposes the Brier score into factors such as bias, scatter, 
minimum forecast variance, variance of outcome index (d) and covariance between p 
and d. In this section we center attention to the effect on scatter and minimum variance 
components. Results from Table 4.4 show that across the three models, the values of 
both factors declined noticeably when the number of explanatory variables were reduced 
to only the income variable. For example, the declining percent change for the probit 
model and its income only variant in both minimum forecast variance and scatter were 
95.87 percent and 79.48 percent. Likewise, for the logit model and its income-only 
model variant, the decline in percentage change were approximately 96.92 (minimum 
forecast variance) and 79.37 percent (scatter). As for the LPM model, similar changes 
also were observed in both direction of change and magnitude relative to the probit and 
logit models. 
 The effect of omitting important socio-demographic variables resulted then in 
reducing the variability of predicted probabilities. This reduction however also can mean 
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limited information flow which can constrain the ability of choice models to 
discriminate between events that occurred and those that did not occur. With limited 
information flow, we find that there is increased filtering of irrelevant information, and 
therefore the value of the scatter component decreases. As with the minimum variance, 
the limited information reduced the overall variance of the respective probabilities. 
Finally, with reduced information flow, the gap between probabilities assigned to binary 
events diminishes, thus we find that the forecast covariance decreases. In summary, 
model specifications that limit information flow in binary choice models can bring about 
increased noise filtering (declining scatter), lessening of overall forecast variance 
(decreased minimum forecast variance) and weakening of the ability to filter relevant 
information that enables the proper assignment of probabilities for events that occur and 
did not occur (reduced forecast covariance).        
Conclusions 
There were two levels of analysis done in this study; considering comparisons 
across choice models and considering comparisons of alternative specifications within 
choice models. Utilizing probit, logit and linear probability choice models to represent 
the choice of organic milk or conventional milk, both Brier scores and prediction-
success tables were evaluated to determine their usefulness in making accurate 
predictions. Results indicate that the probit model predicts better among the three models 
by having the lowest Brier Score and highest forecast covariance values. However, when 
the prediction-success was used, the logit model performed best in terms of correct 
classifications. One notable observation was that across the three models, the values of 
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the Brier score, Yates partition factors and prediction-success tables were very close in 
magnitude. The study also utilized probabilistic graphs in order to illustrate the ability of 
all models to differentiate between events that occurred (choosing organic milk) and 
those that did not occur (choosing conventional milk).  
 When important socio-demographic variables are omitted in a binary choice 
model, the variability level of the predicted probabilities becomes significantly reduced. 
Consequently, this diminishes the ability of the model to sort binary events or choices.  
Estimates from the Brier scores indicate that for each of the choice models vis-à-vis their 
respective income-only variant, the values increased indicating diminished forecasting 
ability. Likewise, results from the prediction-success table point to declining percentages 
of correct classifications. The declining slope change of the covariance graphs between 
“complete” models and their income-only variants is indicative of diminished binary 
event discriminatory ability. 
With regards to the effect on the factors from the Yates partition, the study 
focused on the scatter and minimum variance. Results show that when important socio-
demographic variables are omitted, scatter and minimum variance values are 
significantly reduced. An intuitive explanation for this change lies in the reduction of the 
variability of predicted probabilities. Also, the removal of important socio-demographic 
variables resulted in a weakened ability to sort between events that occurred and did not 
occur. And as such, points to the tradeoff between sorting and variability. As to the use 
of prediction success tables, one must also utilize other methods such as probability 
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scoring as this paper showed that logit was the superior model in using the prediction 
success tables, whereas the probit performed best under the probability score criteria.  
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CHAPTER V 
MICRO-DEMAND SYSTEMS ANALYSIS OF NON-ALCOHOLIC  
BEVERAGES IN THE US: AN APPLICATION OF ECONOMETRIC 
TECHNIQUES DEALING WITH CENSORING 
 
The move towards different diet mechanisms that favor nutritious foods has in 
recent years led to the emergence of healthier and natural food choices. In particular, 
manufacturers and retailers have been responsive in introducing new products to the non-
alcoholic beverage industry, especially juices, energy drinks and others. This chapter 
focuses on the interdependencies of milk, and demand for certain non-alcoholic beverages, 
namely: fruit juices, tea, coffee, carbonated soft drinks, and bottled water. In the case of 
the non-alcoholic beverage complex, these products have different levels of market 
penetration. Consequently, the dependent variables associated with these non-alcoholic 
beverages are censored at zero. That is, certain households have zero expenditures, but the 
corresponding information on household characteristics, which forms the basis of the 
explanatory variables are often readily observed. Thus, several competing estimation 
methods have been developed in order to address the censoring issue in the estimation of 
micro-demand systems. Importantly, no prior research has been done in terms of utilizing 
these respective approaches with regard to a particular data set.  
In this study, the estimation of the demand system made use of Quadratic Almost 
Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) model (Banks, Blundell and Lewbel, 1997) and 
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) (Deaton and Mulbauer, 1980). The advantages of 
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the QUAIDS model are its flexibility in incorporating nonlinear effects and interactions 
of price and expenditures in the demand relationships.  Since the data used are at the 
household level, censoring is typically observed as some households report expenditures 
of a beverage product say coffee and none on say bottled water. Thus, in order to model 
the censoring problem in demand systems, the research utilized estimation procedures 
that range from the use of two-step estimators (Heien and Wessells, 1990; Shonkwiler 
and Yen, 1999), maximum entropy and maximum simulated likelihood estimation 
(Dong, Gould and Kaiser, 2004a). The use of the iterated seemingly unrelated regression 
(ITSUR) estimation without adjustments for censoring serves as a basis of comparison 
for the aforementioned estimation techniques. Finally, the source of data is the 1999 
Nielsen Homescan Panel due to its vast array of household demographic information.  
Literature Review 
The use of the Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) model in 
applied work has been well documented. For example, Dhar and Foltz (2005) utilized a 
quadratic AIDS model to estimate values and benefits derived from rBST, organic milk 
and unlabelled milk. Their study used scanner time-series data of milk consumption of 
12 key cities in the United States. Their findings indicate that rBST and organic milk are 
complements, while conventional milk and rBST milk, as well as conventional milk and 
organic milk are substitutes. Their own-price elasticity estimates were -4.40 (rBST free 
milk), -1.37 (organic milk) and -1.04 (conventional milk). 
Likewise, a study done by Mutuc, Pan and Rejesus (2007) investigated 
household demand for vegetables in the Philippines through the use of QUAIDS. Their 
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findings indicated significant differences in expenditure elasticities in both rural and 
urban areas whereas for the respective own and cross-price elasticities, no significant 
variations across rural and urban areas were evident. Dhar and Foltz (2005) used Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML) as an estimation procedure, the Mutuc et al.’s 
(2007) study had a censoring problem because of the presence zero expenditures on 
some vegetable commodities being consumed by the household, hence their  usage of 
the Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) two step procedure. As microdata become increasingly 
available and more detailed, the estimation of micro-demand systems at the household 
level becomes problematic due to censoring.   
The work of Heien and Wessells (1990) was one of the pioneering studies to 
address the censoring problem in demand systems estimation. Their approach mimics 
the Heckman two-stage method by estimating probit models to compute the inverse 
Mill’s ratios for each commodity. Subsequently, these measures are incorporated into the 
second step SUR estimation of the budget shares. On the other hand, Shonkwiler and 
Yen (1999) proposed a consistent estimation procedure that utilizes a probit estimator in 
the first step and then using the cdf to multiply the covariates in the demand shares and 
including the pdf as an independent variable in the second step. Both methods fall under 
the purview of utilizing two-step estimators.  
While the Shonkwiler and Yen approach worked well with the problem of zero 
expenditure, Arndt, Liu and Preckel (1999) claimed that it had limitations with respect to 
dealing with corner solutions. Several studies including Arndt (1999) and Golan, Perloff 
and Shen (2001) propose an alternative approach called maximum entropy to estimate 
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censored demand systems. This approach allows for consistent and efficient estimation 
of demand systems without putting any restrictions on the error terms. Other researchers 
such as Meyerhoefer, Ranney and Sahn (2005) use the general method of moments 
(GMM) estimator to address censoring problems in demand systems estimation. The 
GMM method was not used in this study.   
Several studies have criticized the two step method stating that it has ignores the  
“adding up” restriction in estimating share equations in the censored demand systems 
(Dong, Gould and Kaiser, 2004a; Yen, Lin and Smallwood, 2003). Together with Golan, 
Perloff and Shen (2001), these classes of estimators fall under the Amemiya-Tobin 
framework where the former does not employ maximum likelihood estimation in 
evaluating multivariate probability integrals while Dong, Gould, Kaiser (2004a) and 
Yen, Lin Smallwood (2003) utilize numerical methods such as maximum and quasi-
maximum simulated likelihood estimation in approximating the likelihood function. The 
literature regarding the use of alternative estimation techniques such as Bayesian and 
non-parametric approaches on micro-demand system estimation have been limited 
(Tiffin and Aquiar, 1995).      
Methodology 
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) Model 
This research utilizes the AIDS (Deaton and Mulbauer, 1980) model in the 
demand system estimation of six non-alcoholic beverages, namely: fruit juices, tea, 
coffee, carbonated soft drinks, bottled water and milk.  Equation (1) describes the 
general specification of the AIDS model where pj and wi are the price and budget share 
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of the ith   beverage commodity with the price index ln α(p) being specified further as a 
function of own and cross prices. The average budget share wi is computed as piqi/M 
where M = ∑piqi is the total expenditure. The parameters of this system are αi, γi and βi, 
respectively. One can also incorporate household demographic characteristics into the 
demand system thru the intercept parameter αi.  These variables include HHsize for 
household size, Inc as household income and Race is race type. Also, the variable 
Season represents the seasonality component and Rg is the Region. 
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On the other hand, the classical theoretical restrictions of adding up, 
homogeneity and symmetry imposed in the AIDS demand system estimation have the 
following notational representation; 
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 By imposing these restrictions, the model satisfies the Engel Aggregation thru 
the adding up condition and from the parameter γij, homogeneity and symmetry are 
imposed.  
Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) Model 
The Quadratic Almost Ideal Demand System (QUAIDS) model (Banks, Blundell 
and Lewbel, 1997) also is utilized in this demand analysis. The advantages of using this 
model over competing flexible demand systems is its unparalleled capability of 
incorporating non-linear effects and interactions of price and expenditures on the 
demand specifications. The mathematical representation of the QUAIDS demand system 
is as follows:  
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The QUAIDS model is a more generalized version of the AIDS model. Also, if 
the joint significance test of the parameter λi =0 is rejected then the QUAIDS model is a 
superior model at least statistically relative to the AIDS model system. In this research, 
the intercept parameter αi incorporates the household demographic characteristics just as 
with the AIDS model. Since the QUAIDS model has a quadratic term, then another 
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parameter restriction associated with adding up is imposed in addition to the classical 
theoretical restrictions that were applied.  
Adding up:∑
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Again the imposition of these restrictions satisfies the Engel Aggregation and the 
homogeneity and symmetry conditions are subsumed thru the parameter γij. 
Elasticity Estimation in AIDS and QUAIDS Demand Systems 
When the needed parameters are already estimated, the elasticity estimates can 
now be calculated for the AIDS and QUAIDS demand systems. Following Green and 
Alston (1990) and Bank, Blundell and Lewbel (1997) formulas, the expenditure, 
uncompensated and compensated price elasticities are given by the following formulas; 
(3)                           1+=
i
i
i
w
βη , for the AIDS model 
(4)                          1)(
ln)(
2
+












+
=
i
i
i
i
w
pa
m
pb
λβ
η , for the QUAIDS model. 
On the other hand the Marshallian or uncompensated price elasticities are given by  
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Finally, from the Slutsky’s Equation, the Hicksian or compensated elasticties are 
calculated via the formula; ji
u
ij
c
ij wηεε += ,   where uijε  is the uncompensated price 
elasticity of i with respect to j and iη  is the budget elasticity of good i. The term wj is the 
mean budget share of good j.    
Estimation Techniques That Address Censoring in a Demand System 
Two-Step Estimators 
A class of estimation techniques that deal with censored systems equation is the 
two-step estimation procedure. In this paper we highlight the two approaches namely the 
Heien and Wessells (1990) approach and the Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) method. These 
techniques usually consist of estimating a binary choice model in the first step, whose 
purpose is to account for those households that purchased and did not purchase the said 
commodity. In this exercise a probit model was estimated where the outcome variable 
takes on two values namely those households that purchased (1) and those that did not 
purchase (0). Two important derivatives of the probit estimation include the calculation 
of the cumulative distribution function (cdf) and probability density function (pdf) from 
the choice model.  
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In the case of the Heien and Wessells (1990) approach, the calculation of the 
inverse Mill’s ratio (ratio of the pdf and cdf) from the first step probit estimation is now 
included as an added regressor into the estimation of the demand system. We note 
however that for those households that consumed and did not consume the beverage 
item, the inverse mills ratio had the following formula: 
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where IMR, )ˆ( ηφ iW , )ˆ( ηiWΦ  and Wi  are the inverse mills ratio, pdf , cdf and vector of 
socio-demographic variables including income, race and region. Thus, the Heien and 
Wessells (1990) two step approach of estimating a demand system can be represented as:  
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On the other hand, the Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) consistent two step approach 
utilizes the calculated cdf to multiply the whole RHS variables of the share equation and 
include the pdf as an additional regressor in the system of budget shares. In notational 
form this can be represented as: 
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Dong, Gould and Kaiser Approach (2004) 
In this paper, we use the Dong, Gould and Kaiser (2004a) approach which is a 
variant of the Amemiya-Tobin model in estimating a censored AIDS model. In this 
approach the AIDS demand model can be written as:  
(13)          εβγα +
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where iii qpw =*  represents the latent budget share with pi and qi correspond to the price 
and quantity of ith beverage. As pointed out by Stockton, Capps and Dong (2007), the 
censored system will take into account the latent budget share if the vector mapping of 
the latent shares to its corresponding actual shares addresses the following conditions 
concerning the latent share; *iw . These conditions are i) 10 ≤≤ iw  and ii) 1=∑
i
iw . 
Thus, Dong, Gould and Kaiser (2004a) proposed an approach that addresses both 
restrictions by applying the following mapping condition; 
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 , if 0* >iw and Ω corresponds to the positive latent share space. 
      0=iw ,         if 0
* ≤iw  
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 In this mapping rule, we find that not only is the adding up condition for latent and 
observed shares satisfied but because the rule addressed the two constraints imposed on 
the latent share, non-negative expenditure shares are expected. As for the estimation 
procedure, the error structure of the respective share equation assumes a multivariate 
normal distribution, thus the method of maximum simulated likelihood was used to 
evaluate the integrals inherent in a multivariate normal distribution. 
Generalized Maximum Entropy Procedure 
Following the SAS ETS 9.2 ENTROPY Procedure guide (SAS ETS 9.2 User 
Guide, 2008), the procedure selects the parameter estimates consistent with the 
maximization of the entropy distribution. Thus, the entropy metric for a given 
distribution is given as; 
(15)                     max )ln(
1
i
n
i
i pp∑
=
−  s.t. ∑
=
=
n
i
ip
1
1, 
where ip  is the probability of the ith support point. 
 In a regression framework, since this method assumes no parametric assumptions 
about the error terms and coefficients, a transformation known as reparameterization is 
necessary in order to identify the said parameters. For a two point support case, a 
reparametrized error term can be written as 2211 zzzz erer +=ε  where r1 and r2 are 
associated weights of the error term’s upper and lower bound values of e1 and e2. As for 
the reparameterized coefficients, this can be written as 2211 hhhh spsp +=β  where p1 and 
p2 represent the probabilities of β and s1 and s2 are the upper and lower bounds values 
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based on prior information involving β. From this reparameterization, the GME 
maximization problem can be notationally written as: 
(16)                                 max  )ln(')ln('),( rrpprpG −−=  
                                s.t.   q = X S p + E r 
                                      1H  = (IHΘ 11L ) p 
                                       1Z = (IZΘ 11L ) r 
where q is the vector of response variable, X is the matrix of independent covariate 
observations. S and p denote the vectors of weight and their associated probabilities with 
respect to β, while r is the weight associated with the boundary point contained in E. 
And finally IH and IZ are identity matrices. The symbol Θ is the Kronecker product. 
 However for this exercise, we deal with censored shares in a demand system 
such that we make modifications in solving the primal problem of the entropy procedure 
found in equation 16. For example, given that q = wi is the share in the AIDS 
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Following this example in the AIDS model, a similar construction can be done in the 
QUAIDS model.  
Estimation Issues  
This research also attempted to use the Dirichlet distribution to model the 
censored shares of the non-alcoholic beverage demand system. The Dirichlet distribution 
is a multivariate generalization of the beta distribution and imposes following properties 
in terms of modeling the shares in the demand system; i) 10 << iw  and ii) 1=∑
i
iw . 
However, in the Dirichlet distribution, densities do not exist in the distribution’s 
boundaries (0 and 1) and therefore only those observations that are in the interior are 
valid. Thus, modeling censored demand systems with Dirichlet distribution is not 
possible. 
 The estimation of the AIDS and QUAIDS specification using the maximum 
entropy technique was done using the experimental SAS procedure called PROC 
ENTROPY. However, this experimental procedure at present is only limited to 
estimation of systems of linear regressions. Thus, attempts were made to linearize the 
demand system by using the starting values generated from the ITSUR specification and 
simplifying through the use of mean values of the non linear components such as the 
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nonlinear price index ln(a(p)) and Cobb–Douglas price aggregator b(p)  into constants in 
both the AIDS and QUAIDS model. Thus, in this case, the linearized AIDS and 
QUAIDS model can be represented as: 
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=Γ  with lnC as the calculated constant of ln a(p) and D is the 
constant representing the Cobb-Douglas price aggregator b(p).  
Another simplification that the study did was to forego the imposition of classical 
restriction of adding up, symmetry and homogeneity in the maximum entropy estimation 
of the demand system. This is because of the difficulty of identifying the values of 
support points of those coefficients being restricted. And with so many restrictions being 
imposed, the identification of problematic constraints becomes a major problem. Thus, 
the estimation of the AIDS and QUAIDS models were done without the usual imposition 
of the classical theoretical constraints. 
 The usage of the Dong, Gould and Kaiser (2004) technique was only performed 
in the AIDS model. This study did not attempt to use it in a QUAIDS model 
specification. This was primarily due to the highly non linear nature of the QUAIDS 
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model and because the estimation approach requires the evaluation of multivariate 
integrals in a highly non linear model, convergence maybe difficult to achieve.     
Data 
The data used in the study is the 1999 AC Nielsen HomeScan Panel where the 
data set is a compilation of household purchase transactions of the said year. In this data 
set, the household’s transaction records with respect to total expenditures and quantities 
of commodities are purchased primarily in retail groceries which include the usage of 
either discounts or coupons. The household transactions are performed by the use of 
scanner equipment. The number of household used is 7, 195 and because it was further 
disaggregated by quarter the total sample size numbered to 28,780. This sample size can 
be thought of a national representative sample of the huge amounts of item purchases of 
U.S. households for the year 1999.  
In this study, the various specific socio-demographic variables used in the study 
were household income, household size, race, region and seasonal indicator for quarter. 
From Table 5.1, we find the mean household income is $51,740 and dominant household 
size for the sample is those with two members (38%). As for race, approximately 94 
percent are white and black households. As for region, 33 percent come from South 
while rest has the following shares: east (20%), Central (25%) and West (20%). 
Another feature of the data set is that commodity prices are not readily available, 
instead one uses the derivation of total expenditures over total quantity of the purchased 
item and it is called unit values and this is used as a proxy for the item price. If both the 
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Table 5.1. Descriptive Statistics of Relevant Household Demographic Variables  
 
Variables Mean Std. Deviation  Min Max 
  
   
Household Income($) 51,740 26,254 5,000 100,000 
Household Size (%)    
 
One member 22 41 0 1 
Two members 38 48 0 1 
Three members 16 37 0 1 
Four members 15 36 0 1 
Five members 10 29 0 1 
Race (%)     
 
White 84 37 0 1 
Black 10 30 0 1 
Oriental 1 11 0 1 
Other 5 22 0 1 
Region (%)    
 
East 20 40 0 1 
Central 25 43 0 1 
South 34 47 0 1 
West 20 40 0 1 
Quarter (%)    
 
Q1 25 43 0 1 
Q2 25 43 0 1 
Q3 25 43 0 1 
Q4 25 43 0 1 
     
Observations 28,780     
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expenditures and quantities were zero, then this study utilized a simple price imputation 
procedure where the process rested on the use of income, race and regional dummy 
variables. If Pi = 0, then 
Pfruitjuice = 4.53912 + (hinc*0.00000345) + (white*-0.0885) + (black*-0.24972) + 
(oriental*0.01158) + (central*-0.07377) + (south*-0.02857) + (west*0.60825); 
 
 Ptea = 2.07429 + (hinc*0.00000716) + (white*-0.39710) + (black*-0.08642) + 
(oriental*-0.13340) + (central*0.03567) + (south*-0.29073) + (west*0.24558); 
 
 Pcoffee = 1.26359 + (hinc*0.00000539) + (white*-0.26017) + (black*-0.18400) + 
(oriental*0.86170)+ (central*0.10697) + (south*0.00532) + (west*0.33853); 
 
 Pcsd = 2.29327 + (hinc*0.0000006510327) + (white*0.02942) + (black*0.03566) + 
(oriental*0.14496) + (central*0.07624) + (south*0.16520)+ (west*0.21459); 
 
 Pwater = 1.98661 + (hinc*0.00000218) + (white*0.04082) + (black*-0.06763) + 
(oriental*0.01389) + (central*-0.00548) + (south*-0.06986) + (west*-0.20992); 
 
Pmilk = 3.21833 + (hinc*-0.000000112181) + (white*-0.13875) + (black*0.28677) + 
(oriental*0.22932) + (central*-0.24758) + (south*-0.05396) + (west*0.17670); 
 
 
Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4 present the mean total expenditures, quantity purchased 
and prices for the 6 non-alcoholic beverages used in the study. In this case we find that 
the top household purchases with respect to non-alcoholic beverages were carbonated 
soft drinks, fruit juices, milk and coffee. The mean price  are as follows fruit juices 
($4.71/gal), tea ($2.06/gal), coffee ($1.41/gal), carbonated soft drinks ($2.48/gal), 
bottled water ($2.06/gal) and milk ($3.08/gal). On the other hand, Table 5.5 presents the 
mean budget shares of the beverage items. For the period 1999, approximately 81 
percent of total expenditures for non alcoholic beverages are captured by carbonated soft 
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Table 5.2. Descriptive Statistics for Total Expenditure for Each Non- 
Alcoholic Beverage Item (n=28,780) 
 
  
Mean  
($) 
Std. Deviation 
($) 
Min 
($) Max ($) 
Fruit Juices 14.19 19.15 0 268.82 
Tea 3.42 7.36 0 177.26 
Coffee 8.45 13.21 0 230.59 
Carbonated Soft Drinks 31.14 41.24 0 1814.93 
Bottled Water 3.02 8.34 0 206.96 
Milk 22.86 23.87 0 304.05 
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Table 5.3. Descriptive Statistics for Quantities for Each Non Alcoholic Beverage 
Item (n=28,780) 
 
  
Mean 
(gallons) 
Std. Deviation 
(gallons) 
Min 
(gallons) 
Max 
(gallons) 
Fruit Juices 3.17 4.25 0 63.31 
Tea 2.76 6.03 0 137.50 
Coffee 8.27 13.73 0 305.51 
Carbonated Soft Drinks 13.27 16.83 0 681.75 
Bottled Water 2.44 7.51 0 151.45 
Milk 8.30 9.22 0 98.00 
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Table 5.4. Descriptive Statistics for Prices1 for Each Non-Alcoholic Beverage 
Item (n=28,780) 
 
  
Mean 
($/gallon) 
Std. Deviation 
($/gallon) 
Min 
($/gallon) 
Max 
($/gallon) 
Fruit Juices 4.71 1.31 0.99 15.09 
Tea 2.06 1.24 0.08 16.08 
Coffee 1.41 1.32 0.13 16.03 
Carbonated Soft Drinks 2.48 0.85 0.30 11.44 
Bottled Water 2.06 1.04 0.05 12.83 
Milk 3.08 0.89 0.88 15.56 
 
1
 When expenditure and quantities are equal to zero, price imputation was used where if qty=0 
then Pi=f(income,race and region). 
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Table 5.5. Mean Budget Shares for Each Beverage Item for Calendar Year 1999 
 
Beverage Product 
Average  
Budget Share Std. Deviation Min Max 
Fruit Juices 0.175 0.188 0.000 1.000 
Tea 0.047 0.096 0.000 1.000 
Coffee 0.109 0.153 0.000 1.000 
Carbonated Soft Drinks 0.343 0.247 0.000 1.000 
Bottled Water 0.038 0.094 0.000 1.000 
Milk 0.288 0.210 0.000 1.000 
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drinks, fruit juices and milk. The 19 percent are devoted to tea (4.7 %), coffee (11%) and 
bottled water (3.8 %).  
Table 5.6 describes the degree of censoring associated with each type of non-
alcoholic beverages. From the table items with minimal to medium censoring are milk 
(6.77%), carbonated soft drinks (8.84 %) and fruit juices (23.09 %). On the other hand 
the remaining highly censored non-alcoholic beverage items are tea (54.88 %), coffee 
(42.77 %) and bottled water (60.65 %). 
Empirical Results      
Estimated Demand Parameters 
Both the censored AIDS and QUAIDS specifications and their unrestricted 
analogs were estimated using the various techniques addressing the censoring issue. 
These included the Iterated Seemingly Unrelated regression (ITSUR), the two step 
procedure approaches; Heien & Wessells (1990) and Shonkwiler & Yen (1999), the 
Generalized Maximum Entropy and the Simulated Maximum Likelihood estimation 
(Dong et al., 2004a). Tables 5.7 to 5.10 provide the estimated parameters of AIDS and 
QUAIDS plus their unrestricted specifications.  
Almost all of the socio-demographic parameters in both specifications and across 
all estimation techniques are statistically significant. Also, almost all of the parameters 
in both AIDS and QUAIDS and across estimation techniques are relatively close to one 
another and the same can be said for the AIDS and QUAIDS unrestricted cases. Thus it 
can be postulated that because of a relatively large sample size, the various estimation 
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Table 5.6. Number of Censored Responses for Each Beverage 
Item 
 
  
Number of 
Observations Percentage 
Fruit Juices 6,646 23.09 
Tea 15,795 54.88 
Coffee 12,310 42.77 
Carbonated Soft Drinks 2,544 8.84 
Bottled Water 17,454 60.65 
Milk 1,949 6.77 
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Table 5.7. Parameter Estimates of Different Censoring Techniques for AIDS Estimation 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien & P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value Dong et al T-value 
      Wessells    & Yen   
Max. 
Entropy   Actual   
           
I. Fruit Juice           
constant (af0) 0.214472 <.0001 0.23759 <.0001 0.219606 <.0001 0.128333 <.0001 -0.1565 -6.3447 
hinc (afa) 7.98E-07 <.0001 8.59E-07 <.0001 9.42E-07 <.0001 6.93E-07 <.0001 0.044 20.2886 
hs2(afb) -0.01708 <.0001 -0.01751 <.0001 -0.02443 <.0001 -0.01304 <.0001 -0.0222 -5.4082 
hs3(afc) -0.0299 <.0001 -0.02968 <.0001 -0.0407 <.0001 -0.02392 <.0001 -0.0365 -6.6273 
hs4(afd) -0.04384 <.0001 -0.04243 <.0001 -0.05824 <.0001 -0.03647 <.0001 -0.0535 -9.041 
hs5(afe) -0.04321 <.0001 -0.04035 <.0001 -0.05902 <.0001 -0.03435 <.0001 -0.0523 -7.6816 
white(aff) -0.03569 <.0001 -0.03543 <.0001 -0.04462 <.0001 -0.03073 <.0001 -0.053 -7.6536 
black(afg) 0.056458 <.0001 0.053506 <.0001 0.062805 <.0001 0.058266 <.0001 0.0698 8.673 
oriental(afh) 0.058398 <.0001 0.054969 <.0001 0.064485 <.0001 0.054533 <.0001 0.0814 6.1896 
central(afi) -0.05463 <.0001 -0.05483 <.0001 -0.06587 <.0001 -0.05309 <.0001 -0.0701 -14.5763 
south(afj) -0.0382 <.0001 -0.03899 <.0001 -0.04285 <.0001 -0.03852 <.0001 -0.0504 -11.4912 
west(afk) -0.05601 <.0001 -0.05792 <.0001 -0.06122 <.0001 -0.06379 <.0001 -0.0794 -16.005 
Q1(afl) -0.00255 0.402 -0.00141 0.6164 -0.00383 0.3215 -0.00251 0.4083 -0.0029 -0.6597 
Q2(afm) -0.01287 <.0001 -0.01064 0.0002 -0.01737 <.0001 -0.01109 0.0003 -0.0172 -3.8355 
Q3(afn) -0.01244 <.0001 -0.00997 0.0004 -0.01645 <.0001 -0.01074 0.0004 -0.0193 -4.3565 
lpf(gff) -0.00018 0.961 0.007987 0.0181 0.002367 0.6077 0.016855 <.0001 -0.0203 -3.6021 
lpt(gft) 0.000672 0.6064 -0.00051 0.6983 -0.00409 0.0205 0.002177 0.2267 0.0066 2.8842 
lpc(gfc) 0.014688 <.0001 0.010834 <.0001 0.021914 <.0001 0.025443 <.0001 0.0265 8.172 
lps(gfs) -0.03636 <.0001 -0.03467 <.0001 -0.04115 <.0001 -0.01617 <.0001 0.0079 3.3476 
lpw(gfw) -0.00306 0.0293 -0.00392 0.0021 -0.00634 0.0016 -0.00652 0.0041 -0.0087 -3.7526 
lpm(gfm) 0.02424 <.0001 0.02029 <.0001 0.0273 <.0001 0.05256 <.0001   
bf 0.004014 0.0063 -0.00695 <.0001 0.003695 0.0468 0.007302 <.0001 0.005 2.5906 
pf   0.04244 <.0001       
zf     0.154526 0.0109     
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Table 5.7 Continued 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien & P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value Dong et al T-value 
      Wessells    & Yen   
Max. 
Entropy   Actual   
           
II. Coffee           
constant (ac0) 0.065597 <.0001 0.129077 <.0001 0.202503 0.0068 0.11659 <.0001 0.0751 3.8193 
hinc (aca) -3.99E-08 0.2611 -7.28E-09 0.8111 -2.62E-07 0.0001 2.30E-08 0.5283 -0.0078 -4.3928 
hs2(acb) 0.012944 <.0001 0.004756 0.028 0.020336 <.0001 0.011339 <.0001 0.0236 6.2644 
hs3(acc) -0.022 <.0001 -0.0232 <.0001 -0.0417 <.0001 -0.02426 <.0001 -0.0319 -6.0685 
hs4(acd) -0.02987 <.0001 -0.02913 <.0001 -0.05379 <.0001 -0.03261 <.0001 -0.0443 -7.7021 
hs5(ace) -0.03579 <.0001 -0.03235 <.0001 -0.06595 <.0001 -0.03915 <.0001 -0.0537 -7.7525 
white(acf) 0.018138 <.0001 0.019822 <.0001 0.004924 0.7136 0.015943 0.0001 0.0304 4.4625 
black(acg) -0.02062 <.0001 -0.02618 <.0001 0.019014 0.425 -0.02246 <.0001 -0.041 -4.9089 
oriental(ach) 0.001977 0.8188 -0.01509 0.0405 0.046877 0.0998 0.003139 0.7128 0.0111 0.6569 
central(aci) -0.00988 0.0002 -0.01195 <.0001 0.009873 0.4256 -0.01037 <.0001 -0.0186 -4.3013 
south(acj) -0.01742 <.0001 -0.019 <.0001 -0.01579 0.0266 -0.0175 <.0001 -0.0267 -6.2609 
west(ack) 0.00872 0.0018 0.003549 0.137 0.036907 0.0014 0.012525 <.0001 0.0097 2.1751 
Q1(acl) -0.00328 0.1846 -0.00225 0.2871 -0.00689 0.1025 -0.00294 0.2337 -0.0055 -1.4365 
Q2(acm) -0.0123 <.0001 -0.00813 0.0001 -0.02353 <.0001 -0.01242 <.0001 -0.0244 -6.0645 
Q3(can) -0.01018 <.0001 -0.00678 0.0014 -0.02055 <.0001 -0.01038 <.0001 -0.0215 -5.3264 
lpf(gfc) 0.014688 <.0001 0.010834 <.0001 0.021914 <.0001 0.00149 0.6438 0.0265 8.172 
lpt(gtc) 0.001992 0.0411 -0.00272 0.005 0.020093 <.0001 0.000145 0.9211 0.0043 2.5191 
lpc(gcc) -0.06452 <.0001 -0.04213 <.0001 -0.09507 <.0001 -0.0691 <.0001 -0.1117 -40.2576 
lps(gcs) 0.010469 <.0001 0.007857 0.0001 0.010647 0.0117 0.000615 0.8444 0.0213 6.4296 
lpw(gcw) 0.007774 <.0001 0.004823 <.0001 0.0169 <.0001 0.004692 0.011 0.0188 9.9521 
lpm(gcm) 0.029593 <.0001 0.021335 <.0001 0.025515 <.0001 0.01873 <.0001   
bc -0.00098 0.4119 -0.01559 <.0001 0.000419 0.8376 -0.00351 0.004 0.0026 1.3483 
pc   0.056251 <.0001       
zc     -0.08333 0.4306     
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Table 5.7 Continued 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien & P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value Dong et al T-value 
      Wessells    & Yen   
Max. 
Entropy   Actual   
          
III. Carbonated Soft Drinks          
constant (as0) 0.196319 <.0001 0.214279 <.0001 0.085908 0.0107 0.143986 <.0001 0.5269 30.7133 
hinc (asa) -3.66E-07 <.0001 -3.23E-07 <.0001 1.27E-07 0.55 -5.38E-07 <.0001 -0.0305 -20.084 
hs2(asb) -0.01101 0.0078 -0.01313 0.0011 -0.01146 0.0115 -0.00582 0.1602 -0.0048 -1.0681 
hs3(asc) 0.014921 0.0035 0.011912 0.0165 0.016997 0.0023 0.021685 <.0001 0.0302 4.7479 
hs4(asd) 0.007759 0.1472 0.005664 0.2771 0.008014 0.1686 0.015893 0.0033 0.0205 3.055 
hs5(ase) -0.01083 0.0755 -0.01193 0.0444 -0.01132 0.0875 -0.00112 0.8552 -0.0007 -0.0959 
white(asf) -0.01792 0.0077 -0.01726 0.008 -0.03591 0.0002 -0.01207 0.0717 -0.0009 -0.1634 
black(asg) -0.0098 0.2158 -0.01322 0.0859 -0.02779 0.0101 -0.00777 0.3252 0.0105 1.2538 
oriental(ash) -0.09292 <.0001 -0.09465 <.0001 -0.17557 <.0001 -0.09695 <.0001 -0.1154 -6.3265 
central(asi) 0.076523 <.0001 0.076186 <.0001 0.095466 <.0001 0.077509 <.0001 0.1151 20.2808 
south(asj) 0.055064 <.0001 0.054924 <.0001 0.071278 <.0001 0.055863 <.0001 0.083 15.059 
west(ask) 0.038646 <.0001 0.036423 <.0001 0.040851 <.0001 0.029935 <.0001 0.0619 10.2527 
Q1(asl) -0.00229 0.5706 -0.00198 0.6142 -0.00216 0.6234 -0.00325 0.4197 0.0045 0.8924 
Q2(asm) 0.035846 <.0001 0.035323 <.0001 0.040252 <.0001 0.036678 <.0001 0.0487 9.4008 
Q3(asn) 0.025694 <.0001 0.025005 <.0001 0.029413 <.0001 0.026503 <.0001 0.0331 6.3035 
lpf(gfs) -0.03636 <.0001 -0.03467 <.0001 -0.04115 <.0001 -0.03095 <.0001 -0.0485 -11.6719 
lpt(gts) 0.004836 0.0011 0.003496 0.0298 0.005699 0.0415 0.010563 <.0001 0.0079 3.3476 
lpc(gcs) 0.010469 <.0001 0.007857 0.0001 0.010647 0.0117 0.017874 <.0001 0.0213 6.4296 
lps(gss) -0.00442 0.3568 -0.00136 0.7693 -0.0083 0.1352 0.009411 0.0658 -0.005 -0.8126 
lpw(gsw) 0.01128 <.0001 0.007153 <.0001 0.012525 <.0001 0.019091 <.0001 0.0179 7.3878 
lpm(gsm) 0.0142 <.0001 0.017532 <.0001 0.020577 <.0001 0.034187 <.0001   
bs 0.04851 <.0001 0.04169 <.0001 0.052889 <.0001 0.054016 <.0001 0.0514 24.3444 
ps   0.032694 <.0001       
zs     0.611293 <.0001     
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Table 5.7 Continued 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien & P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value Dong et al T-value 
      Wessells    & Yen   
Max. 
Entropy   Actual   
           
IV. Water           
constant (aw0) 0.051332 <.0001 0.088 <.0001 0.087653 0.0874 0.014262 0.0059 -0.2621 -31.8639 
hinc (awa) 2.35E-07 <.0001 3.15E-08 0.1081 5.05E-07 0.0295 1.86E-07 <.0001 0.0223 25.7652 
hs2(awb) -0.01574 <.0001 -0.01305 <.0001 -0.02319 <.0001 -0.01446 <.0001 -0.0369 -14.3957 
hs3(awc) -0.01338 <.0001 -0.01246 <.0001 -0.01941 <.0001 -0.01162 <.0001 -0.0292 -8.6243 
hs4(awd) -0.01789 <.0001 -0.01865 <.0001 -0.02791 <.0001 -0.01593 <.0001 -0.031 -8.1557 
hs5(awe) -0.01834 <.0001 -0.01798 <.0001 -0.02957 <.0001 -0.01608 <.0001 -0.0342 -7.6966 
white(awf) -0.01419 <.0001 -0.00351 0.1186 -0.03622 0.012 -0.01252 <.0001 -0.0366 -8.6262 
black(awg) 0.018541 <.0001 0.014063 <.0001 0.041239 <.0001 0.02049 <.0001 0.0267 5.6107 
oriental(awh) 0.003686 0.4835 0.007951 0.0911 0.001508 0.9017 0.003302 0.5191 -0.0076 -0.9225 
central(awi) -0.007 <.0001 -0.00109 0.4511 -0.01506 0.0184 -0.00733 <.0001 -0.0192 -6.3875 
south(awj) -0.00246 0.1008 -0.00127 0.3433 -0.00472 0.1212 -0.00222 0.1369 -0.0078 -2.8603 
west(awk) 0.001469 0.3899 0.0007 0.6475 0.002552 0.5063 -0.00182 0.2912 0.0005 0.1555 
Q1(awl) -0.00679 <.0001 -0.00373 0.0058 -0.01049 <.0001 -0.00709 <.0001 -0.0196 -6.7781 
Q2(awm) 0.003286 0.0303 0.00288 0.034 0.004472 0.0705 0.002744 0.0698 0.0048 2.0111 
Q3(awn) 0.007918 <.0001 0.004951 0.0003 0.011802 <.0001 0.007448 <.0001 0.0185 6.9359 
lpf(gfw) -0.00306 0.0293 -0.00392 0.0021 -0.00634 0.0016 0.012044 <.0001 -0.0087 -3.7526 
lpt(gtw) 0.002819 <.0001 -0.00075 0.2724 0.011376 <.0001 0.006699 <.0001 0.0095 6.9618 
lpc(gcw) 0.007774 <.0001 0.004823 <.0001 0.0169 <.0001 0.010618 <.0001 0.0188 9.9521 
lps(gsw) 0.01128 <.0001 0.007153 <.0001 0.012525 <.0001 0.017538 <.0001 0.0179 7.3878 
lpw(gww) -0.03863 <.0001 -0.02198 <.0001 -0.06014 <.0001 -0.03603 <.0001 -0.0864 -54.3579 
lpm(gwm) 0.01982 <.0001 0.014676 <.0001 0.025679 <.0001 0.021395 <.0001   
bw -0.00252 0.0005 -0.00942 <.0001 -0.00289 0.0145 -0.00161 0.0303 0.0132 10.72 
pw   0.037163 <.0001       
zw     0.012815 0.8692     
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Table 5.7 Continued 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien & P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value Dong et al T-value 
      Wessells    & Yen   
Max. 
Entropy   Actual   
           
V. Milk           
constant (am0) 0.377373 <.0001 0.39274 <.0001 0.283723 <.0001 0.540447 <.0001   
hinc (ama) -7.10E-07 <.0001 -6.53E-07 <.0001 -3.19E-07 0.0072 -4.26E-07 <.0001   
hs2(amb) 0.032931 <.0001 0.030971 <.0001 0.035746 <.0001 0.02293 <.0001   
hs3(amc) 0.052592 <.0001 0.05096 <.0001 0.056512 <.0001 0.038544 <.0001   
hs4(amd) 0.088858 <.0001 0.088101 <.0001 0.095301 <.0001 0.071789 <.0001   
hs5(ame) 0.112908 <.0001 0.113932 <.0001 0.122047 <.0001 0.092776 <.0001   
white(amf) 0.04869 <.0001 0.053929 <.0001 0.063972 <.0001 0.037542 <.0001   
black(amg) -0.0427 <.0001 -0.04191 <.0001 -0.08646 <.0001 -0.046 <.0001   
oriental(amh) 0.033911 0.0041 0.036459 0.0013 0.020234 0.1565 0.042021 0.0003   
central(ami) 0.018784 <.0001 0.019153 <.0001 0.031074 <.0001 0.016128 <.0001   
south(amj) 0.018609 <.0001 0.019418 <.0001 0.027692 <.0001 0.017834 <.0001   
west(amk) 0.026552 <.0001 0.025821 <.0001 0.022959 <.0001 0.044341 <.0001   
Q1(aml) 0.015226 <.0001 0.015816 <.0001 0.015902 <.0001 0.016005 <.0001   
Q2(amm) -0.01613 <.0001 -0.01488 <.0001 -0.01742 <.0001 -0.01899 <.0001   
Q3(amn) -0.01286 0.0002 -0.01212 0.0002 -0.01379 0.0001 -0.01557 <.0001   
lpf(gfm) 0.02424 <.0001 0.02029 <.0001 0.0273 <.0001 -0.00779 0.0753   
lpt(gtm) 0.004002 0.0056 0.016702 <.0001 -0.00664 0.0062 -0.00715 0.0003   
lpc(gcm) 0.029593 <.0001 0.021335 <.0001 0.025515 <.0001 0.010791 0.0002   
lps(gsm) 0.0142 <.0001 0.017532 <.0001 0.020577 <.0001 -0.01891 <.0001   
lpw(gwm) 0.01982 <.0001 0.014676 <.0001 0.025679 <.0001 0.017642 <.0001   
lpm(gmm) -0.09185 <.0001 -0.09054 <.0001 -0.09243 <.0001 -0.1471 <.0001   
bm -0.03648 <.0001 -0.04419 <.0001 -0.03924 <.0001 -0.04407 <.0001   
pm   0.04714 <.0001       
zm     0.634439 <.0001     
gtt -0.01432 <.0001 -0.01622 <.0001 -0.02644 <.0001     
at0 0.094907 <.0001 -0.06169 <.0001 0.120607 0.0677     
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Table 5.7 Continued 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien & P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value Dong et al T-value 
      Wessells    & Yen   
Max. 
Entropy   Actual   
           
VI. Tea           
constant (am0)         -0.0616 -5.6556 
hinc (ama)         0.012 12.9142 
hs2(amb)         -0.0048 -1.7551 
hs3(amc)         -0.0045 -1.199 
hs4(amd)         -0.0083 -2.0865 
hs5(ame)         -0.007 -1.4864 
white(amf)         -0.0035 -1.1978 
black(amg)         -0.0058 -1.3305 
oriental(amh)         -0.014 -1.4741 
central(ami)         -0.0464 -14.5257 
south(amj)         -0.0276 -9.4982 
west(amk)         -0.0362 -11.0767 
Q1(aml)         -0.0001 -0.0249 
Q2(amm)         0.0059 2.2412 
Q3(amn)         0.0053 1.8728 
lpf(gft)         0.0066 2.8842 
lpt(gtt)         -0.04 -24.2229 
lpc(gtc)         0.0043 2.5191 
lps(gts)         0.0079 3.3476 
lpw(gtw)         0.0095 6.9618 
bm                 -0.0145 -10.7511 
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Table 5.8. Parameter Estimates of Different Censoring Techniques for QUAIDS Estimation 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien &  P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value 
      Wessells    & Yen   Max Entropy   
         
I. Fruit Juice         
constant (af0) 0.170773 <.0001 0.207559 <.0001 0.199746 <.0001 0.091257 <.0001 
hinc (afa) 0.000001 <.0001 8.59E-07 <.0001 6.06E-07 0.0009 6.93E-07 <.0001 
hs2(afb) -0.017390 <.0001 -0.01771 <.0001 -0.02477 <.0001 -0.01334 <.0001 
hs3(afc) -0.028940 <.0001 -0.029 <.0001 -0.03924 <.0001 -0.02323 <.0001 
hs4(afd) -0.041430 <.0001 -0.04073 <.0001 -0.05481 <.0001 -0.03477 <.0001 
hs5(afe) -0.039830 <.0001 -0.03799 <.0001 -0.05439 <.0001 -0.032 <.0001 
white(aff) -0.035170 <.0001 -0.03501 <.0001 -0.03545 <.0001 -0.03028 <.0001 
black(afg) 0.056113 <.0001 0.053298 <.0001 0.056322 <.0001 0.058094 <.0001 
oriental(afh) 0.060538 <.0001 0.056488 <.0001 0.070516 <.0001 0.055337 <.0001 
central(afi) -0.054570 <.0001 -0.05479 <.0001 -0.05357 <.0001 -0.05304 <.0001 
south(afj) -0.038350 <.0001 -0.03907 <.0001 -0.03304 <.0001 -0.03858 <.0001 
west(afk) -0.056150 <.0001 -0.05804 <.0001 -0.0425 0.0001 -0.0638 <.0001 
Q1(afl) -0.002610 0.3908 -0.00142 0.6146 -0.00404 0.2956 -0.0025 0.4102 
Q2(afm) -0.012910 <.0001 -0.01061 0.0002 -0.01756 <.0001 -0.01114 0.0003 
Q3(afn) -0.012600 <.0001 -0.01003 0.0004 -0.01682 <.0001 -0.01087 0.0004 
lpf(gff) -0.002840 0.4445 0.007467 0.0277 -0.00181 0.7029 0.017361 <.0001 
lpt(gft) 0.001701 0.2005 -0.00287 0.0467 -0.00097 0.5987 0.002311 0.1993 
lpc(gfc) 0.010472 <.0001 0.009464 <.0001 0.01337 <.0001 0.025439 <.0001 
lps(gfs) -0.033690 <.0001 -0.03316 <.0001 -0.03672 <.0001 -0.01526 <.0001 
lpw(gfw) -0.001770 0.2158 -0.0033 0.0107 -0.0037 0.0745 -0.00654 0.0039 
lpm(gfm) 0.026132 <.0001 0.022391 <.0001 0.029829 <.0001 0.053057 <.0001 
bf 0.037883 <.0001 0.015828 0.0012 0.051421 <.0001 0.033981 <.0001 
lf -0.006030 <.0001 -0.00402 <.0001 -0.0082 <.0001 -0.00486 <.0001 
pf   0.042948 <.0001     
zf     0.041737 0.4792   
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Table 5.8 Continued 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien &  P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value 
      Wessells    & Yen   Max Entropy   
         
II. Coffee         
constant (ac0) -0.010190 0.2119 0.062059 <.0001 0.20217 <.0001 0.049244 <.0001 
hinc (aca) 0.000000 0.2189 -9.82E-09 0.746 -3.14E-07 <.0001 2.39E-08 0.5107 
hs2(acb) 0.012016 <.0001 0.004078 0.0584 0.018907 <.0001 0.010765 <.0001 
hs3(acc) -0.020750 <.0001 -0.02187 <.0001 -0.0396 <.0001 -0.02293 <.0001 
hs4(acd) -0.026110 <.0001 -0.02551 <.0001 -0.04811 <.0001 -0.02933 <.0001 
hs5(ace) -0.030410 <.0001 -0.0273 <.0001 -0.05728 <.0001 -0.03462 <.0001 
white(acf) 0.017941 <.0001 0.019864 <.0001 -0.01377 0.1863 0.016803 <.0001 
black(acg) -0.022200 <.0001 -0.02745 <.0001 0.058613 0.0012 -0.02279 <.0001 
oriental(ach) 0.004886 0.5699 -0.01238 0.0912 0.095345 0.0001 0.004677 0.5828 
central(aci) -0.010050 0.0001 -0.01207 <.0001 0.031827 0.0005 -0.01027 <.0001 
south(acj) -0.017930 <.0001 -0.0194 <.0001 -0.00469 0.4124 -0.0176 <.0001 
west(ack) 0.008250 0.003 0.003125 0.1883 0.057608 <.0001 0.012509 <.0001 
Q1(acl) -0.003590 0.1452 -0.00246 0.242 -0.0068 0.1061 -0.00292 0.236 
Q2(acm) -0.012620 <.0001 -0.0083 <.0001 -0.02372 <.0001 -0.0125 <.0001 
Q3(acn) -0.010690 <.0001 -0.00714 0.0007 -0.02094 <.0001 -0.01061 <.0001 
lpf(gfc) 0.010472 <.0001 0.009464 <.0001 0.01337 <.0001 0.002463 0.4438 
lpt(gtc) 0.003795 0.0002 -0.00811 <.0001 0.024437 <.0001 0.000403 0.7829 
lpc(gcc) -0.071550 <.0001 -0.04536 <.0001 -0.11061 <.0001 -0.0691 <.0001 
lps(gcs) 0.014694 <.0001 0.011647 <.0001 0.022269 <.0001 0.002367 0.4495 
lpw(gcw) 0.009988 <.0001 0.006423 <.0001 0.023245 <.0001 0.004639 0.0118 
lpm(gcm) 0.032605 <.0001 0.025931 <.0001 0.027291 <.0001 0.019685 <.0001 
bc 0.058849 <.0001 0.036218 <.0001 0.098272 <.0001 0.047798 <.0001 
lc -0.010600 <.0001 -0.0091 <.0001 -0.0164 <.0001 -0.00934 <.0001 
pc   0.056598 <.0001     
zc     -0.27906 0.0001   
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Table 5.8 Continued 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien &  P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value 
      Wessells    & Yen   Max Entropy   
        
III. Carbonated Soft Drinks        
constant (as0) 0.287611 <.0001 0.326417 <.0001 0.189931 <.0001 0.226915 <.0001 
hinc (asa) 0.000000 <.0001 -3.10E-07 <.0001 8.38E-08 0.684 -5.39E-07 <.0001 
hs2(asb) -0.010060 0.0149 -0.0122 0.0024 -0.01038 0.0219 -0.00502 0.2254 
hs3(asc) 0.013243 0.0094 0.009599 0.0525 0.015562 0.0051 0.019843 0.0001 
hs4(asd) 0.003055 0.5691 -0.00025 0.9616 0.003983 0.4949 0.011321 0.0364 
hs5(ase) -0.017490 0.0043 -0.02001 0.0008 -0.01716 0.0099 -0.00744 0.228 
white(asf) -0.018220 0.0066 -0.01734 0.0073 -0.03579 0.0002 -0.01328 0.0473 
black(asg) -0.008370 0.2893 -0.01153 0.1318 -0.02586 0.0159 -0.00732 0.3533 
oriental(ash) -0.096640 <.0001 -0.09942 <.0001 -0.17657 <.0001 -0.09912 <.0001 
central(asi) 0.076621 <.0001 0.07641 <.0001 0.094539 <.0001 0.077371 <.0001 
south(asj) 0.055531 <.0001 0.055445 <.0001 0.07091 <.0001 0.056009 <.0001 
west(ask) 0.039208 <.0001 0.037076 <.0001 0.042126 <.0001 0.02996 <.0001 
Q1(asl) -0.002000 0.6192 -0.00163 0.6773 -0.00231 0.5984 -0.00328 0.4146 
Q2(asm) 0.036151 <.0001 0.035592 <.0001 0.040078 <.0001 0.036796 <.0001 
Q3(asn) 0.026234 <.0001 0.025565 <.0001 0.029419 <.0001 0.026828 <.0001 
lpf(gfs) -0.033690 <.0001 -0.03316 <.0001 -0.03672 <.0001 -0.03231 <.0001 
lpt(gts) 0.003189 0.0335 0.011352 <.0001 0.001008 0.6803 0.010203 <.0001 
lpc(gcs) 0.014694 <.0001 0.011647 <.0001 0.022269 <.0001 0.017885 <.0001 
lps(gss) -0.004450 0.3573 -0.00516 0.2781 -0.00806 0.143 0.006965 0.173 
lpw(gsw) 0.009859 <.0001 0.004772 0.0008 0.004875 0.0502 0.019166 <.0001 
lpm(gsm) 0.010402 0.0028 0.010546 0.0018 0.016628 <.0001 0.032854 <.0001 
bs -0.023230 0.001 -0.04397 <.0001 -0.01689 0.0276 -0.01757 0.0152 
ls 0.012729 <.0001 0.014866 <.0001 0.011634 <.0001 0.013037 <.0001 
ps   0.035701 <.0001     
zs     0.5855 <.0001   
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Table 5.8 Continued 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien &  P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value 
      Wessells    & Yen   Max Entropy   
         
IV. Water         
constant (aw0) 0.074274 <.0001 0.10597 <.0001 -0.04179 0.3203 0.038078 <.0001 
hinc (awa) 0.000000 <.0001 3.39E-08 0.084 -3.00E-07 0.1127 1.86E-07 <.0001 
hs2(awb) -0.015470 <.0001 -0.01277 <.0001 -0.02256 <.0001 -0.01426 <.0001 
hs3(awc) -0.013780 <.0001 -0.01269 <.0001 -0.0202 <.0001 -0.01207 <.0001 
hs4(awd) -0.019060 <.0001 -0.01949 <.0001 -0.03017 <.0001 -0.01705 <.0001 
hs5(awe) -0.020010 <.0001 -0.01918 <.0001 -0.03295 <.0001 -0.01764 <.0001 
white(awf) -0.014050 <.0001 -0.00319 0.1555 0.012752 0.2821 -0.01281 <.0001 
black(awg) 0.019139 <.0001 0.014733 <.0001 0.038107 <.0001 0.020612 <.0001 
oriental(awh) 0.002970 0.572 0.007572 0.1075 0.025583 0.0227 0.002776 0.587 
central(awi) -0.006930 <.0001 -0.00099 0.492 0.005837 0.2768 -0.00736 <.0001 
south(awj) -0.002280 0.1278 -0.0011 0.4135 0.001873 0.5111 -0.00218 0.1435 
west(awk) 0.001688 0.3225 0.000941 0.5384 -0.00582 0.105 -0.00181 0.2926 
Q1(awl) -0.006680 <.0001 -0.00361 0.0075 -0.01023 <.0001 -0.00709 <.0001 
Q2(awm) 0.003392 0.0252 0.002998 0.0272 0.00496 0.0445 0.002775 0.0665 
Q3(awn) 0.008086 <.0001 0.00512 0.0002 0.012397 <.0001 0.007529 <.0001 
lpf(gfw) -0.001770 0.2158 -0.0033 0.0107 -0.0037 0.0745 0.011716 <.0001 
lpt(gtw) 0.002286 0.0012 0.001362 0.0684 0.010468 <.0001 0.006611 <.0001 
lpc(gcw) 0.009988 <.0001 0.025931 <.0001 0.023245 <.0001 0.01062 <.0001 
lps(gsw) 0.009859 <.0001 0.004772 0.0008 0.004875 0.0502 0.016937 <.0001 
lpw(gww) -0.039230 <.0001 -0.02252 <.0001 -0.06193 <.0001 -0.03601 <.0001 
lpm(gwm) 0.018870 <.0001 0.013257 <.0001 0.027046 <.0001 0.021083 <.0001 
bw -0.020760 <.0001 -0.02365 <.0001 -0.04092 <.0001 -0.0193 <.0001 
lw 0.003239 <.0001 0.002482 <.0001 0.006509 <.0001 0.003223 <.0001 
pw   0.03713 <.0001     
zw     0.287215 <.0001   
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Table 5.8 Continued 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien &  P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value 
      Wessells    & Yen   Max Entropy   
         
V. Milk         
constant (am0) 0.372864 <.0001 0.408687 <.0001 0.307543 <.0001 0.524688 <.0001 
hinc (ama) -0.000001 <.0001 -6.55E-07 <.0001 -4.50E-07 0.0001 -4.25E-07 <.0001 
hs2(amb) 0.032792 <.0001 0.03094 <.0001 0.035132 <.0001 0.022713 <.0001 
hs3(amc) 0.052592 <.0001 0.050421 <.0001 0.055931 <.0001 0.039042 <.0001 
hs4(amd) 0.089030 <.0001 0.087038 <.0001 0.094797 <.0001 0.073024 <.0001 
hs5(ame) 0.113146 <.0001 0.112551 <.0001 0.121474 <.0001 0.094484 <.0001 
white(amf) 0.048320 <.0001 0.054143 <.0001 0.059077 <.0001 0.037872 <.0001 
black(amg) -0.043200 <.0001 -0.04154 <.0001 -0.07559 <.0001 -0.04612 <.0001 
oriental(amh) 0.033459 0.0046 0.035624 0.0017 0.025358 0.075 0.042608 0.0003 
central(ami) 0.018673 <.0001 0.019098 <.0001 0.028144 <.0001 0.016166 <.0001 
south(amj) 0.018509 <.0001 0.019602 <.0001 0.025014 <.0001 0.017796 <.0001 
west(amk) 0.026246 <.0001 0.025682 <.0001 0.024688 <.0001 0.044334 <.0001 
Q1(aml) 0.015126 <.0001 0.015872 <.0001 0.015893 <.0001 0.016014 <.0001 
Q2(amm) -0.016250 <.0001 -0.01486 <.0001 -0.01741 <.0001 -0.01902 <.0001 
Q3(amn) -0.012990 0.0001 -0.01206 0.0002 -0.01378 0.0001 -0.01565 <.0001 
lpf(gfm) 0.026132 <.0001 0.022391 <.0001 0.029829 <.0001 -0.00742 0.0903 
lpt(gtm) 0.003660 0.012 0.020484 <.0001 -0.00768 0.0002 -0.00706 0.0004 
lpc(gcm) 0.032605 <.0001 0.025931 <.0001 0.027291 <.0001 0.010788 0.0002 
lps(gsm) 0.010402 0.0028 0.010546 0.0018 0.016628 <.0001 -0.01825 <.0001 
lpw(gwm) 0.018870 <.0001 0.013257 <.0001 0.027046 <.0001 0.017622 <.0001 
lpm(gmm) -0.091670 <.0001 -0.09261 <.0001 -0.09312 <.0001 -0.14674 <.0001 
bm -0.032280 <.0001 -0.05595 <.0001 -0.0365 <.0001 -0.02473 <.0001 
lm -0.000740 0.4636 0.002048 0.0294 -0.00036 0.7227 -0.00352 0.0009 
pm   0.048897 <.0001     
zm     0.498066 <.0001   
         
gtt -0.014630 <.0001 -0.02222 <.0001 -0.02727 <.0001   
at0 0.104673 <.0001 -0.11069 <.0001 0.142398 0.0008   
bt -0.020460 <.0001 0.071514 <.0001 -0.05538 <.0001     
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Table 5.9. Parameter Estimates of Different Censoring Techniques for AIDS Estimation (Unrestricted) 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien &  P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value 
      Wessells    & Yen   Max. Entropy   
         
I. Fruit Juice         
constant (af0) 0.120829 <.0001 0.157005 <.0001 0.099739 0.0006 0.128333 <.0001 
hinc (afa) 6.94E-07 <.0001 7.59E-07 <.0001 8.22E-07 <.0001 6.93E-07 <.0001 
hs2(afb) -0.01285 <.0001 -0.01396 <.0001 -0.01902 <.0001 -0.01304 <.0001 
hs3(afc) -0.02364 <.0001 -0.02453 <.0001 -0.03258 <.0001 -0.02392 <.0001 
hs4(afd) -0.03615 <.0001 -0.03616 <.0001 -0.04831 <.0001 -0.03647 <.0001 
hs5(afe) -0.03401 <.0001 -0.03285 <.0001 -0.04682 <.0001 -0.03435 <.0001 
white(aff) -0.0307 <.0001 -0.03096 <.0001 -0.04015 <.0001 -0.03073 <.0001 
black(afg) 0.058184 <.0001 0.055244 <.0001 0.064239 <.0001 0.058266 <.0001 
oriental(afh) 0.054438 <.0001 0.050954 <.0001 0.062202 <.0001 0.054533 <.0001 
central(afi) -0.05312 <.0001 -0.05393 <.0001 -0.06458 <.0001 -0.05309 <.0001 
south(afj) -0.03853 <.0001 -0.03923 <.0001 -0.04437 <.0001 -0.03852 <.0001 
west(afk) -0.06381 <.0001 -0.06516 <.0001 -0.07458 <.0001 -0.06379 <.0001 
Q1(afl) -0.0025 0.4098 -0.00142 0.613 -0.00371 0.3361 -0.00251 0.4083 
Q2(afm) -0.0111 0.0003 -0.00938 0.0009 -0.01483 0.0001 -0.01109 0.0003 
Q3(afn) -0.01077 0.0004 -0.00881 0.0019 -0.01412 0.0003 -0.01074 0.0004 
lpf(gff) 0.017989 <.0001 0.024776 <.0001 0.02359 <.0001 0.016855 <.0001 
lpt(gft) -0.01817 0.4817 -0.01714 0.1197 -0.02498 0.3113 0.002177 0.2267 
lpc(gfc) 0.026287 <.0001 0.022831 <.0001 0.017041 0.0011 0.025443 <.0001 
lps(gfs) -0.01592 <.0001 -0.0161 <.0001 -0.01605 0.0012 -0.01617 <.0001 
lpw(gfw) -0.00623 0.0063 -0.00616 0.0035 -0.01506 <.0001 -0.00652 0.0041 
lpm(gfm) 0.055842 <.0001 0.044247 <.0001 0.070089 <.0001 0.05256 <.0001 
bf 0.006872 <.0001 -0.00422 0.0026 0.006963 0.0002 0.007302 <.0001 
pf   0.042621 <.0001     
zf     0.162905 0.0129   
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Table 5.9 Continued 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien &  P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value 
      Wessells    & Yen   Max. Entropy   
         
II. Coffee         
constant (ac0) 0.118101 <.0001 0.175941 <.0001 -1.83385 <.0001 0.11659 <.0001 
hinc (aca) 2.04E-08 0.5761 3.26E-08 0.2938 9.89E-07 <.0001 2.30E-08 0.5283 
hs2(acb) 0.010877 <.0001 0.003393 0.118 0.017825 <.0001 0.011339 <.0001 
hs3(acc) -0.02492 <.0001 -0.02532 <.0001 -0.04426 <.0001 -0.02426 <.0001 
hs4(acd) -0.03337 <.0001 -0.03193 <.0001 -0.05596 <.0001 -0.03261 <.0001 
hs5(ace) -0.03998 <.0001 -0.03576 <.0001 -0.06838 <.0001 -0.03915 <.0001 
white(acf) 0.015892 0.0001 0.020714 <.0001 0.317918 <.0001 0.015943 0.0001 
black(acg) -0.02225 <.0001 -0.02536 <.0001 -0.58441 <.0001 -0.02246 <.0001 
oriental(ach) 0.003359 0.697 -0.01113 0.1299 -0.51884 <.0001 0.003139 0.7128 
central(aci) -0.01034 <.0001 -0.01277 <.0001 -0.32311 <.0001 -0.01037 <.0001 
south(acj) -0.01744 <.0001 -0.01793 <.0001 -0.19237 <.0001 -0.0175 <.0001 
west(ack) 0.012586 <.0001 0.006807 0.0049 -0.2511 <.0001 0.012525 <.0001 
Q1(acl) -0.00295 0.2334 -0.00149 0.4794 -0.00619 0.1416 -0.00294 0.2337 
Q2(acm) -0.01244 <.0001 -0.0081 0.0001 -0.0213 <.0001 -0.01242 <.0001 
Q3(can) -0.01036 <.0001 -0.00688 0.0012 -0.01821 <.0001 -0.01038 <.0001 
lpf(gcf) 0.001002 0.7564 -0.00189 0.4933 0.00129 0.8152 0.00149 0.6438 
lpt(gct) 0.007957 0.4444 -0.07595 0.0408 0.01551 0.3056 0.000145 0.9211 
lpc(gcc) -0.06924 <.0001 -0.04716 <.0001 -0.10587 <.0001 -0.0691 <.0001 
lps(gcs) 0.000199 0.9495 -0.00233 0.3949 -0.00148 0.7837 0.000615 0.8444 
lpw(gcw) 0.004663 0.0118 0.002683 0.0924 0.012315 0.0003 0.004692 0.011 
lpm(gcm) 0.017495 <.0001 0.006217 0.0637 0.030717 <.0001 0.01873 <.0001 
bc -0.00262 0.0311 -0.01736 <.0001 -0.00384 0.0649 -0.00351 0.004 
pc   0.057273 <.0001     
zc     2.91415 <.0001   
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Table 5.9 Continued 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien &  P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value 
      Wessells    & Yen   Max. Entropy   
        
III. Carbonated Soft Drinks        
constant (as0) 0.079025 <.0001 0.107221 <.0001 0.005497 0.8784 0.143986 <.0001 
hinc (asa) -5.35E-07 <.0001 -4.82E-07 <.0001 -3.55E-07 0.097 -5.38E-07 <.0001 
hs2(asb) -0.00562 0.1766 -0.008 0.0484 -0.00621 0.1724 -0.00582 0.1602 
hs3(asc) 0.022062 <.0001 0.018411 0.0002 0.023602 <.0001 0.021685 <.0001 
hs4(asd) 0.01633 0.0025 0.01341 0.011 0.015771 0.0074 0.015893 0.0033 
hs5(ase) -0.00065 0.9165 -0.00254 0.6732 -0.00217 0.7465 -0.00112 0.8552 
white(asf) -0.01235 0.0666 -0.01226 0.0616 -0.01983 0.0401 -0.01207 0.0717 
black(asg) -0.00804 0.3108 -0.01068 0.1668 -0.01644 0.1277 -0.00777 0.3252 
oriental(ash) -0.09756 <.0001 -0.1009 <.0001 -0.14218 <.0001 -0.09695 <.0001 
central(asi) 0.077335 <.0001 0.076828 <.0001 0.089018 <.0001 0.077509 <.0001 
south(asj) 0.05575 <.0001 0.05511 <.0001 0.066322 <.0001 0.055863 <.0001 
west(ask) 0.029905 <.0001 0.028655 <.0001 0.031656 <.0001 0.029935 <.0001 
Q1(asl) -0.00321 0.4261 -0.00325 0.4084 -0.00325 0.4586 -0.00325 0.4197 
Q2(asm) 0.036638 <.0001 0.035345 <.0001 0.04037 <.0001 0.036678 <.0001 
Q3(asn) 0.026391 <.0001 0.025037 <.0001 0.029435 <.0001 0.026503 <.0001 
lpf(gsf) -0.02274 <.0001 -0.02046 <.0001 -0.02499 <.0001 -0.03095 <.0001 
lpt(gst) -0.14758 0.4533 0.216142 0.0277 -0.20111 0.3125 0.010563 <.0001 
lpc(gsc) 0.024684 <.0001 0.024985 <.0001 -0.09046 <.0001 0.017874 <.0001 
lps(gss) 0.013186 0.0278 0.021732 <.0001 0.007004 0.3083 0.009411 0.0658 
lpw(gsw) 0.021362 <.0001 0.022064 <.0001 -0.02304 0.0013 0.019091 <.0001 
lpm(gsm) 0.060126 <.0001 0.052037 <.0001 0.0636 <.0001 0.034187 <.0001 
bs 0.053321 <.0001 0.046191 <.0001 0.058813 <.0001 0.054016 <.0001 
ps   0.032445 <.0001     
zs     0.403847 0.0086   
 
  
140
 
Table 5.9 Continued 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien &  P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value 
      Wessells    & Yen   Max. Entropy   
         
IV. Water         
constant (aw0) 0.015818 0.0047 0.065179 <.0001 -0.76235 <.0001 0.014262 0.0059 
hinc (awa) 1.86E-07 <.0001 -1.02E-08 0.6107 -3.02E-06 <.0001 1.86E-07 <.0001 
hs2(awb) -0.0146 <.0001 -0.01191 <.0001 -0.0204 <.0001 -0.01446 <.0001 
hs3(awc) -0.01181 <.0001 -0.01115 <.0001 -0.01522 <.0001 -0.01162 <.0001 
hs4(awd) -0.01615 <.0001 -0.0174 <.0001 -0.02291 <.0001 -0.01593 <.0001 
hs5(awe) -0.01633 <.0001 -0.01655 <.0001 -0.02375 <.0001 -0.01608 <.0001 
white(awf) -0.01257 <.0001 -0.00026 0.9067 0.177208 <.0001 -0.01252 <.0001 
black(awg) 0.02051 <.0001 0.017098 <.0001 0.025008 <.0001 0.02049 <.0001 
oriental(awh) 0.003357 0.523 0.010236 0.0294 0.118177 <.0001 0.003302 0.5191 
central(awi) -0.00734 <.0001 -0.00126 0.3823 0.074172 <.0001 -0.00733 <.0001 
south(awj) -0.00222 0.1382 -0.00038 0.7753 0.019595 <.0001 -0.00222 0.1369 
west(awk) -0.0018 0.2971 -0.00135 0.3831 -0.04053 <.0001 -0.00182 0.2912 
Q1(awl) -0.00709 <.0001 -0.0035 0.0093 -0.01085 <.0001 -0.00709 <.0001 
Q2(awm) 0.002733 0.0717 0.002549 0.0603 0.004399 0.0757 0.002744 0.0698 
Q3(awn) 0.007448 <.0001 0.004583 0.0007 0.011911 <.0001 0.007448 <.0001 
lpf(gwf) 0.011791 <.0001 0.007075 <.0001 0.019015 <.0001 0.012044 <.0001 
lpt(gwt) 0.010845 0.0562 -0.03585 0.0657 0.016548 0.0126 0.006699 <.0001 
lpc(gwc) 0.010443 <.0001 0.005222 <.0001 0.020464 <.0001 0.010618 <.0001 
lps(gws) 0.017363 <.0001 0.010045 <.0001 0.026262 <.0001 0.017538 <.0001 
lpw(gww) -0.03605 <.0001 -0.01967 <.0001 -0.05591 <.0001 -0.03603 <.0001 
lpm(gwm) 0.020641 <.0001 0.011315 <.0001 0.034418 <.0001 0.021395 <.0001 
bw -0.0014 0.0587 -0.00905 <.0001 -0.00142 0.2387 -0.00161 0.0303 
pw   0.038215 <.0001     
zw     1.207913 <.0001   
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Table 5.9 Continued 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien &  P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value 
      Wessells    & Yen   Max. Entropy   
         
V. Milk         
constant (am0) 0.595231 <.0001 0.622839 <.0001 0.476322 <.0001 0.540447 <.0001 
hinc (ama) -4.27E-07 <.0001 -3.70E-07 <.0001 1.46E-07 0.2448 -4.26E-07 <.0001 
hs2(amb) 0.023139 <.0001 0.019202 <.0001 0.025623 <.0001 0.02293 <.0001 
hs3(amc) 0.038783 <.0001 0.03458 <.0001 0.042178 <.0001 0.038544 <.0001 
hs4(amd) 0.072065 <.0001 0.068431 <.0001 0.07762 <.0001 0.071789 <.0001 
hs5(ame) 0.093081 <.0001 0.090795 <.0001 0.100767 <.0001 0.092776 <.0001 
white(amf) 0.037798 <.0001 0.037661 <.0001 0.06107 <.0001 0.037542 <.0001 
black(amg) -0.04599 <.0001 -0.04899 <.0001 -0.11081 <.0001 -0.046 <.0001 
oriental(amh) 0.042321 0.0003 0.038684 0.0006 0.017848 0.2102 0.042021 0.0003 
central(ami) 0.016262 <.0001 0.015664 <.0001 0.031461 <.0001 0.016128 <.0001 
south(amj) 0.017868 <.0001 0.017408 <.0001 0.031825 <.0001 0.017834 <.0001 
west(amk) 0.044288 <.0001 0.043272 <.0001 0.035049 <.0001 0.044341 <.0001 
Q1(aml) 0.015966 <.0001 0.01537 <.0001 0.017081 <.0001 0.016005 <.0001 
Q2(amm) -0.01894 <.0001 -0.01925 <.0001 -0.02038 <.0001 -0.01899 <.0001 
Q3(amn) -0.01548 <.0001 -0.0162 <.0001 -0.01669 <.0001 -0.01557 <.0001 
lpf(gmf) -0.01456 0.0008 -0.01668 <.0001 -0.01542 0.0014 -0.00779 0.0753 
lpt(gmt) 0.123771 0.4477 -0.23732 0.0311 0.163821 0.3047 -0.00715 0.0003 
lpc(gmc) 0.005021 0.0857 0.003202 0.2645 0.098117 <.0001 0.010791 0.0002 
lps(gms) -0.02161 <.0001 -0.02634 <.0001 -0.01838 0.001 -0.01891 <.0001 
lpw(gmw) 0.015659 <.0001 0.013294 <.0001 0.05287 <.0001 0.017642 <.0001 
lpm(gmm) -0.1684 <.0001 -0.16844 <.0001 -0.17687 <.0001 -0.1471 <.0001 
bm -0.04416 <.0001 -0.05177 <.0001 -0.04713 <.0001 -0.04407 <.0001 
pm   0.049404 <.0001     
zm     0.859325 <.0001   
         
gtt         
at0 -2.95849 0.4216 4.524465 0.0365 -3.61141 0.2849   
bt                 
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Table 5.10. Parameter Estimates of Different Censoring Techniques for QUAIDS Estimation (Unrestricted) 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien & P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value 
       Wessells    & Yen   Max Entropy   
         
I. Fruit Juice         
constant (af0) 0.109324 <.0001 0.144883 <.0001 0.029642 0.3045 0.091257 <.0001 
hinc (afa) 7.00E-07 <.0001 7.61E-07 <.0001 1.16E-06 <.0001 6.93E-07 <.0001 
hs2(afb) -0.01307 <.0001 -0.01414 <.0001 -0.01889 <.0001 -0.01334 <.0001 
hs3(afc) -0.02353 <.0001 -0.02432 <.0001 -0.03247 <.0001 -0.02323 <.0001 
hs4(afd) -0.03597 <.0001 -0.03538 <.0001 -0.04839 <.0001 -0.03477 <.0001 
hs5(afe) -0.0339 <.0001 -0.03176 <.0001 -0.04725 <.0001 -0.032 <.0001 
white(aff) -0.03155 <.0001 -0.03095 <.0001 -0.04949 <.0001 -0.03028 <.0001 
black(afg) 0.057652 <.0001 0.054952 <.0001 0.069414 <.0001 0.058094 <.0001 
oriental(afh) 0.053676 <.0001 0.051799 <.0001 0.058822 <.0001 0.055337 <.0001 
central(afi) -0.05407 <.0001 -0.0539 <.0001 -0.07945 <.0001 -0.05304 <.0001 
south(afj) -0.03976 <.0001 -0.03922 <.0001 -0.05598 <.0001 -0.03858 <.0001 
west(afk) -0.0646 <.0001 -0.06508 <.0001 -0.09775 <.0001 -0.0638 <.0001 
Q1(afl) -0.00259 0.3944 -0.00142 0.6133 -0.00429 0.2653 -0.0025 0.4102 
Q2(afm) -0.01092 0.0004 -0.00937 0.0009 -0.01575 <.0001 -0.01114 0.0003 
Q3(afn) -0.01049 0.0006 -0.00886 0.0018 -0.0147 0.0002 -0.01087 0.0004 
lpf(gff) 0.017866 <.0001 0.024335 <.0001 0.021496 <.0001 0.017361 <.0001 
lpt(gft) -0.01224 0.0174 -0.00317 0.3059 0.007402 0.0195 0.002311 0.1993 
lpc(gfc) 0.026185 <.0001 0.021961 <.0001 0.016225 0.0473 0.025439 <.0001 
lps(gfs) -0.01615 <.0001 -0.01555 <.0001 -0.01749 0.0004 -0.01526 <.0001 
lpw(gfw) -0.00586 0.0102 -0.00617 0.0035 -0.01322 <.0001 -0.00654 0.0039 
lpm(gfm) 0.056285 <.0001 0.044377 <.0001 0.070427 <.0001 0.053057 <.0001 
bf 0.012664 <.0001 0.008023 0.083 0.017254 <.0001 0.033981 <.0001 
lf -0.00049 <.0001 -0.00235 0.0048 -0.0009 <.0001 -0.00486 <.0001 
pf   0.043097 <.0001     
zf     0.282385 <.0001   
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Table 5.10 Continued 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien & P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value 
       Wessells    & Yen   Max Entropy   
         
II. Coffee         
constant (ac0) 0.111606 <.0001 0.127712 <.0001 -3.6965 <.0001 0.049244 <.0001 
hinc (aca) 2.39E-08 0.5129 3.52E-08 0.2566 2.12E-06 <.0001 2.39E-08 0.5107 
hs2(acb) 0.010788 <.0001 0.002739 0.2056 0.016188 0.0002 0.010765 <.0001 
hs3(acc) -0.02485 <.0001 -0.0246 <.0001 -0.04581 <.0001 -0.02293 <.0001 
hs4(acd) -0.03326 <.0001 -0.02922 <.0001 -0.05777 <.0001 -0.02933 <.0001 
hs5(ace) -0.03989 <.0001 -0.03195 <.0001 -0.06904 <.0001 -0.03462 <.0001 
white(acf) 0.01566 0.0001 0.020842 <.0001 0.609494 <.0001 0.016803 <.0001 
black(acg) -0.02231 <.0001 -0.02611 <.0001 -1.1468 <.0001 -0.02279 <.0001 
oriental(ach) 0.003202 0.7105 -0.00788 0.2821 -1.04757 <.0001 0.004677 0.5828 
central(aci) -0.01075 <.0001 -0.01256 <.0001 -0.63723 <.0001 -0.01027 <.0001 
south(acj) -0.018 <.0001 -0.01787 <.0001 -0.35914 <.0001 -0.0176 <.0001 
west(ack) 0.01226 <.0001 0.007109 0.0032 -0.52624 <.0001 0.012509 <.0001 
Q1(acl) -0.00295 0.2326 -0.00156 0.4583 -0.00274 0.507 -0.00292 0.236 
Q2(acm) -0.0123 <.0001 -0.00812 0.0001 -0.01645 <.0001 -0.0125 <.0001 
Q3(can) -0.01017 <.0001 -0.0071 0.0008 -0.01511 0.0003 -0.01061 <.0001 
lpf(gcf) 0.001021 0.7518 -0.0033 0.2354 0.009152 0.093 0.002463 0.4438 
lpt(gct) 0.00671 0.034 -0.01474 <.0001 -0.0192 <.0001 0.000403 0.7829 
lpc(gcc) -0.0693 <.0001 -0.05012 <.0001 -0.16896 <.0001 -0.0691 <.0001 
lps(gcs) 0.000103 0.9739 0.000531 0.8455 0.003133 0.5569 0.002367 0.4495 
lpw(gcw) 0.004866 0.0087 0.003393 0.0346 0.010092 0.0021 0.004639 0.0118 
lpm(gcm) 0.018052 <.0001 0.008222 0.0135 0.030066 <.0001 0.019685 <.0001 
bc 0.00031 0.8388 0.026469 <.0001 -0.05622 <.0001 0.047798 <.0001 
lc -0.00024 0.0033 -0.00826 <.0001 0.00499 <.0001 -0.00934 <.0001 
pc   0.057371 <.0001     
zc     5.746743 <.0001   
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Table 5.10 Continued 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien & P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value 
       Wessells    & Yen   Max Entropy   
        
III. Carbonated Soft Drinks        
constant (as0) 0.068912 <.0001 0.200245 <.0001 -0.02957 0.4096 0.226915 <.0001 
hinc (asa) -5.30E-07 <.0001 -4.83E-07 <.0001 -3.85E-07 0.0689 -5.39E-07 <.0001 
hs2(asb) -0.00574 0.1674 -0.00739 0.0666 -0.00577 0.2044 -0.00502 0.2254 
hs3(asc) 0.022211 <.0001 0.01619 0.0012 0.024035 <.0001 0.019843 0.0001 
hs4(asd) 0.016544 0.0022 0.007406 0.1595 0.016271 0.0057 0.011321 0.0364 
hs5(ase) -0.00047 0.9397 -0.01059 0.078 -0.00202 0.7631 -0.00744 0.228 
white(asf) -0.01283 0.0565 -0.01316 0.0434 -0.01709 0.0755 -0.01328 0.0473 
black(asg) -0.00829 0.2955 -0.01001 0.1921 -0.01775 0.0988 -0.00732 0.3533 
oriental(ash) -0.09801 <.0001 -0.10778 <.0001 -0.14548 <.0001 -0.09912 <.0001 
central(asi) 0.076594 <.0001 0.076296 <.0001 0.087166 <.0001 0.077371 <.0001 
south(asj) 0.054797 <.0001 0.054834 <.0001 0.066066 <.0001 0.056009 <.0001 
west(ask) 0.029277 <.0001 0.027933 <.0001 0.028723 <.0001 0.02996 <.0001 
Q1(asl) -0.00324 0.4212 -0.00324 0.4076 -0.00418 0.3397 -0.00328 0.4146 
Q2(asm) 0.036821 <.0001 0.035168 <.0001 0.039021 <.0001 0.036796 <.0001 
Q3(asn) 0.026654 <.0001 0.025268 <.0001 0.028575 <.0001 0.026828 <.0001 
lpf(gsf) -0.02331 <.0001 -0.01801 0.0005 -0.03131 <.0001 -0.03231 <.0001 
lpt(gst) -0.11075 <.0001 0.034682 <.0001 0.036379 0.0017 0.010203 <.0001 
lpc(gsc) 0.024291 <.0001 0.030132 <.0001 -0.17846 <.0001 0.017885 <.0001 
lps(gss) 0.013024 0.0114 0.017326 0.0006 0.005935 0.3213 0.006965 0.173 
lpw(gsw) 0.021893 <.0001 0.021237 <.0001 -0.00937 0.1218 0.019166 <.0001 
lpm(gsm) 0.059799 <.0001 0.049326 <.0001 0.061522 <.0001 0.032854 <.0001 
bs 0.058028 <.0001 -0.03779 <.0001 0.073441 <.0001 -0.01757 0.0152 
ls -0.0004 0.0033 0.015778 <.0001 -0.00134 <.0001 0.013037 <.0001 
ps   0.035683 <.0001     
zs     0.399182 0.0086   
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Table 5.10 Continued 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien & P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value 
       Wessells    & Yen   Max Entropy   
         
IV. Water         
constant (aw0) 0.01936 0.0007 0.080486 <.0001 -0.53882 <.0001 0.038078 <.0001 
hinc (awa) 1.84E-07 <.0001 -1.06E-08 0.5983 -2.02E-06 <.0001 1.86E-07 <.0001 
hs2(awb) -0.01453 <.0001 -0.01172 <.0001 -0.0205 <.0001 -0.01426 <.0001 
hs3(awc) -0.01184 <.0001 -0.0114 <.0001 -0.01537 <.0001 -0.01207 <.0001 
hs4(awd) -0.0162 <.0001 -0.01829 <.0001 -0.02303 <.0001 -0.01705 <.0001 
hs5(awe) -0.01636 <.0001 -0.01778 <.0001 -0.02393 <.0001 -0.01764 <.0001 
white(awf) -0.01233 <.0001 -0.00023 0.9189 0.116325 <.0001 -0.01281 <.0001 
black(awg) 0.020657 <.0001 0.017496 <.0001 0.029346 <.0001 0.020612 <.0001 
oriental(awh) 0.003573 0.4966 0.009248 0.0491 0.083243 <.0001 0.002776 0.587 
central(awi) -0.00706 <.0001 -0.00133 0.3562 0.048269 <.0001 -0.00736 <.0001 
south(awj) -0.00186 0.2154 -0.00039 0.7708 0.012364 0.0007 -0.00218 0.1435 
west(awk) -0.00157 0.3651 -0.00144 0.351 -0.02989 <.0001 -0.00181 0.2926 
Q1(awl) -0.00707 <.0001 -0.00348 0.0097 -0.01115 <.0001 -0.00709 <.0001 
Q2(awm) 0.002677 0.0777 0.00256 0.0591 0.004027 0.1041 0.002775 0.0665 
Q3(awn) 0.007362 <.0001 0.004679 0.0006 0.01163 <.0001 0.007529 <.0001 
lpf(gwf) 0.011816 <.0001 0.007706 <.0001 0.018637 <.0001 0.011716 <.0001 
lpt(wt) 0.009538 <.0001 0.016926 <.0001 0.011615 <.0001 0.006611 <.0001 
lpc(gwc) 0.010466 <.0001 0.006541 <.0001 0.027848 <.0001 0.01062 <.0001 
lps(gws) 0.017426 <.0001 0.008667 <.0001 0.026071 <.0001 0.016937 <.0001 
lpw(gww) -0.03617 <.0001 -0.02022 <.0001 -0.05607 <.0001 -0.03601 <.0001 
lpm(gwm) 0.020459 <.0001 0.009754 <.0001 0.03391 <.0001 0.021083 <.0001 
bw -0.00314 0.0007 -0.02299 <.0001 0.000737 0.6314 -0.0193 <.0001 
lw 0.000146 0.0038 0.002646 <.0001 -0.00025 0.0069 0.003223 <.0001 
pw   0.038072 <.0001     
zw     0.861922 <.0001   
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Table 5.10 Continued 
 
Parameters ITSUR P-value Heien & P-value Shonkwiler P-value Generalized P-value 
       Wessells    & Yen   Max Entropy   
         
V. Milk         
constant (am0) 0.583246 <.0001 0.627887 <.0001 0.463968 <.0001 0.524688 <.0001 
hinc (ama) -4.20E-07 <.0001 -3.67E-07 <.0001 8.70E-08 0.4838 -4.25E-07 <.0001 
hs2(amb) 0.023129 <.0001 0.019312 <.0001 0.025888 <.0001 0.022713 <.0001 
hs3(amc) 0.039104 <.0001 0.034673 <.0001 0.042351 <.0001 0.039042 <.0001 
hs4(amd) 0.072474 <.0001 0.068512 <.0001 0.077746 <.0001 0.073024 <.0001 
hs5(ame) 0.093482 <.0001 0.09097 <.0001 0.100714 <.0001 0.094484 <.0001 
white(amf) 0.037682 <.0001 0.038345 <.0001 0.061616 <.0001 0.037872 <.0001 
black(amg) -0.04585 <.0001 -0.04845 <.0001 -0.10687 <.0001 -0.04612 <.0001 
oriental(amh) 0.042235 0.0003 0.038793 0.0005 0.019061 0.1795 0.042608 0.0003 
central(ami) 0.015589 <.0001 0.015696 <.0001 0.030425 <.0001 0.016166 <.0001 
south(amj) 0.016926 <.0001 0.017466 <.0001 0.031552 <.0001 0.017796 <.0001 
west(amk) 0.043699 <.0001 0.043184 <.0001 0.034954 <.0001 0.044334 <.0001 
Q1(aml) 0.016005 <.0001 0.015477 <.0001 0.01651 <.0001 0.016014 <.0001 
Q2(amm) -0.01864 <.0001 -0.0192 <.0001 -0.02113 <.0001 -0.01902 <.0001 
Q3(amn) -0.01509 <.0001 -0.01614 <.0001 -0.01709 <.0001 -0.01565 <.0001 
lpf(gmf) -0.01391 0.0014 -0.01598 0.0001 -0.01359 0.0046 -0.00742 0.0903 
lpt(gmt) 0.095511 <.0001 0.020502 <.0001 -0.01542 0.0504 -0.00706 0.0004 
lpc(gmc) 0.005243 0.0724 0.004566 0.1063 0.197153 <.0001 0.010788 0.0002 
lps(gms) -0.02171 <.0001 -0.02847 <.0001 -0.02053 <.0001 -0.01825 <.0001 
lpw(gmw) 0.015828 <.0001 0.011532 <.0001 0.042422 <.0001 0.017622 <.0001 
lpm(gmm) -0.16677 <.0001 -0.17284 <.0001 -0.17347 <.0001 -0.14674 <.0001 
bm -0.03901 <.0001 -0.05375 <.0001 -0.03874 <.0001 -0.02473 <.0001 
lm -0.000440 0.0003 0.000288 0.7597 -0.00072 <.0001 -0.00352 0.0009 
pm   0.051058 <.0001     
zm     0.812745 <.0001   
         
gtt         
at0 -2.293840 <.0001 -0.52751 <.0001 0.263861 0.1244   
bt 0.328340 <.0001 0.323619 <.0001 -0.2258 <.0001     
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procedures converged to yielding relatively close parameter estimates. Also, the 
parameters associated with the quadratic term in the QUAIDS specification are highly 
significant, suggesting in part the appropriateness of the QUAIDS specification over the 
AIDS model across estimation procedures and is also true for the unrestricted case.   In 
Table 5.11, we find that the symmetry, homogeneity and the combination of both 
restrictions are rejected in both AIDS and QUAIDS models.     
Expenditure, Uncompensated and Compensated Elasticities      
Tables 5.12 to 5.23 present the calculated expenditure, uncompensated and 
compensated elasticities of non-alcoholic beverages across model specification, 
estimation techniques and imposition of theoretical restrictions. From the tables, we find 
that both expenditure elasticities and own-price elasticities were generally similar across 
model specification, estimation technique and whether the theoretical restrictions were 
imposed. All of the expenditure elasticities are positive indicating that all non-alcoholic 
beverages are normal goods. Also, if we look at the compensated cross-price elasticities 
across model specification, estimation technique and theoretical restriction, we find that 
almost all of them are positive indicating that the set of non-alcoholic beverages are net 
substitutes. Similarly, the major substitutes for fruit juice and tea are coffee, carbonated 
soft drink and milk. On the other hand the major substitutes for coffee are fruit juice, 
carbonated soft drinks and milk. For carbonated soft drinks the major substitutes are 
coffee and milk. Coffee, carbonated soft drinks and milk represent the major non-
alcoholic beverage substitutes for bottled water. Finally, major commodity substitutes 
for milk are fruit juice, coffee and carbonated soft drinks.  
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Table 5.11. Symmetry, Homogeneity and Combination of Symmetry and 
Homogeneity Restriction Wald Tests 
 
  Symmetry   Homogeneity   
Symmetry and 
Homogeneity  
  
χ2-
Statistic p-value   
χ2-
Statistic p-value   
χ2-
Statistic p-value 
A. AIDS model 
 
        
ITSUR 671.32 <.0001  367.24 <.0001  755.93 <.0001 
H&W 610.79 <.0001  201.58 <.0001  730.66 <.0001 
S&Y 561.91 <.0001  177.43 <.0001  624.23 <.0001 
  
  
 
  
 
 
B. QUAIDS model 
  
  
 
  
  
ITSUR 664.31 <.0001  351.10 <.0001  726.78 <.0001 
H&W 623.55 <.0001  745.17 <.0001  1027.90 <.0001 
S&Y 594.46 <.0001   392.83 <.0001   1019.80 <.0001 
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Table 5.12. Expenditure Elasticities1 of Non-Alcoholic Beverages Using the AIDS System and 1999 ACNielsen 
Homescan Data 
 
  ITSUR H&W S&Y GME Dong et al. Dong et al. Mean Standard 
Item Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
Actual 
Estimates 
Latent 
Estimates 
  
Deviation 
Fruit Juice 1.023 0.960 1.021 1.042 1.008 1.027 1.013 0.028 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.005) 
  
Tea 0.733 1.733 0.684 0.741 0.889 0.728 0.918 0.405 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
  
Coffee 0.991 0.857 1.004 0.968 1.005 1.021 0.974 0.060 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.089) 
  
Carbonated 
Soft drinks 1.141 1.122 1.154 1.158 1.112 1.156 1.140 0.019 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
  
Bottled Water 0.934 0.752 0.924 0.958 1.128 1.397 1.016 0.222 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) 
  
Milk 0.873 0.847 0.864 0.847 0.864 0.790 0.848 0.030 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.000)     
 
 Note: p-values are in brackets 
1Calculated using sample means 
. 
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Table 5.13. Uncompensated Own- and Cross-Price Elasticity Matrix1 of Non-Alcoholic Beverages Using the AIDS and the 1999 ACNielsen 
Homescan Data 
 
                Carbonated    Bottled     
  
    Fruit Juice   Tea   Coffee    Soft Drinks    Water   Milk 
  
Fruit Juice ITSUR -1.006 [.0001] 0.002 [0.8293] 0.081 [.0001] -0.212 [.0001] -0.019 [.0196] 0.130 [.0001] 
 H&W -0.945 [.0001] -0.005 [0.5003] 0.068 [.0001] -0.191 [.0001] -0.019 [.0136] 0.131 [.0001] 
 S&Y -0.991 [.0001] -0.026 [0.0100] 0.120 [.0001] -0.236 [.0001] -0.038 [.0137] 0.150 [.0001] 
 Dong et al (actual) -1.053 [.0001] 0.016 [0.0095] 0.079 [.0001] -0.143 [.0001] -0.045 [.0001] 0.137 [.0001] 
 Dong et al (latent) -1.105 [.0001] 0.037 [0.0013] 0.138 [.0001] -0.273 [.0001] -0.040 [.0007] 0.216 [.0001] 
 GME (unrestricted) -0.912  0.009  0.141  -0.100  -0.182  0.173  
 
             
 Mean -1.002  0.005  0.104  -0.193  -0.057  0.156  
 Std. Deviation 0.070  0.021  0.032  0.063  0.062  0.034  
    
 
         
Tea ITSUR 0.071 [.0120] -1.279 [.0001] 0.073 [.0004] 0.148 [.0002] 0.075 [.0001] 0.179 [.0001] 
 H&W -0.188 [.0001] -1.306 [.0001] -0.178 [.0001] -0.065 [.0002] -0.082 [.0001] 0.085 [.0001] 
 S&Y -0.018 [.6308] -1.528 [.0001] 0.513 [.0001] 0.139 [.0194] 0.270 [.0001] -0.058 [.2577 
 Dong et al (actual) 0.035 [.0191] -1.298 [0.0001] 0.050 [.0001] 0.121 [.0001] 0.017 [.0478] 0.186 [.0001] 
 Dong et al (latent) 0.075 [.0408] -1.763 [0.0001] 0.126 [.0001] 0.279 [.0001] 0.111 [.0001] 0.445 [.0001] 
 GME (unrestricted) 0.231  -1.242  0.124  0.205  0.038  0.524  
 
             
 Mean 0.034  -1.403  0.118  0.138  0.071  0.227  
 Std. Deviation 0.137  0.204  0.224  0.115  0.117  0.220  
      
 
       
Coffee ITSUR 0.137 [.0001] 0.019 [0.0325] -1.591 [.0001] 0.098 [0.0001] 0.072 [.0001] 0.275 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.134 [.0001] -0.033 [0.0003] -1.363 [.0001] 0.099 [0.0001] 0.057 [.0001] 0.248 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.200 [.0001] 0.1840 [0.0001] -1.873 [.0001] 0.097 [0.0123] 0.155 [.0001] 0.233 [.0001] 
 Dong et al (actual) 0.114 [.0001] 0.014 [0.0204] -1.447 [.0001] 0.092 [.0001] 0.053 [.0137] 0.169 [.0001] 
 Dong et al (latent) 0.219 [.0001] 0.036 [0.0047] -1.910 [.0001] 0.163 [.0001] 0.158 [.0001] 0.313 [.0001] 
 GME (unrestricted) 0.020  0.004  -1.628  0.011  0.045  0.183  
 
             
 Mean 0.137  0.037  -1.635  0.093  0.090  0.237  
 Std. Deviation 0.071  0.075  0.221  0.048  0.052  0.055  
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Table 5.13 Continued  
 
                Carbonated    Bottled     
  
    
Fruit 
Juice   Tea   Coffee    Soft Drinks    Water   Milk 
  
Carbonated Soft drinks ITSUR -0.136 [.0001] 0.0004 [0.9340] 0.014 [.0300] -1.037 [.0001] 0.025 [.0001] -0.008 [.3993] 
 H&W -0.131 [.0001] 0.017 [0.0003] 0.003 [.6093] -1.027 [.0001] 0.010 [.0141] 0.006 [.5079] 
 S&Y -0.153 [.0001] 0.000 [0.9949] -0.010 [.2407] -1.033 [.0001] 0.023 [.0013] 0.019 [.0728] 
 Dong et al (actual) -0.083 [.0001] 0.015 [0.0011] 0.015 [.0213] -1.057 [.0001] 0.042 [.0137] -0.045 [.0001] 
 Dong et al (latent) -0.120 [.0001] 0.032 [0.0001] 0.038 [.0001] -1.089 [.0001] 0.093 [.0001] -0.110 [.0001] 
 GME (unrestricted) -0.123  0.016  0.033  -0.999  0.047  0.044  
 
             
 Mean -0.124  0.013  0.016  -1.040  0.040  -0.016  
 Std. Deviation 0.024  0.012  0.018  0.030  0.029  0.055  
          
 
   
Bottled Water ITSUR -0.066 [.0754] 0.081 [.0001] 0.212 [.0001] 0.308 [.0001] -2.013 [.0001] 0.545 [.0001] 
 H&W -0.043 [.2050] -0.033 [.0663] 0.168 [.0001] 0.235 [.0001] -1.556 [.0001] 0.478 [.0001] 
 S&Y -0.150 [0.0051 0.308 [.0001] 0.465 [.0001] 0.334 [.0001] -2.576 [.0001] 0.696 [.0001] 
 Dong et al (actual) -0.058 [.0076] 0.093 [.0100] 0.155 [.0001] 0.126 [.0001] -1.850 [.0137] 0.407 [.0001] 
 Dong et al (latent) -0.191 [.0029] 0.305 [.0100] 0.498 [.0001] 0.351 [.0001] -3.501 [.0137] 1.142 [.0001] 
 GME (unrestricted) 0.325  0.180  0.284  0.463  -1.944  0.577  
 
 Mean -0.031  0.156  0.297  0.303  -2.240  0.641  
 Std. Deviation 0.184  0.135  0.150  0.114  0.702  0.264  
            
 
 
Milk ITSUR 0.111 [.0001] 0.026 [.0001] 0.117 [.0001] 0.070 [.0001] 0.076 [.0001] -1.274 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.108 [.0001] 0.050 [.0001] 0.099 [.0001] 0.090 [.0001] 0.065 [.0001] -1.258 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.124 [.0001] -0.008 [.2041] 0.125 [.0001] 0.079 [.0001] 0.101 [.0001] -1.285 [.0001] 
 
Dong et al (actual) 0.084 [.0001] 0.011 [.0156] 0.101 [.0001] 0.085 [.0001] 0.056 [.0001] -1.200 [.0001] 
 
Dong et al (latent) 0.125 [.0001] 0.032 [.0001] 0.184 [.0001] 0.123 [.0001] 0.125 [.0001] -1.379 [.0001] 
  
GME (unrestricted) 0.004   -0.011   0.056   -0.039   0.070   -1.456   
 
           
 
 
 
Mean 0.093  0.017  0.114  0.068  0.082  -1.309  
 
Std. Deviation 0.046  0.024  0.042  0.055  0.026  0.092  
Note: p-values are in brackets 
1Calculated using sample means. 
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Table 5.14. Compensated Own- and Cross-Price Elasticity Matrix1 of Non-Alcoholic Beverages Using the AIDS and the 1999 ACNielsen Homescan 
Data 
 
    Fruit            Carbonated    Bottled     
  
    Juice   Tea   Coffee    Soft Drinks    Water   Milk 
  
Fruit Juice ITSUR -0.827 [.0001] 0.050 [.0001] 0.193 [.0001] 0.139 [.0001] 0.020 [.0108] 0.425 [.0001] 
 H&W -0.777 [.0001] 0.040 [.0001] 0.173 [.0001] 0.139 [.0001] 0.018 [.0149] 0.407 [.0001] 
 S&Y -0.812 [.0001] 0.022 [.0245] 0.231 [.0001] 0.114 [.0001] 0.001 [.9528] 0.445 [.0001] 
 Dong et al (actual) -0.877 [.0001] 0.064 [0.0001] 0.189 [.0001] 0.202 [.0001] -0.006 [.1923] 0.428 [.0001] 
 Dong et al (latent) -0.913  0.091  0.265  0.065  -0.006  0.498  
 GME (unrestricted) -0.730  0.057  0.255  0.257  -0.142  0.474  
 
             
 Mean -0.823  0.054  0.218  0.153  -0.019  0.446  
 Std. Deviation 0.066  0.023  0.038  0.068  0.061  0.034  
    
 
         
Tea ITSUR 0.199 [.0001] -1.244 [.0001] 0.153 [.0001] 0.399 [.0001] 0.103 [.0001] 0.390 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.115 [.0001] -1.224 [.0001] 0.011 [.5905] 0.530 [.0001] -0.016 [.2609] 0.585 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.101 [.0073] -1.496 [.0001] 0.587 [.0001] 0.373 [.0001] 0.296 [.0001] 0.139 [.0001] 
 Dong et al (actual) 0.190 [.0001] -1.256 [0.0001] 0.147 [.0001] 0.425 [.0001] 0.051 [.0001] 0.442 [.0001] 
 Dong et al (latent) 0.210  -1.725  0.216  0.519  0.135  0.645  
 GME (unrestricted) 0.361  -1.207  0.206  0.257  -0.142  0.474  
 
             
 Mean 0.196  -1.359  0.220  0.417  0.071  0.446  
 Std. Deviation 0.093  0.209  0.194  0.101  0.148  0.177  
      
 
       
Coffee ITSUR 0.310 [0.0001] 0.066 [.0001] -1.483 [.0001] 0.437 [.0001] 0.109 [.0001] 0.560 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.284 [0.0001] 0.008 [.3918] -1.270 [.0001] 0.393 [.0001] 0.090 [.0001] 0.495 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.376 [0.0001] 0.231 [.0001] -1.764 [.0001] 0.442 [.0001] 0.193 [.0001] 0.522 [.0001] 
 Dong et al (actual) 0.289 [.0001] 0.061 [.0001] -1.337 [.0001] 0.437 [.0001] 0.092 [.0001] 0.459 [.0001] 
 Dong et al (latent) 0.409  0.090  -1.785  0.500  0.192  0.594  
 GME (unrestricted) 0.189  0.050  -1.522  0.343  0.081  0.462  
 
             
 Mean 0.310  0.084  -1.527  0.425  0.126  0.515  
 Std. Deviation 0.077  0.077  0.213  0.053  0.052  0.054  
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Table 5.14 Continued  
 
     Fruit           Carbonated    Bottled     
  
    Juice   Tea   Coffee    Soft Drinks    Water   Milk 
  
Carbonated Soft drinks ITSUR 0.064 [.0001] 0.054 [.0001] 0.139 [.0001] -0.645 [.0001] 0.068 [.0001] 0.320 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.066 [.0001] 0.069 [.0001] 0.125 [.0001] -0.642 [.0001] 0.053 [.0001] 0.329 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.049 [.0001] 0.054 [.0001] 0.115 [.0001] -0.637 [.0001] 0.067 [.0001] 0.352 [.0001] 
 Dong et al (actual) 0.112 [.0001] 0.067 [.0001] 0.137 [.0001] -0.676 [.0001] 0.084 [.0001] 0.276 [.0001] 
 Dong et al (latent) 0.096  0.093  0.181 [.0001] -0.708  0.132  0.207  
 GME (unrestricted) 0.080  0.071  0.160  -0.603  0.091  0.377  
 
             
 Mean 0.078  0.068  0.143  -0.652  0.083  0.310  
 Std. Deviation 0.023  0.014  0.024  0.036  0.028  0.061  
          
 
   
Bottled Water ITSUR 0.097 [.0089] 0.125 [.0001] 0.314 [.0001] 0.628 [.0001] -1.977 [.0001] 0.814 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.088 [.0090] 0.002 [.8978] 0.250 [.0001] 0.493 [.0001] -1.527 [.0001] 0.694 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.011 [.8326] 0.351 [.0001] 0.566 [.0001] 0.651 [.0001] -2.541 [.0001] 0.962 [.0001] 
 Dong et al (actual) 0.139 [.0001] 0.146 [.0001] 0.278 [.0001] 0.512 [.0001] -1.807 [.0001] 0.732 [.0001] 
 Dong et al (latent) 0.068  0.380  0.670  0.811  -3.455  1.525  
 GME (unrestricted)  0.492  0.225  0.389  0.791  -1.908  0.853  
 
             
 Mean 0.149  0.205  0.411  0.648  -2.203  0.930  
 Std. Deviation 0.173  0.144  0.170  0.134  0.698  0.307  
            
 
 
Milk ITSUR 0.264 [.0001] 0.067 [.0001] 0.213 [.0001] 0.370 [.0001] 0.109 [.0001] -1.023 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.256 [.0001] 0.090 [.0001] 0.192 [.0001] 0.380 [.0001] 0.097 [.0001] -1.014 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.275 [.0001] 0.032 [.0001] 0.219 [.0001] 0.375 [.0001] 0.134 [.0001] -1.036 [.0001] 
 
Dong et al (actual) 0.235 [.0001] 0.052 [.0001] 0.195 [.0001] 0.381 [.0001] 0.088 [.0001] -0.951 [.0001] 
 
Dong et al (latent) 0.272  0.074  0.281  0.383  0.152  -1.162  
  
GME (unrestricted) 0.152   0.040   0.148   0.251   0.102   -1.211   
 
           
 
 
 
Mean 0.242  0.059  0.208  0.357  0.114  -1.066  
 
Std. Deviation 0.046  0.022  0.044  0.052  0.024  0.099  
Note: p-values are in brackets 
1Calculated using sample means. 
  
154 
 
Table 5.15. Expenditure Elasticities1 of Non-Alcoholic Beverages Using the 
QUAIDS System and 1999 ACNielsen Homescan Data 
 
  ITSUR H&W S&Y GME Mean Standard 
Item Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
  
Deviation 
Fruit Juice 0.982 0.932 0.964 1.010 0.972 0.033 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
 
Tea 0.767 1.601 0.841 0.776 0.996 0.404 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
 
Coffee 0.879 0.757 0.844 0.872 0.838 0.056 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
 
Carbonated Soft 
drinks 1.184 1.171 1.189 1.201 1.186 0.012 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
 
Bottled Water 1.033 0.828 1.127 1.054 1.011 0.128 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
 
Milk 0.870 0.855 0.864 0.833 0.856 0.016 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
    
Note: p-values are in brackets 
1Calculated using sample means 
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Table 5.16. Uncompensated Own- and Cross-Price Elasticity Matrix1 of Non-Alcoholic Beverages Using the QUAIDS and the 1999 ACNielsen 
Homescan Data 
 
                Carbonated    Bottled     
  
    Fruit Juice   Tea   Coffee    Soft Drinks    Water   Milk 
  
Fruit Juice ITSUR -0.998 [.0001] 0.004 [0.6352] 0.084 [.0001] -0.197 [.0001] -0.017 [.0344] 0.143 [.0001] 
 H&W -0.939 [.0001] -0.004 [0.5953] 0.070 [.0001] -0.181 [.0001] -0.018 [.0137] 0.139 [.0001] 
 S&Y -0.974 [.0001] -0.033 [0.0011] 0.142 [.0001] -0.214 [.0001] -0.046 [.0001] 0.160 [.0001] 
 GME (unrestricted) -0.892  -0.004  0.160  -0.095  -0.210  0.177  
             
 
 Mean -0.951  -0.009  0.114  -0.172  -0.073  0.155  
 Std. Deviation 0.046  0.016  0.044  0.053  0.093  0.018  
    
 
         
Tea ITSUR 0.063 [.0454] -1.279 [.0001] 0.070 [.0019] 0.136 [.0002] 0.074 [.0001] 0.170 [.0001] 
 H&W -0.165 [.0070] -1.303 [.0001] -0.177 [.0001] -0.005 [.8915] -0.072 [.0001] 0.120 [.0012] 
 S&Y -0.080 [.0747] -1.462 [.0001] 0.389 [.0001] 0.076 [.1515] 0.289 [.0001] -0.053 [.2629] 
 GME (unrestricted) 0.201  -1.236  0.090  0.216  0.048  0.514  
             
 
 Mean 0.005  -1.320  0.093  0.106  0.085  0.188  
 Std. Deviation 0.161  0.098  0.231  0.094  0.150  0.237  
      
 
       
Coffee ITSUR 0.159 [0.0001] 0.025 [0.0059] -1.586 [0.0001] 0.140 [0.0001] 0.078 [.0001] 0.305 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.154 [0.0001] -0.0299 [0.0009] -1.357 [0.0001] 0.137 [0.0001] 0.062 [.0001] 0.277 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.248 [0.0064] 0.143 [0.0001] -1.792 [0.0001] 0.198 [0.0913] 0.132 [.0001] 0.228 [.0001] 
 GME (unrestricted) 0.076  -0.002  -1.579  0.037  0.034  0.201  
             
 
 Mean 0.159  0.034  -1.579  0.128  0.077  0.253  
 Std. Deviation 0.070  0.076  0.178  0.067  0.041  0.047  
        
 
     
Carbonated  ITSUR -0.145 [.0001] -0.002 [0.6908] 0.010 [.1178] -1.051 [.0001] 0.023 [.0001] -0.020 [.0446] 
Soft drinks H&W -0.141 [.0001] 0.014 [0.0019] -0.001 [.8488] -1.044 [.0001] 0.007 [.0642] -0.007 [.4951] 
 S&Y -0.166 [.0001] 0.001 [0.8270] -0.027 [.0023] -1.046 [.0001] 0.039 [.0001] 0.009 [.4027] 
 GME (unrestricted) -0.143  0.017  0.021  -1.022  0.048  0.037  
             
 
 Mean -0.149  0.008  0.001  -1.041  0.029  0.005  
 Std. Deviation 0.012  0.009  0.020  0.013  0.018  0.025  
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Table 5.16 Continued 
 
                Carbonated    Bottled     
  
    Fruit Juice   Tea   Coffee    Soft Drinks    Water   Milk 
  
Bottled Water ITSUR -0.089 [0.0171] 0.077 [.0001] 0.204 [.0001] 0.274 [.0001] -2.015 [.0001] 0.517 [.0001] 
 H&W -0.062 [0.06203] -0.035 [.0510] 0.159 [.0001] 0.210 [.0001] -1.556 [.0001] 0.457 [.0001] 
 S&Y -0.230 [0.5354] 0.375 [.0835] 0.372 [.0001] 0.144 [.0290] -2.539 [.0001] 0.751 [.0001] 
 GME (unrestricted) 0.267  0.187  0.232  0.457  -1.932  0.558  
             
 
 Mean -0.029  0.151  0.242  0.271  -2.011  0.571  
 Std. Deviation 0.211  0.175  0.092  0.135  0.405  0.127  
            
 
 
Milk ITSUR 0.114 [.0001] 0.026 [.0001] 0.120 [.0001] 0.069 [.0001] 0.075 [.0001] -1.274 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.107 [.0001] 0.051 [.0001] 0.102 [.0001] 0.083 [.0001] 0.064 [.0001] -1.261 [.0001] 
 
S&Y 0.131 [.0001] -0.010 [.1081] 0.133 [.0001] 0.079 [.0001] 0.088 [.0001] -1.285 [.0001] 
  
GME (unrestricted) 0.007   -0.010   0.053   -0.024   0.071   -1.455   
 
           
 
 
 
Mean 0.090  0.014  0.102  0.052  0.074  -1.319  
 
Std. Deviation 0.056  0.030  0.035  0.051  0.010  0.091  
Note: p-values are in brackets 
          
1Calculated using sample means. 
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Table 5.17. Compensated Own- and Cross-Price Elasticity Matrix1 of Non-Alcoholic Beverages Using the QUAIDS and the 1999 ACNielsen 
Homescan Data 
 
                Carbonated    Bottled     
  
    Fruit Juice   Tea   Coffee    Soft Drinks    Water   Milk 
  
Fruit Juice ITSUR -0.826 [.0001] 0.050 [.0001] 0.191 [.0001] 0.140 [.0001] 0.020 [.0108] 0.426 [.0001] 
 H&W -0.776 [.0001] 0.040 [.0001] 0.172 [.0001] 0.139 [.0001] 0.018 [.0214] 0.408 [.0001] 
 S&Y -0.805 [.0001] 0.013 [.2032] 0.247 [.0001] 0.117 [.0001] -0.009 [.4151] 0.438 [.0001] 
 GME (unrestricted) -0.716  0.043  0.270  0.251  -0.172  0.469  
             
 
 Mean -0.781  0.036  0.220  0.162  -0.036  0.435  
 Std. Deviation 0.048  0.016  0.046  0.060  0.092  0.026  
    
 
         
Tea ITSUR 0.197 [.0001] -1.243 [.0001] 0.154 [.0001] 0.399 [.0001] 0.103 [.0001] 0.391 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.115 [.0001] -1.228 [.0001] -0.002 [.9184] 0.544 [.0001] -0.011 [.4564] 0.581 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.067 [.0772] -1.422 [.0001] 0.480 [.0001] 0.365 [.0001] 0.321 [.0001] 0.189 [.0001] 
 GME (unrestricted) 0.337  -1.199  0.175  0.482  0.078  0.737  
             
 
 Mean 0.179  -1.273  0.202  0.447  0.123  0.475  
 Std. Deviation 0.118  0.101  0.202  0.081  0.141  0.237  
      
 
       
Coffee ITSUR 0.313 [0.0001] 0.066 [.0001] -1.490 [.0001] 0.442 [.0001] 0.111 [.0001] 0.558 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.286 [0.0001] 0.006 [.5303] -1.275 [.0001] 0.397 [.0001] 0.091 [.0001] 0.495 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.396 [0.0001] 0.182 [.0001] -1.700 [.0001] 0.487 [.0001] 0.164 [.0001] 0.471 [.0001] 
 GME (unrestricted) 0.228  0.039  -1.484  0.336  0.068  0.452  
             
 
 Mean 0.306  0.073  -1.487  0.415  0.108  0.494  
 Std. Deviation 0.070  0.077  0.174  0.065  0.041  0.046  
        
 
     
Carbonated  ITSUR 0.062 [.0001] 0.054 [.0001] 0.139 [.0001] -0.644 [.0001] 0.068 [.0001] 0.321 [.0001] 
Soft drinks H&W 0.064 [.0001] 0.069 [.0001] 0.126 [.0001] -0.642 [.0001] 0.052 [.0001] 0.331 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.042 [.0001] 0.057 [.0001] 0.103 [.0001] -0.638 [.0001] 0.084 [.0001] 0.352 [.0001] 
 GME (unrestricted) 0.067  0.073  0.152  -0.611  0.094  0.384  
             
 
 Mean 0.059  0.064  0.130  -0.634  0.075  0.347  
 Std. Deviation 0.011  0.009  0.021  0.016  0.019  0.028  
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Table 5.17 Continued 
 
                Carbonated    Bottled     
  
    Fruit Juice   Tea   Coffee    Soft Drinks    Water   Milk 
  
Bottled Water ITSUR 0.092 [.0693] 0.125 [.0001] 0.317 [.0001] 0.628 [.0001] -1.976 [.0001] 0.814 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.083 [.0140] 0.004 [.8310] 0.249 [.0001] 0.494 [.0001] -1.525 [.0001] 0.695 [.0001] 
 S&Y -0.033 [.5349] 0.428 [.0001] 0.495 [.0001] 0.530 [.0001] -2.496 [.0001] 1.076 [.0001] 
 GME (unrestricted) 0.451  0.236  0.347  0.818  -1.892  0.862  
             
 
 Mean 0.148  0.198  0.352  0.618  -1.972  0.862  
 Std. Deviation 0.210  0.180  0.104  0.145  0.400  0.159  
            
 
 
Milk ITSUR 0.266 [.0001] 0.067 [.0001] 0.215 [.0001] 0.367 [.0001] 0.108 [.0001] -1.024 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.257 [.0001] 0.091 [.0001] 0.195 [.0001] 0.377 [.0001] 0.096 [.0001] -1.015 [.0001] 
 
S&Y 0.283 [.0001] 0.031 [.0001] 0.227 [.0001] 0.375 [.0001] 0.120 [.0001] -1.036 [.0001] 
  
GME (unrestricted) 0.153   0.039   0.145   0.261   0.103   -1.215   
 
           
 
 
 
Mean 0.240  0.057  0.195  0.345  0.107  -1.072  
 
Std. Deviation 0.059  0.027  0.036  0.056  0.010  0.095  
Note:  p-values are in brackets 
1Calculated using sample means. 
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Table 5.18. Expenditure Elasticities1 of Non-Alcoholic Beverages Using the 
AIDS System and 1999 ACNielsen Homesan Data (Unrestricted) 
  
  ITSUR H&W S&Y GME Mean Standard 
Item Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
  
Deviation 
Fruit Juice 1.039 0.976 1.040 1.042 1.024 0.032 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
 
Tea 0.745 1.770 0.715 0.741 0.993 0.519 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
 
Coffee 0.976 0.841 0.965 0.968 0.937 0.065 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
 
Carbonated 
Soft Drinks 1.155 1.135 1.171 1.158 1.155 0.015 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
 
Bottled Water 0.963 0.762 0.963 0.958 0.911 0.100 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
 
Milk 0.847 0.820 0.836 0.847 0.838 0.013 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
    
p-values are in parenthesis 
1Calculated using sample means 
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Table 5.19. Uncompensated Own- and Cross-Price Elasticity Matrix1 of Non-Alcoholic Beverages Using the AIDS and 1999 ACNielsen Homescan 
Data (Unrestricted) 
 
                Carbonated    Bottled     
  
    Fruit Juice   Tea   Coffee    Soft drinks    Water   Milk 
  
Fruit Juice ITSUR -0.905 [.0001] 0.010 [0.3170] 0.145 [.0001] -0.093 [.0001] -0.038 [.0035] 0.301 [.0001] 
 H&W -0.853 [.0001] 0.016 [0.1106] 0.133 [.0001] -0.084 [.0001] -0.034 [.0136] 0.258 [.0001] 
 S&Y -0.872 [.0001] 0.000 [0.9705] 0.170 [.0001] -0.086 [.0022] -0.059 [.0004] 0.384 [.0001] 
 GME -0.912  0.009  0.141  -0.100  -0.182  0.173  
  
 
           
 Mean -0.885  0.009  0.147  -0.091  -0.078  0.279  
 Std. Deviation 0.028  0.007  0.016  0.007  0.070  0.088  
             
 
Tea ITSUR 0.197 [.0001] -1.254 [.1828] 0.096 [.0004] 0.159 [.0001] 0.036 [.0001] 0.417 [.0001] 
 H&W -0.018 [.0586] -1.431 [.3909] -0.277 [.0001] 0.019 [.1877] -0.306 [.0001] 0.991 [.0001] 
 S&Y -0.024 [.0123] -1.376 [.1545] 0.775 [.0001] 0.014 [.2010] 0.416 [.0001] -0.345 [.0001] 
 GME 0.231  -1.242  0.124  0.205  0.038  0.524  
    
 
         
 Mean 0.097  -1.325  0.179  0.099  0.046  0.397  
 Std. Deviation 0.136  0.093  0.437  0.098  0.295  0.554  
             
 
Coffee ITSUR 0.014 [0.6441] 0.003 [0.8206] -1.632 [0.0001] 0.003 [0.9226] 0.044 [.0092] 0.172 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.018 [0.4823] 0.053 [0.0001] -1.415 [0.0001] 0.032 [0.2068] 0.034 [.0192] 0.092 [.0025] 
 S&Y 0.018 [0.7216] 0.0164 [0.4725] -2.035 [0.0001] -0.019 [0.7024] 0.089 [.0022] 0.297 [.0001] 
 GME 0.020  0.004  -1.628  0.011  0.045  0.183  
      
 
       
 Mean 0.017  0.019  -1.678  0.007  0.053  0.186  
 Std. Deviation 0.003  0.023  0.259  0.021  0.024  0.084  
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Table 5.19 Continued  
 
                Carbonated    Bottled     
  
    Fruit Juice   Tea   Coffee    Soft drinks    Water   Milk 
  
Carbonated  ITSUR -0.096 [.0001] 0.0218 [0.0025] 0.053 [.0001] -0.968 [.0001] 0.053 [.0001] 0.103 [.0001] 
Soft drinks H&W -0.090 [.0001] -0.004 [0.6689] 0.058 [.0001] -0.982 [.0001] 0.056 [.0001] 0.058 [.0001] 
 S&Y -0.103 [.0001] 0.027 [0.0007] 0.048 [.0001] -0.954 [.0001] 0.051 [.0001] 0.112 [.0001] 
 GME -0.123  0.016  0.033  -0.999  0.047  0.044  
        
 
     
 Mean -0.103  0.015  0.048  -0.976  0.052  0.079  
 Std. Deviation 0.015  0.013  0.011  0.019  0.004  0.033  
             
 
Bottled Water ITSUR 0.317 [0.0001] 0.178 [.0001] 0.279 [.0001] 0.458 [.0001] -1.947 [.0001] 0.560 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.239 [0.0001] 0.177 [.0001] 0.163 [.0001] 0.344 [.0001] -1.503 [.0001] 0.351 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.507 [0.0001] 0.302 [.0001] 0.471 [.0001] 0.686 [.0001] -2.497 [.0001] 0.922 [.0001] 
 GME 0.325  0.180  0.284  0.463  -1.944  0.577  
          
 
   
 Mean 0.347  0.209  0.299  0.488  -1.973  0.602  
 Std. Deviation 0.113  0.062  0.127  0.143  0.407  0.236  
             
 
Milk ITSUR -0.022 [.1566] -0.016 [.0234] 0.037 [.0003] -0.069 [.0001] 0.063 [.0001] -1.513 [.0001] 
 H&W -0.018 [.2153] 0.022 [.0156] 0.031 [.0019] -0.031 [.0390] 0.057 [.0001] -1.545 [.0001] 
 S&Y -0.024 [.1348] -0.016 [.0341] 0.044 [.0001] -0.088 [.0001] 0.070 [.0001] -1.544 [.0001] 
  
GME 0.004   -0.011   0.056   -0.039   0.070   -1.456   
 
           
 
 
 
Mean -0.015  -0.005  0.042  -0.057  0.065  -1.515  
 
Std. Deviation 0.013  0.018  0.011  0.026  0.006  0.042  
Note: p-values are in brackets 
1Calculated using sample means 
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Table 5.20. Compensated Own- and Cross-Price Elasticity Matrix1 of Non-Alcoholic Beverages Using the AIDS and 1999 ACNielsen Homescan 
Data (Unrestricted) 
 
                Carbonated    Bottled     
  
    Fruit Juice   Tea   Coffee    Soft Drinks    Water   Milk 
  
Fruit Juice ITSUR -0.723 [.0001] 0.059 [.0001] 0.259 [.0001] 0.264 [.0001] 0.002 [.9024] 0.600 [.0001] 
 H&W -0.682 [.0001] 0.061 [.0001] 0.239 [.0001] 0.251 [.0001] 0.003 [.7842] 0.539 [.0001] 
 S&Y -0.690 [.0001] 0.048 [.0002] 0.283 [.0001] 0.271 [.0001] -0.019 [.2473] 0.683 [.0001] 
 GME -0.730  0.057  0.255  0.257  -0.142  0.474  
  
 
           
 Mean -0.706  0.057  0.259  0.261  -0.039  0.574  
 Std. Deviation 0.024  0.006  0.018  0.009  0.069  0.089  
             
 
Tea ITSUR 0.327 [.0001] -1.219 [.1954] 0.177 [.0001] 0.415 [.0001] 0.065 [.0001] 0.631 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.292 [.0001] -1.347 [.4191] -0.084 [.0001] 0.626 [.0001] -0.239 [.0001] 1.501 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.102 [.0001] -1.342 [.1649] 0.853 [.0001] 0.259 [.0001] 0.443 [.0001] -0.139 [.0001] 
 GME 0.361  -1.207  0.206  0.257  -0.142  0.474  
    
 
         
 Mean 0.270  -1.279  0.288  0.389  0.032  0.617  
 Std. Deviation 0.116  0.076  0.398  0.174  0.302  0.677  
             
 
Coffee ITSUR 0.185 [0.0001] 0.049 [.0003] -1.526 [.0001] 0.338 [.0001] 0.081 [.0001] 0.045 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.165 [0.0001] 0.092 [.0001] -1.324 [.0001] 0.320 [.0001] 0.066 [.0001] 0.335 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.187 [0.0002] 0.062 [.0001] -1.930 [.0001] 0.312 [.0001] 0.125 [.0001] 0.575 [.0001] 
 GME 0.189  0.050  -1.522  0.343  0.081  0.462  
      
 
       
 Mean 0.181  0.063  -1.575  0.328  0.088  0.354  
 Std. Deviation 0.011  0.020  0.255  0.014  0.026  0.228  
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Table 5.20 Continued 
 
                Carbonated    Bottled     
  
    Fruit Juice   Tea   Coffee    Soft Drinks    Water   Milk 
  
Carbonated  ITSUR 0.107 [.0001] 0.076 [.0001] 0.179 [.0001] -0.572 [.0001] 0.097 [.0001] 0.436 [.0001] 
Soft drinks H&W 0.109 [.0001] 0.050 [.0001] 0.182 [.0001] -0.593 [.0001] 0.099 [.0001] 0.449 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.102 [.0001] 0.082 [.0001] 0.175 [.0001] -0.552 [.0001] 0.096 [.0001] 0.450 [.0001] 
 GME 0.080  0.071  0.160  -0.603  0.091  0.377  
        
 
     
 Mean 0.099  0.070  0.174  -0.580  0.096  0.428  
 Std. Deviation 0.013  0.014  0.010  0.023  0.004  0.034  
             
 
Bottled Water ITSUR 0.486 [.0001] 0.223 [.0001] 0.384 [.0001] 0.789 [.0001] -1.910 [.0001] 0.838 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.372 [.0001] 0.213 [.0001] 0.246 [.0001] 0.605 [.0001] -1.474 [.0001] 0.570 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.675 [.0001] 0.347 [.0001] 0.576 [.0001] 0.651 [.0001] -2.461 [.0001] 1.016 [.0001] 
 GME 0.492  0.225  0.389  0.791  -1.908  0.853  
          
 
   
 Mean 0.506  0.252  0.399  0.709  -1.938  0.819  
 Std. Deviation 0.125  0.064  0.135  0.095  0.404  0.185  
             
 
Milk ITSUR 0.127 [.0001] 0.024 [.0009] 0.129 [.0001] 0.222 [.0001] 0.096 [.0001] -1.269 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.125 [.0001] 0.060 [.0001] 0.120 [.0001] 0.250 [.0001] 0.088 [.0001] -1.309 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.122 [.0001] 0.023 [.0001] 0.135 [.0001] 0.199 [.0001] 0.102 [.0001] -1.303 [.0001] 
  
GME 0.152   0.040   0.148   0.251   0.102   -1.211   
 
           
 
 
 
Mean 0.131  0.037  0.133  0.230  0.097  -1.273  
 
Std. Deviation 0.014  0.018  0.012  0.025  0.007  0.045  
Note: p-values are in brackets 
1Calculated using sample means 
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Table 5.21. Expenditure Elasticities1 of Non-Alcoholic Beverages Using the 
QUAIDS System and 1999 ACNielsen Homescan Data (Unrestricted) 
 
  ITSUR H&W S&Y GME Mean Standard 
Item Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate 
  
Deviation 
Fruit Juice 1.054 0.956 1.079 1.010 1.025 0.054 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Tea 0.586 1.547 0.929 0.776 0.959 0.416 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Coffee 0.988 0.734 0.661 0.872 0.814 0.145 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Carbonated Soft Drinks 1.162 1.198 1.199 1.201 1.190 0.019 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Bottled Water 0.943 0.862 0.995 1.054 0.963 0.081 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Milk 0.854 0.820 0.856 0.833 0.841 0.017 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)       
Note: p-values are in brackets 
1Calculated using sample means 
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Table 5.22. Uncompensated Own- and Cross-Price Elasticity Matrix1 of Non-Alcoholic Beverages Using the QUAIDS and the 1999 ACNielsen 
Homescan Data (Unrestricted) 
 
                Carbonated    Bottled     
  
    Fruit Juice   Tea   Coffee    Soft drinks    Water   Milk 
  
Fruit Juice ITSUR -0.907 [.0001] 0.051 [0.0001] 0.143 [.0001] -0.094 [.0001] -0.037 [.0045] 0.297 [.0001] 
 H&W -0.850 [.0001] -0.028 [0.1028] 0.134 [.0001] -0.081 [.0001] -0.034 [.0049] 0.264 [.0001] 
 S&Y -0.887 [.0001] 0.021 [0.1310] 0.384 [.0001] -0.095 [.0007] -0.038 [.0232] 0.377 [.0001] 
 GME -0.892  -0.004  0.160  -0.095  -0.210  0.177  
  
 
           
 Mean -0.884  0.010  0.205  -0.091  -0.080  0.279  
 Std. Deviation 0.024  0.034  0.120  0.007  0.087  0.083  
             
 
Tea ITSUR 0.210 [.0001] -1.686 [.0001] 0.115 [.0001] 0.160 [.0001] 0.014 [.0001] 0.453 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.006 [.7797] -1.737 [.0001] -0.287 [.0001] 0.140 [.8915] -0.312 [.0001] 0.978 [.0001] 
 S&Y -0.074 [.0001] -1.427 [.0001] 1.984 [.0001] 0.071 [.0001] 0.520 [.0001] -0.451 [.0001] 
 GME 0.201  -1.236  0.090  0.216  0.048  0.514  
    
 
         
 Mean 0.086  -1.521  0.475  0.147  0.067  0.373  
 Std. Deviation 0.142  0.234  1.023  0.060  0.343  0.598  
             
 
Coffee ITSUR 0.012 [0.6903] 0.034 [0.0413] -1.634 [0.0001] 0.003 [0.9165] 0.045 [.0076] 0.170 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.094 [0.0004] 0.003 [0.7935] -1.410 [0.0001] 0.052 [0.0386] 0.042 [.0042] 0.139 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.124 [0.0147] -0.083 [0.0258] -3.800 [0.0001] 0.0003 [0.9951] -0.067 [.0897] 0.390 [.0001] 
 GME 0.076  -0.002  -1.579  0.037  0.034  0.201  
      
 
       
 Mean 0.077  -0.012  -2.106  0.023  0.014  0.225  
 Std. Deviation 0.048  0.050  1.133  0.025  0.054  0.113  
             
 
Carbonated Soft drinks ITSUR -0.097 [.0001] 0.041 [0.0001] 0.052 [.0001] -0.970 [.0001] 0.054 [.0001] 0.103 [.0001] 
 H&W -0.136 [.0001] 0.035 [0.0001] 0.053 [.0001] -0.989 [.0001] 0.051 [.0001] 0.090 [.001] 
 S&Y -0.116 [.0001] 0.051 [0.0001] 0.747 [.0001] -0.972 [.0001] 0.066 [.0001] 0.116 [.0001] 
 GME -0.143  0.017  0.021  -1.022  0.048  0.037  
        
 
     
 Mean -0.123  0.036  0.218  -0.988  0.055  0.087  
 Std. Deviation 0.021  0.014  0.353  0.024  0.008  0.034  
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Table 5.22 Continued 
 
                Carbonated    Bottled     
  
    Fruit Juice   Tea   Coffee    Soft drinks    Water   Milk 
  
Bottled Water ITSUR 0.321 [0.0001] 0.123 [.0001] 0.282 [.0001] 0.459 [.0001] -1.948 [.0001] 0.565 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.227 [0.0001] 0.318 [.0001] 0.167 [.0001] 0.297 [.0001] -1.499 [.0001] 0.354 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.492 [0.0001] 0.307 [.0001] 0.711 [.0001] 0.688 [.0001] -2.478 [.0001] 0.893 [.0001] 
 GME 0.267  0.187  0.232  0.457  -1.932  0.558  
          
 
   
 Mean 0.327  0.234  0.348  0.475  -1.965  0.593  
 Std. Deviation 0.116  0.095  0.247  0.161  0.401  0.223  
             
 
Milk ITSUR -0.022 [.1551] 0.003 [.7189] 0.035 [.0004] -0.066 [.0001] 0.064 [.0001] -1.516 [.0001] 
 H&W -0.016 [.2688] -0.017 [.1292] 0.035 [.0001] -0.045 [.0015] 0.060 [.0001] -1.526 [.0001] 
 
S&Y -0.029 [.0798] -0.014 [.0710] 0.149 [.0001] -0.077 [.0001] 0.080 [.0001] -1.557 [.0001] 
 
GME 0.007  -0.010  0.053  -0.024  0.071  -1.455  
 
           
 
 
 
Mean -0.015  -0.009  0.068  -0.053  0.069  -1.514  
 
Std. Deviation 0.015  0.009  0.055  0.023  0.009  0.043  
Note: p-values are in brackets 
1Calculated using sample means 
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Table 5.23. Compensated Own- and Cross-Price Elasticity Matrix1 of Non-Alcoholic Beverages Using the QUAIDS and the 1999 ACNielsen 
Homescan Data (Unrestricted) 
 
                Carbonated    Bottled     
  
    Fruit Juice   Tea   Coffee    Soft Drinks    Water   Milk 
  
Fruit Juice ITSUR -0.723 [.0001] 0.100 [.0001] 0.258 [.0001] 0.268 [.0001] 0.003 [.8061] 0.600 [.0001] 
 H&W -0.683 [.0001] 0.017 [.3264] 0.238 [.0001] 0.246 [.0001] 0.003 [.8260] 0.539 [.0001] 
 S&Y -0.698 [.0001] 0.071 [.0001] 0.502 [.0001] 0.275 [.0001] 0.003 [.8804] 0.687 [.0001] 
 GME -0.716  0.043  0.270  0.251  -0.172  0.469  
  
 
           
 Mean -0.705  0.058  0.317  0.260  -0.041  0.574  
 Std. Deviation 0.018  0.036  0.124  0.014  0.087  0.093  
             
 
Tea ITSUR 0.312 [.0001] -1.658 [.0001] 0.179 [.0001] 0.361 [.0001] 0.037 [.0001] 0.622 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.276 [.0001] -1.207 [.0001] -0.119 [.0001] 0.671 [.0001] -0.254 [.0001] 1.424 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.089 [.0001] -1.383 [.0001] 2.085 [.0001] 0.390 [.0001] 0.555 [.0001] -0.184 [.0001] 
 GME 0.337  -1.199  0.175  0.482  0.078  0.737  
    
 
         
 Mean 0.254  -1.362  0.580  0.476  0.104  0.650  
 Std. Deviation 0.113  0.215  1.013  0.140  0.335  0.659  
             
 
Coffee ITSUR 0.185 [0.0001] 0.081 [.0001] -1.527 [.0001] 0.342 [.0001] 0.083 [.0001] 0.454 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.163 [0.0001] -0.163 [.0001] -1.330 [.0001] 0.304 [.0001] 0.070 [.0001] 0.351 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.240 [0.0001] -0.052 [.1667] -3.728 [.0001] 0.227 [.0001] -0.042 [.2921] 0.580 [.0001] 
 GME 0.228  0.039  -1.484  0.336  0.068  0.452  
      
 
       
 Mean 0.204  -0.024  -2.017  0.302  0.044  0.459  
 Std. Deviation 0.036  0.108  1.144  0.053  0.058  0.094  
             
 
Carbonated Soft drinks ITSUR 0.106 [.0001] 0.096 [.0001] 0.178 [.0001] -0.572 [.0001] 0.098 [.0001] 0.438 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.110 [.0001] 0.214 [.0001] 0.184 [.0001] -0.578 [.0001] 0.097 [.0001] 0.435 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.093 [.0001] 0.108 [.0001] 0.348 [.0001] -0.561 [.0001] 0.112 [.0001] 0.461 [.0001] 
 GME 0.067  0.073  0.152  -0.611  0.094  0.384  
        
 
     
 Mean 0.094  0.123  0.216  -0.580  0.100  0.429  
 Std. Deviation 0.019  0.062  0.089  0.021  0.008  0.033  
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Table 5.23 Continued 
 
                Carbonated    Bottled     
  
    Fruit Juice   Tea   Coffee    Soft Drinks    Water   Milk 
  
Bottled Water ITSUR 0.486 [.0001] 0.167 [.0001] 0.385 [.0001] 0.783 [.0001] -1.912 [.0001] 0.837 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.378 [.0001] 0.358 [.0001] 0.261 [.0001] 0.593 [.0001] -1.467 [.0001] 0.602 [.0001] 
 S&Y 0.666 [.0001] 0.354 [.0001] 0.819 [.0001] 1.029 [.0001] -2.440 [.0001] 1.180 [.0001] 
 GME 0.451  0.236  0.347  0.818  -1.892  0.862  
          
 
   
 Mean 0.495  0.279  0.453  0.806  -1.928  0.870  
 Std. Deviation 0.122  0.093  0.250  0.179  0.399  0.237  
             
 
Milk ITSUR 0.128 [.0001] 0.043 [.0001] 0.129 [.0001] 0.227 [.0001] 0.096 [.0001] -1.270 [.0001] 
 H&W 0.127 [.0001] 0.022 [.0594] 0.124 [.0001] 0.236 [.0001] 0.091 [.0001] -1.290 [.0001] 
 
S&Y 0.121 [.0001] 0.026 [.0001] 0.243 [.0001] 0.216 [.0001] 0.112 [.0001] -1.311 [.0001] 
 
GME 0.153  0.039  0.145  0.261  0.103  -1.215  
 
           
 
 
 
Mean 0.132  0.033  0.160  0.235  0.101  -1.271  
 
Std. Deviation 0.014  0.010  0.056  0.019  0.009  0.041  
                            
Note: p-values are in brackets 
1Calculated using sample means 
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Elasticity Comparisons across Censored Estimation Techniques of  
Non-Alcoholic Beverages    
Table 5.14 presents the AIDS compensated or Hicksian price elasticity matrix of 
non-alcoholic beverages. We note more variability of cross price elasticities estimates of 
non-alcoholic beverage that are highly censored. These include tea, coffee and bottled 
water. On the other hand, relatively less variable cross-price elasticity estimates were 
observed for commodities with relatively minor censoring issues. For example, in milk, 
the cross-price elasticity estimates of milk with respect to fruit juice ranged from 0.152 
to 0.264. Though not comparable, the cross-price elasticity values for bottled water with 
respect to fruit juice ranged from 0.011 to 0.492. Also note that associated p-values for 
all price elasticities are mostly significant. For the QUAIDS specification, we note the 
same claim that the greater number of censored observations the commodity, the more 
variable its respective own- and cross-price elasticities are. For milk the compensated 
price elasticities with respect to fruit juice ranged from 0.153 to 0.283, while for the 
bottled water, the compensated price elasticities ranged from -0.033 to 0.451 (Table 
5.17). On the other hand, the same observation can be made for the AIDS and QUAIDS 
unrestricted cases. For example the cross price elasticity of milk with respect fruit juice 
ranged from 0.122 to 0.152 for AIDS and 0.121 to 0.153 for QUAIDS, while the cross 
price elasticity of bottled water with respect to fruit juice ranged from 0.372 to 0.675 for 
the AIDS specification and 0.378 to 0.666 for the QUAIDS model (Tables 20 and 23). 
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Elasticity Comparisons across Model Specification (AIDS vs. QUAIDS) 
Table 5.14 and 5.17 present the compensated own- and cross-price elasticity 
matrices of non-alcoholic beverages of both the AIDS and QUAIDS models. We note 
relatively similar price elasticity estimates especially with respect to the own price 
elasticity values of both models. For example for milk, the range of the own price 
elasticities were from -0.951 to -1.211, whereas for the QUAIDS model, the values 
ranged from -1.015 to -1.215. Also if we look at a highly censored commodity such as 
bottled water, the cross price elasticity of bottled water with respect to tea ranged from 
0.002 to 0.380 for the AIDS model and 0.004 to 0.428 in the QUAIDS specification. The 
same findings were also observed for the unrestricted cases of AIDS and QUAIDS 
where the calculated compensated price elasticities were remarkably similar. 
Elasticity Comparisons across Imposition of Theoretical Restrictions 
Tables 5.14 and 5.20 show the compensated own- and cross-price elasticity 
matrices of the AIDS restricted and unrestricted cases. Two notable results were 
observed; own price elasticity estimates (absolute values) were larger in the restricted 
case vis-as-vis the unrestricted case. On the other hand compensated cross price 
elasticities were generally larger in absolute terms in the unrestricted case relative to the 
values generated in the restricted case. The same result can also be observed for the 
QUAIDS restricted and unrestricted models (Tables 5.17 & 5.23).  
Fit Comparisons across Econometric Techniques 
 Table 5.24 present the R-square values of the budget share equations from 
different censoring econometric techniques across demand system specification and 
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imposition of theoretical restrictions. From the estimates, we find that across model 
specification and theoretical restrictions, the Heien and Wessells approach had the 
highest R-square values in its budget share equations. On the other hand, R-square 
values generated by the Shonkwiler and Yen technique registered second if theoretical 
restrictions are relaxed.  Likewise, the ITSUR technique placed last across demand 
model specifications and theoretical impositions.     
Conclusions 
We find that the price elasticities especially the compensated price elasticities 
were robust and relatively similar and statistically significant across model 
specifications, estimation techniques and restriction impositions. The results of the 
compensated cross-price elasticities across the three categories were generally positive 
indicating that the respective non-alcoholic beverages are net substitutes. Comparative 
analysis show that across estimation techniques, greater variability of compensated 
cross-price elasticity estimates were observed in highly censored non-alcoholic 
beverages such as tea, coffee and bottled water. As for the comparison between model 
specification (AIDS versus QUAIDS), the compensated price estimates were remarkably 
similar especially for the own-price elasticity values. Finally, the estimates for 
unrestricted compensated cross price elasticities were generally greater vis-à-vis the 
restricted cases. The reverse is generally true with regard to the compensated own-price 
elasticity estimates.  
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Table 5.24. R-squared Values of Budget Share Equations from Different Censoring Econometric Techniques 
 
Micro-Demand  Econometric Fruit Juice Coffee Soft Drink Bottled Water Milk Tea 
System  Model Techniques w_f w_c w_s w_w w_m w_t 
AIDS ITSUR 0.0622 0.0673 0.0484 0.0764 0.0734 0.0184 
 H&W 0.1937 0.3202 0.0966 0.2593 0.1441 0.0038 
 S&Y 0.0629 0.0641 0.0479 0.0720 0.0744 0.0133 
 GME (unrestricted) 0.0673 0.0695 0.0537 0.0801 0.0937 0.0145 
 Dong et. al 0.0139 0.0484 0.0016 0.0676 0.0253 0.0101 
        
QUAIDS ITSUR 0.0636 0.0732 0.0517 0.0779 0.0734 0.0189 
 H&W 0.1956 0.3259 0.1054 0.2602 0.1463 0.0037 
 S&Y 0.0643 0.0702 0.0511 0.0740 0.0742 0.0155 
 GME (unrestricted) 0.0681 0.0742 0.0571 0.0816 0.0940 0.0150 
        
AIDS  ITSUR 0.0672 0.0694 0.0532 0.0801 0.0940 0.0035 
(unrestricted) H&W 0.1981 0.3257 0.1008 0.2649 0.1699 0.0113 
 S&Y 0.0676 0.0697 0.0529 0.0766 0.0944 0.0005 
 GME 0.0673 0.0695 0.0537 0.0801 0.0937 0.0145 
        
QUAIDS  ITSUR 0.0682 0.0697 0.0536 0.0804 0.0946 0.0030 
(unrestricted) H&W 0.1995 0.3299 0.1106 0.2656 0.1721 0.0001 
 S&Y 0.0696 0.1076 0.0562 0.0768 0.0958 0.0037 
  GME 0.0681 0.0742 0.0571 0.0816 0.0940 0.0150  
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 The robustness of both the parameter estimates and the calculated expenditure 
and price elasticities may be explained in part to the availability of high number of 
observations (n~30,000). However, since most censored data sets do not usually have 
this particular characteristic, then studies that simulate the effect of sample size will be 
beneficial on determining whether robustness will still be observed for parameter 
estimates and price and expenditures elasticities in the presence of differing sample 
sizes.   
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 This dissertation has produced a series of interrelated studies that focused from 
the examination of selected socio-demographic variables as potential drivers of organic 
and conventional milk choice, estimation of demand interrelationship of organic and 
conventional milk, examination of the sorting ability of binary choice models and to the 
estimation of a demand system that includes milk in a broader non-alcoholic beverage 
complex.  These studies relied on the usage of 1999 and 2004 Nielsen Homescan Panel 
data. 
In Chapter II, an attempt was made to look at the various socio-demographic 
drivers in terms of explaining household purchase of three milk types namely purchase 
of organic and conventional milk, purchase of organic milk only and purchase of 
conventional milk only. This examination was facilitated by the usage of both 
multinomial logit and multinomial probit models. The findings indicated that increasing 
household size, the presence of children, increasing educational level of household, 
hispanic households and those located in the west were identified as the key variables in 
explaining the likelihood of purchasing organic milk and the combination of organic and 
conventional milk. The study also found that little differences exist in the magnitudes of 
the marginal effects for both the multinomial logit and probit models. However the 
standard errors from the multinomial probit model are higher than the multinomial logit 
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model thus more insignificant marginal effects with the multinomial probit model were 
observed than from the multinomial logit model.  
In chapter III, a Heckman two-step correction was done in order to address the 
issue of sample selection in estimating the demand for both organic and conventional 
milk. Results from the first-stage probit analysis indicate that socio-demographic 
variables such household size, income, educational and employment levels of household 
head, race, ethnicity and regions were significant in explaining the likelihood of 
purchasing organic milk. Likewise, once the decision to purchase organic milk has been 
made, the findings indicate that variables such as household size, presence of children 
are associated with increased purchases of both organic and conventional milks. Also as 
household head educational level increases, purchases of organic milk also increases. 
The same also is true for white and oriental households where purchases of organic are 
more relative to black households. In terms of race, Hispanic households purchase more 
organic milk, while those located in the west purchase more organic milk relative to the 
other regions. Finally, the calculated elasticties indicate that both organic and 
conventional milks are substitutes. However the relationship is an asymmetric one, 
where the demand for organic milk is more sensitive to price changes in conventional 
milk but changes in the price of organic milk has relatively little impact on the demand 
for conventional milk.  
In Chapters II and III, binary choice models were used in evaluating behavioral 
choices with regard to two alternatives. And because of their usefulness, methods such 
as the prediction-success contingency tables have been a standard measure in evaluating 
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the ability of models to make correct predictions. However, these types of methods are 
centered on the assumption of a symmetric loss function with a default cut-off value of 
0.5. And a major critique of this method is it does not address the quality of predicted 
probabilities in that is there is no discrimination whether the predicted probability is 51 
percent or 99 percent. Thus, Chapter IV focuses on the assessment of binary choice 
models through alternative methods such as probability scores. In this chapter both the 
Brier Score and Yates Brier Score Decomposition were used. Results show that when 
important socio-demographic variables are omitted, scatter and minimum variance 
values are significantly reduced. An intuitive explanation for this change might lie in the 
variability reduction of the predicted probabilities. Also the removal of important socio-
demographic variables resulted in a weakened ability to sort between events that 
occurred and did not occur.  
Finally in Chapter V, the study estimated both censored AIDS and QUAIDS 
demand systems involving non-alcoholic beverages such as fruit juice, tea, coffee, 
carbonated soft drinks, bottled water and tea. The highlight of the study involved the 
usage of different estimation techniques that addressed censoring in demand systems. 
These include two-step estimation techniques such as the Heien and Wessells (1990) and 
Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) approaches, general maximum entropy and the Dong, Gould 
and Kaiser (2004a) methods. The study also included the use of ITSUR without 
adjustments for censoring as a means of acting as a base estimator relative to the other 
techniques. The results show that the estimated elasticities bear little difference with the 
estimates from past studies and most of the commodities in the non-alcoholic beverage 
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complex are net substitutes. Likewise across censoring techniques, variability of cross 
price elasticities was observed especially for those beverages that are highly censored 
such as tea, coffee and bottled water.  On the other hand when comparisons are made 
across model types, compensated price elasticities especially the own price elasticities 
were remarkably very similar. Also compensated cross price estimates from the 
unrestricted AIDS and QUAIDS models were relatively greater compared to the 
restricted cases, but the reverse is true with regards to the compensated own price 
elasticities.  
From a marketing standpoint, the implications for organic milk are clear, that the 
results of the dissertation particularly those of Chapters II and III imply crucial inputs in 
terms of  designing marketing strategies that can target demographic groups such as 
single person, college educated head, Hispanic households. However, since the data 
were compiled from a 2004 data set, a more updated database might provide richer 
insights as to whether significant changes have occurred with regards to organic milk 
preference.  
In terms of methodological implications, the chapter on Brier score provides 
valuable insights in using alternative techniques such as the Yates partition in 
complementing the use of prediction-success tables. More importantly, binary choice 
specifications that omit important drivers may achieve some noise reduction but at the 
cost of weakening the ability of models to sort alternative events. And finally, since 
many censored data sets do not have the luxury of very high sample sizes, a future area 
of research might be determining robustness through simulation of different levels of 
  
178 
sample sizes and its effect on the estimated elasticities in a censored demand system 
framework. Also one can simulate alternative error term specifications and determine 
whether robustness still holds in all of the considered techniques that address censored 
demand systems.    
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